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Minister’s foreword
Tasmania is exposed to a range of natural hazards, which can lead to significant 
consequences for the Tasmanian community.
In 2013, Tasmania experienced one of the worst bushfire seasons in almost 50 years 
with properties, businesses and infrastructure destroyed in several communities. 
In 2016, the Tasmania Fire Service and partner agencies undertook a 60 day bushfire campaign involving thousands 
of emergency services personnel including volunteers, public servants, business employees, and community 
members. Over 1,000 personnel were deployed from numerous States, Territories, and New Zealand. At the same 
time, the State Emergency Service also responded to state-wide flash flooding and storm damage events. 
These events reinforce the need for a Tasmanian community-based state-level risk assessment, which can inform 
emergency services and emergency management partners in making decisions to prepare for and mitigate against 
the impacts of natural disasters and encourage other stakeholders to do the same.
The National Strategy for Disaster Resilience promotes the importance of continuing to develop community resilience 
to better withstand the effects of natural disasters. Under this strategy, it is recognised that a disaster resilient 
community is one that works together to understand and manage the risks that it confronts, and that disaster 
resilience is the collective responsibility of all sectors of society, including all levels of government, business, the non-
government sector and individuals. 
The 2016 Tasmanian State Natural Disaster Risk Assessment contributes to enabling disaster resilience by providing 
information on state-level risks posed by a range of priority natural hazards. This revision of the Tasmanian State 
Natural Disaster Risk Assessment includes emerging risks associated with climate change, such as heatwave and 
coastal inundation. 
The University of Tasmania, Antarctic Climate and Ecosystems Cooperative Research Centre and RMIT University 
project team facilitated the participation of Tasmanian Government agencies and other organisations including the 
Australian Red Cross, Engineers Australia, the Bureau of Meteorology, and private businesses in the development of 
the 2016 Tasmanian State Natural Disaster Risk Assessment. This approach of working together to understand risk is a 
positive indicator of the Tasmanian community’s disaster resilience.
I thank all stakeholders for their contribution to the 2016 Tasmanian State Natural Disaster Risk Assessment, and their 
continued commitment towards improving the Tasmanian community’s disaster resilience. 
I encourage all organisations with a role in emergency management to consider this valuable report and utilise it to 
inform the management of risks applicable to their interests and responsibilities. 
 
The Hon Rene Hidding, MP 
Minister for Police, Fire and Emergency Management
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Executive summary
This report will help the Tasmanian community be better prepared for, respond to and recover from natural 
disasters through an updated understanding and awareness of the natural hazards that have the most potential to 
impact the State. 
The information contained in this report, including the risk register and risk treatment options together with the 
accompanying all hazard summary report, can be used by stakeholders and practitioners throughout the emergency 
management sector to inform emergency management planning. 
This report assesses the State level risks posed by Bushfire, Flood, Severe Storm, Landslide, Tsunami, Earthquake, 
Heatwave, Coastal Inundation and Pandemic Influenza. 
Bushfire remains the greatest aggregated risk to Tasmania. It is a ‘High’ or ‘Extreme’ risk across all sectors of society, 
often with catastrophic consequences expected every 30 years (i.e. ‘Unlikely’ likelihood). This likelihood is expected 
to become more frequent with climate change. 
Land-use planning and building systems are strong and effective controls for each of the hazards apart from 
Pandemic Influenza. Limiting future development and vulnerability in known ‘at risk’ areas is considered to be the 
most effectve way of protecting life and property while limiting future government liability. 
A ‘multi-hazards’ approach to exercises and business continuity planning within government was agreed to be an 
important treatment option, with hazard-specific training recommended for key incident management personnel 
(e.g. incident controllers) as well as formalising the arrangements to guide decision-makers in times of crisis to 
ensure rapid decision.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Background: TSNDRA 2012
There is an increasing focus on risk assessment being used to inform emergency management priorities, particularly 
in the area of natural disasters. The 2004 Council of Australian Governments (COAG) review of mitigation, 
relief and recovery arrangements identified eight key areas for improvement in current Australian emergency 
management arrangements:
• a lack of independent and comprehensive systematic natural disaster risk assessments, and natural 
disaster data and analysis
• a focus on response and reaction at the expense of prevention, mitigation and recovery of affected 
communities
• a lack of independent and comprehensive post-disaster assessments to identify lessons learnt,  
and opportunities for improvement
• uneven recognition of the important role local governments have to play in emergency management 
arrangements
• a lack of preparation for catastrophic disasters
• limited availability of flood insurance
• a tendency on the part of governments to introduce ad hoc special relief schemes which may  
lead to confusion, inequities and higher costs
• a lack of effective inter-governmental, and in some cases intra-governmental, machinery to support a 
coordinated national approach to disaster management.
In response to these findings and the report’s subsequent recommendations, a suite of national activities were 
commenced to address the identified issues, improve capability and build resilience to disasters. One of the first 
outputs relating to risk assessment was the National Risk Assessment Framework for Sudden Onset Hazards 
(2007), which identified a need to develop a consistent national approach to risk assessment, and consistent baseline 
information to support hazard risk assessments. This was followed by the development of the National Emergency 
Risk Assessment Guidelines (NERAG) in 2010, which produced a new methodology designed to improve the 
consistency and rigour of emergency risk assessments, increase the quality and comparability of information on risk 
and improve the national evidence base on emergency risks in Australia.
The push for greater collaboration and cooperation led to all states and territories signing the National Partnership 
Agreement (NPA) on Natural Disaster Resilience (2009)1. With the aim of building resilience to withstand natural 
disasters, under the NPA each Australian state and territory agreed to produce a state/territory-wide prioritised 
natural disaster risk assessment in accordance with the relevant Australian standards. 
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Risk is also a major theme within the National Strategy for Disaster Resilience, which was published in February 
20112 and promotes a focus on priority outcomes to build disaster-resilient communities across Australia. Warning 
that communities are becoming increasingly vulnerable in a climate which has the potential for more frequent 
and severe extreme weather events, the strategy outlines a range of risk-themed activities framed around better 
understanding and communicating the nature and extent of local disaster risks.
These activities led to the production of the 2012 Tasmanian State Natural Disaster Risk Assessment (TSNDRA)3, 
which provided a platform for informing risk reduction and mitigation priorities across the Tasmanian emergency 
management sector.
1.2 The TSNDRA 2016 project
TSNDRA 2012 was one of a series of state/territory-wide assessments conducted following the publication of the 
first edition of the NERAG in 2010. Development of these risk assessments – as well as the NERAG guidelines 
that underpinned them – was iterative, with assessments such as TSNDRA 2012 building on the learnings and 
approaches applied in other states, some of which pre-dated the formalisation of national guidelines (the State of 
Victoria, for example, developed an emergency risk assessment framework that was applied in 2008, before release 
of the ISO 31000:2009 standard)4. The 2012 Tasmanian assessment process, completed in 2012, was one of the first 
to fully follow the NERAG guidelines, with others updating earlier approaches to fit the new national framework5, 
with variable levels of compliance6. A timeline of the national NERAG development process is shown in Figure 1.1, 
which provides the historical context for the TSNDRA 2016 project. 
Figure 1.1 Timeline of the development, implementation and review of the  
National Emergency Risk Assessment Guidelines.
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
NERAG
Published
COAG
Adoption
NSW NDRA WA NDRA ACT NDRA
TSNDRA 
15/16
NT NDRA
VIC NDRA
SA NDRA
QLD NDRA
TAS NDRA
NERAG Review
NERAG 2.0 Drafted  
(2015 release)
Revision  
Deadline 2017
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All Australian states and territories are now required to complete revised assessments under the new NERAG 
2015 guidelines before the national deadline of June 2017. The TSNDRA 2016 revision project, funded through 
the State Emergency Management Program (SEMP) and led by the University of Tasmania in partnership with the 
Antarctic Climate and Ecosystems Cooperative Research Centre (ACE CRC) and RMIT University, is one of the 
first such projects to be initiated. It is expected that all state-level revised assessments will have a much higher level 
of consistency with the NERAG 2015 methodology (due to an extensive state-level consultation process), allowing 
greater comparability between state reports, risk matrices and treatment plans. As such, the first stage of this 
project was to review and re-calibrate the findings of TSNDRA 2012 in order to assess their compatibility with the 
new national guidelines, as well as their currency in light of changes to the Tasmanian context, before reassessing the 
priority hazards following NERAG 2015. The project program, designed at the outset of the project, is set out in 
Figure 1.2.
Figure 1.2 TSNDRA 2016 indicative project structure and timeline.
July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar.
Scope 
Report
Review  
Hazard Data
Workshop
Analysis
Circulate  
Summary  
Reports for 
Feedback
Draft 
TSNDRA 
15–16 Risk 
Analysis 
Component
Circulate 
Workshop 
Report for 
Feedback
Formatting, 
Editing & 
Peer-Review
Draft TSNDRA 15–16  
Risk Evaluation & Treatment 
Components
Develop Hazard-Specific  
Factsheets
Formatting, Editing  
& Peer-Review
Circulate  
Hazard  
Scenarios
Summarise  
Controls  
& Treatment  
Changes
Controls  
Survey
Hazard  
Workshops:
• Bushfire
• Flood
• Storm
• Earthquake
• Tsunami
• Landslip
• Heatwave
• Coastal
Findings 
Feedback, 
Evaluation, 
Priorities & 
Treatment 
Workshop
Present 
Draft to 
SEMC
Launch 
TSNDRA 
15–16 
Report
Deliver 
TSNDRA 
15–16
Deliver  
TSNDRA  
15–16 Factsheets
Pandemic Workshop
Treatment Survey
Deliverable Workshop/Presentation Survey Project Component
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1.3 Aims and objectives of TSNDRA 2016
TSNDRA 2016 aims to provide a review of TSNDRA 2012 and update the understanding and awareness of natural 
hazard risks affecting Tasmania.
The purpose of the TSNDRA is to provide a basis to inform decision-making across the Tasmanian emergency 
management sector, particularly in respect to the prioritisation of risk management activities. Through delivery and 
use of its outputs, the TSNDRA project aims to achieve the following outcomes:
• a better understanding of the State’s emergency risk profile
• improved prioritisation of resources
• improved understanding of emergency risk issues
• improved prioritisation of hazard information collection
• increased transparency and understanding of risk assessment processes
• the ability to undertake a meaningful comparison of risk across different geographical areas and/or 
hazard classes.
The objective of TSNDRA 2016 is:
“To produce a statewide priority natural hazard risk assessment, in accordance with the relevant International and 
Australian standards” 
In addition to complying with relevant standards, TSNDRA 2016 also adopts the methodology as detailed in the 
National Emergency Risk Assessment Guidelines 2015 (referred to hereafter as the NERAG 2015)7. The relevant 
risk management standards were identified as:
• AS/NZS ISO 31000:2009 Risk Management – Principles and Guidelines
• ISO 31010:2009 Risk Management – Risk Assessment Techniques
• ISO Guide 73:2009 Risk Management – Vocabulary
1.4 Scope
The TSNDRA 2016 methodology (see Section 2) has been developed using a re-calibration of the TSNDRA 2012 
methodology, as well as using the relevant national guidelines and standards, but with appropriate modifications to 
enable an assessment of emergency risks in a ‘state level’ context. In light of its national drivers, the TSNDRA has 
focused on a consideration of risks from disaster events arising from identified priority natural hazards. 
For the purpose of the assessment, an emergency-related risk means:
“A risk, which, if realised, would result in an emergency with implications at a state level”
To this end, the methodology is based on analysis of large-scale event scenarios, with impacts measurable at a state 
level. The cumulative impact of frequent smaller-scale emergencies is difficult to capture using this definition, but is 
noted as an emerging issue for the State and may be more appropriately captured with regional or municipality  
level assessments.
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Given the availability of data, the unpredictability of natural disasters and the overall context of the assessment, 
detailed risk analysis is not feasible. Accordingly, the TSNDRA should be considered a baseline, statewide screening 
assessment. This method provides an improved understanding of Tasmania’s emergency risk profile, i.e. the picture 
of emergency-related risk that Tasmania faces, including information about the key controls currently in use and 
guidance for future investment in prevention and mitigation and preparedness. The results are intended to provide 
valuable information to aid emergency response planning, in a state level context, thus providing a tool for risk-
based strategic planning.
1.5 Audience
Given its state-level scope and context, the principal audience for the TSNDRA is the State Emergency 
Management Committee (SEMC). As the key emergency management decision-making body in Tasmania,  
with responsibility for determining priorities at the state level, the SEMC is also the nominated business owner  
of the TSNDRA outputs.
Other key stakeholders include hazard management authorities, agencies, individuals and organisations with 
defined emergency management responsibilities across Tasmania, and the wider national emergency management 
community. 
In recognition of the important role that risk awareness plays in building disaster-resilient communities, a separate 
summary TSNDRA document has also been prepared for the purpose of educating the broader Tasmanian 
community about state-level risks. 
1.6 Updating Tasmania’s priority hazards
TSNDRA 2012 determined that Bushfire, Flood, Severe Storm, Landslide, Tsunami and Earthquake were natural 
hazards that posed a threat to Tasmania. TSNDRA 2016 broadened this scope to include the additional priority 
hazards of Heatwave, Coastal Inundation and Pandemic Influenza. 
Of these, Bushfire, Flood and Severe Storm were recognised in TSNDRA 2012 as being the hazards with the 
greatest economic impact to Tasmania, with agencies specifically dedicated to managing the prevention and 
mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery (PPRR) activities of these hazards on an operational basis. 
Of the geological hazards, while instrumentally recorded seismicity is low in Tasmania, there have been some 
previous earthquake events that have caused impact, and there are areas of land within the State that have 
been identified as susceptible to earthquake, such as the Lake Edgar fault in southern Tasmania. Tasmania is 
also considered prone to landslides, with several active, slow-moving landslides presently being monitored by 
Department of State Growth’s (DSG) Mineral Resources Tasmania (MRT). Records indicate that more than  
150 buildings have been destroyed by landslide in Tasmania since the 1950s. Further to this, recent work by MRT  
has identified many areas across the State at risk from debris flow, including highly frequented, populated centres. 
Coastal hazards (referred to hereafter as Coastal Inundation) were considered a secondary priority for assessment 
in TSNDRA 2012. However, due to the potential implications of future climate change scenarios combined with 
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consensus during the initial stakeholder workshop, Coastal Inundation was included in TSNDRA 2016 assessment  
to complete the Tasmanian Emergency Management Plan (TEMP)8 priority list of natural hazards. 
While the category of coastal hazards comprises emergencies arising from both Tsunami and Storm Surge, it is 
noted that while areas of exposure are similar, these events tend to have different sources, triggers, frequencies, 
magnitudes of consequences and management controls. Thus, Tsunami and Coastal Inundation are assessed 
separately as distinct priority hazards. As sea levels rise in response to global climate change, coastal inundation will 
emerge as a natural hazard with greater impact on Tasmanian communities. Therefore, coastal inundation  
was considered explicitly as a separate hazard in TSNDRA 2016. 
Heatwave has been identified as the most dangerous natural hazard in Australia, causing more deaths than all  
the other natural hazards combined9. It was determined during the initial stakeholder workshop that inclusion  
in TSNDRA 2016 was necessary.
Pandemic influenza was recommended by the 2012 report to be included in future iterations. It is a naturally-
occurring hazard with two important differences:
1. Most natural hazards affect a defined, often localised area, whereas a pandemic affects a large area, 
with global impact. 
2. Most natural hazards have relatively short emergency response phases followed by potentially lengthy 
recovery periods, whereas pandemic influenza may have a protracted response phase, with illness 
potentially hitting communities in waves for up to four-to-six months until a pandemic vaccine is 
developed and widely available. 
It has been established that pandemic influenza is an ongoing significant risk globally, and represents a significant risk 
to Australia, including Tasmania. It has the potential to cause high levels of morbidity and mortality and to disrupt 
our community socially and economically10. Therefore, it was deemed important to be included as a hazard within 
TSNDRA 2016.
A definition of each identified priority hazard is presented in Table 1.1. 
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Table 1.1 Working definitions of the natural hazards considered during the 
TSNDRA process.
Priority Hazards Definition
Bushfire For the purpose of the TSNDRA, a bushfire includes any fire in ‘vegetation’, 
regardless of origin or cause.
Coastal Inundation A rapid rise in coastal sea level, including: storm surge; abnormally high 
spring tides; or their co-occurrence. 
Earthquake An earthquake is shaking and vibration at the surface of the Earth caused 
by underground movement along a fault plane or by volcanic activity11.
Flood Flooding is a general and temporary condition of partial or complete 
inundation of normally dry land area. This inundation is caused by the 
overflow of inland waters from the unusual and rapid accumulation or 
runoff of surface waters from any source12.
Heatwave A period of unusually high atmospheric temperatures for a region for a 
period greater than 48 hrs (simplified from Nairn & Fawcett 2013)13.
Landslide A movement of rock, debris or earth down a slope. Rapid onset landslide 
events are the focus of this study.
Pandemic Influenza A pandemic is a disease outbreak that affects a large proportion of the 
world. Influenza pandemics are unpredictable but recurring events that 
occur when an influenza virus emerges with the ability to cause sustained 
human-to-human transmission, and the human population has little to no 
immunity against the virus14.
Severe Storm A storm is an atmospheric disturbance characterised by strong winds and 
heavy rain. To fit the criteria of a severe storm (or thunderstorm), a storm 
must produce either: a tornado; hail of a diameter >2 cm; wind gusts of 
≥90 km/h; or very heavy rain that is likely to lead to flash flooding15.
Tsunami A tsunami is a series of ocean waves with very long wavelengths caused 
by large-scale disturbances of the ocean such as: earthquake; landslide; 
volcanic eruption; explosion or meteorite16.
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1.7 Risk assessment objectives and the organisation
An important step in both ISO 31000:2009 and the NERAG 2015 is the need to define and understand the 
nature of the ‘organisation’ – being the entity whose risk is to be managed. In the emergency management context, 
governments have specific roles, responsibilities and resources that promote the safety of the community and its 
assets. The external context includes people, industry, the economy and the built and natural environment.
In the TSNDRA methodology, the external context is Tasmania as a part of the Commonwealth of Australia, and 
the organisation is the public sector operating in Tasmania, including the Commonwealth and state governments, 
government departments, agencies and local government. The basis for this is that governments have considerable 
but not total responsibility to manage risks within their jurisdiction.
The definition of risk in the ISO 31000 is the ‘effect of uncertainty on objectives’. It is therefore relevant to define 
the objectives of the organisation, i.e. the public sector in Tasmania. Public sector objectives are not necessarily 
articulated in a way that can be related directly to an emergency risk assessment; however, some guidance can be 
provided by the strategic outcomes of the National Strategy for Disaster Resilience 2011 (NSDR 2011)2. The NSDR 
2011 has four target outcomes: 
1. Encourage the development of communities that function well under stress. 
2. Support communities in efforts for successful adaptation to challenges. 
3. Facilitate the progression towards communities that are self-reliant. 
4. Ensure communities have the capacity to prevent, prepare, mitigate, respond and recover where 
appropriate to hazards and risks. 
To help provide governance to achieve these outcomes, the Tasmania State Emergency Management Committee 
has developed four strategic directions, defined in the Strategic Directions Framework17. These four strategic 
directions are: 
1. Understanding and managing risks.
2. Recovery and building resilience.
3. Ensuring capability and capacity.
4. Developing collaborative leadership.
TSNDRA 2016 fits with the first strategic direction, Understanding and managing risks, and informs the other three. 
As such, they provide a logical reference point upon which to frame the risk assessment. 
Disasters and emergencies can have an effect on progress towards these goals/objectives. Given the inherent 
uncertainty in the location, timing, severity and impacts of hazards, the role of risk assessment is to reduce 
uncertainty through identification of the characteristics of the risk by bringing together the best information and 
judgement, and using that to design appropriate strategies to lessen the likelihood of the consequences occurring.
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Image: Tasmania State Emergency Service
2 Methods
2.1 Re-calibrating the 2012 Risk Assessment
The risks posed by six priority natural hazards: Bushfire, Flood, Storm, Landslide, Tsunami, and Earthquake,  
were assessed in TSNDRA 2012. 
Worst-case scenarios were developed for each of these hazard areas (in some cases split into multiple categories 
due to divergence in characterisation or location). A visualisation of the TSNDRA 2012 results is reproduced  
in Figure 2.1. 
Figure 2.1 TSNDRA 2012 summary of all hazards across all sectors. 
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Under the revised NERAG 2016, likelihood levels, consequence levels, and the overall risk matrix classifications have 
all been modified. A summary of the associated methodological changes is provided below:
• The likelihood level of ‘Almost Incredible’ that was included in the 2010 approach has been 
removed, with no modification to the frequency of other likelihood classifications. The level of 
‘Possible’ has also been removed, however, meaning that the frequencies associated with ‘Possible’, 
‘Unlikely’ and ‘Rare’ are now associated with ‘Unlikely’, ‘Rare’ and a new category of ‘Extremely  
Rare’ respectively.
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• Although the thresholds for likelihood classification have not changed, the descriptors for each 
are now based upon ‘Annual Exceedance Probability’ (AEP), ranging from a scenario being ‘Almost 
Certain’ (AEP of 63% per year or more) to ‘Extremely Rare’ (AEP of 0.001-0.01% per year).
• The consequence levels have not changed; however, the underlying thresholds and sectoral 
categories have changed significantly with ‘Infrastructure’ being removed, definitional changes to 
‘People’ in relation to health, and extensive changes to the criteria for Environmental impacts.
• The risk matrix categories now include a ‘Very Low’ classification, with an upgrading of the risk 
classification of a number of Major/Catastrophic Consequence, Very Rare/Extremely Rare Likelihood 
events (see Figure 2.2).
• Methods for assessing confidence in each scenario’s assessment have been modified, with two 
new levels of confidence classification being added, more extensive descriptors of thresholds 
being included, and a directive to consider confidence in both scenario likelihood and scenario 
consequence.
• Assessment of controls no longer includes the ‘Bow-tie Diagram’ assessment method, with a 
simplified matrix approach being used to qualitatively assess controls or control groups on a risk-by-
risk basis.
• Risk prioritisation now differentiates priority on the basis of the five confidence levels previously 
mentioned, with an additional decision point included for consideration after the development 
of a comprehensive risk register with the aim of determining whether research to further improve 
confidence is needed.
• Risk prioritisation and the decision-tree described above replace the risk tolerability section of the 
2010 NERAG, as well as any reference to the As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) principle 
and associated pyramid diagram.
To ensure the TSNDRA 2016 results are comparable with the findings of the 2012 assessment, the latter had to 
be re-calibrated to the new classification system (see Figure 2.2) in order that the effects of new controls, risk 
treatments and environmental/contextual conditions can be observed over the intervening period. 
On the basis of the methodological changes above, a re-calibration of TSNDRA 2012 was conducted as part of a 
cross-jurisdictional exercise by the National Risk Assessment Working Group (the consolidated output from which 
was submitted to the Australia-New Zealand Emergency Management Committee (ANZEMC) in March 2015, and 
the Law, Crime and Community Safety Council in May 2015). It is noted that this process was undertaken without 
stakeholder consultation or consideration of changes to context, controls, improved data, or subsequent risk 
treatment, and therefore does not constitute a review as set out under the NERAG. Rather, it adjusts the measures 
that were used to determine risk, under the contextual and control assumptions operating in 2012, allowing dynamic 
comparison of Tasmanian state-level risk over time under the NERAG 2015 methodology.
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Figure 2.2 Demonstration of the changes to the risk matrix as defined in NERAG 20157.
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It was also noted that where multiple consequence levels existed for a scenario (for example, with ‘People’ and 
‘Public Administration’ consequences falling into different categories), this was not expressed in the risk matrix. The 
project team identified a new, nuanced approach to visualise the range of possible consequences in TSNDRA 2016, 
including the previous distributions in TSNDRA 2012.
2016 Tasmanian State Natural Disaster Risk Assessment / Section Two / Methods 13 
Section Two Methods
Figure 2.3 Presentation of how the 2012 results have shifted based on changes in 
methodology under NERAG 20157. 
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The basis of the changes observed in Figure 2.3 are summarised below:
2.1.1 Bushfire: Both the economic and social consequences for the 2012 bushfire scenario increased under the 
new guidelines; however, this had no impact on the overall consequence assessment (‘Catastrophic’, on the 
basis of consequences for people). Likelihoods did not change other than by classification name; however, 
due to changes in the risk matrix, the bushfire hazard scenario from TSNDRA 2012 is classified as ‘Extreme’ 
under NERAG 2015 (an increase from ‘High’ under NERAG 2010). 
2.1.2 Riverine Flooding: Due to changes to the assessment of economic and environmental consequences, as well 
as the removal of the ‘Infrastructure’ consequence category, the expected consequence of riverine flooding 
has decreased, with no change to its likelihood under the new NERAG classifications. Although its position in 
the risk matrix has changed, due to the altered category ratings (see Figure 2.3), the overall risk level of ‘High’ 
remains the same as in 2012.
2.1.3 Severe Storm: Classification of the severe storm scenario in terms of the environmental and social setting 
categories has decreased from ‘Minor’ to ‘Insignificant’, resulting in the hazard’s overall classification falling 
to ‘Minor’. With no change to likelihood, this reduced the position of severe storm in the risk matrix to the 
‘Medium’ risk category.
2.1.4 Landslide: Although the individual landslide scenarios shown in Figure 2.1 were not included in the TSNDRA 
2012 assessment, the notable changes to the landslide risk profile under the new NERAG system are due to a 
reduction in the economic consequence classification of a Debris flow scenario from ‘Catastrophic’ to ‘Major’. 
However, the overall risk classification for landslide as ‘High’ remains due to modifications to the risk matrix, 
as shown in Figure 2.3.
2.1.5 Earthquake: Although TSNDRA 2012 states that the overall consequence of a major dam-failure earthquake 
scenario is ‘Moderate’, this was believed to be in error (i.e. too low) due to the classification of economic 
consequences as ‘Catastrophic’ and associated text (p. 49) to this effect. However, under the new NERAG 
guidelines, this same consequence category would now be considered to result in ‘Major’ consequences only, 
reducing the overall classification of the worst-case earthquake scenario. Due to associated modification to 
the risk matrix, the overall classification of earthquake risk remains ‘High’, the same as in 2012.
2.1.6 Tsunami: The only significant change to the tsunami scenario profile is a reduction in environmental 
consequence categorisation from ‘Minor’ to ‘Insignificant’, with no change to the ‘Medium’ risk classification 
for the hazard.
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2.2 Updating the Tasmanian risk context
The outcomes of the re-calibration exercise allowed for the analysis of the changes to Tasmania’s risk profile over 
time, which is a product of:
• improved knowledge of the likelihood or consequence of a hazard scenario (for example, as shown 
in Figure 2.4, a reduction in the uncertainty regarding Hazard A could either increase or decrease its 
expected consequences)
• changed socio-economic or environmental conditions, such as the expected increased 
frequency of extreme heat events due to anthropogenic climate change
• implementation of risk treatments or controls that reduce the likelihood or consequence of the 
hazard scenario occurring.
As shown in Figure 2.4, changes to the local context and hazard profile can also elevate additional hazards to  
a priority hazard level by increasing their likelihood or consequence such that they justify the implementation  
of state-level risk management controls. Heatwave is one such hazard, recently recognised as having significant 
impacts on ambulance call-outs and morbidity in Tasmania, and is discussed further below.
Figure 2.4 Example of how new controls, improved knowledge or changing vulnerability 
can impact on the position of a hazard in the Consequence-Likelihood space.
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The initial workshop had three primary objectives: 
1. To establish a representative expert stakeholder group for the project and familiarise them  
with both TSNDRA 2012, as well as the TSNDRA 2016 process. 
2. To confirm the project approach, scope and contextual assessment (in particular, the hazards  
included for assessment, and the new consequence classification structure). 
3. To promote engagement and ownership of the process by end-users. 
2.3 Scope: defining natural hazards
As identified in TSNDRA 2012, natural disasters are defined by COAG as being: 
“...caused by the impact of a naturally-occurring rapid onset event that threatens or causes death, injury or 
damage to property or the environment and which requires significant and coordinated multi-agency and 
community response”`
However, the NERAG guidelines are applicable to both natural and human-induced hazards / disasters, some of 
which sit across these two categories without clear classification in either academic or emergency management 
literature. Notably, the Victorian Government State Emergency Risk Assessment Report5 did not differentiate 
between natural and human-induced hazard categories, including major incidents such as mine failure, electricity 
supply disruption and hazardous materials spill in the scope of their state-level risk assessment report. It was also 
noted during the workshop presentation by the 2012 report’s author Doug Rossiter that the 2012 approach was 
initially intended to cover all emergency management areas, but was subsequently scoped down to priority natural 
hazards only. 
The TEMP sets out 31 state-level priority hazards on the basis of management authority. From this the project team 
– in consultation with Tasmania State Emergency Service (SES) staff – were able to categorise 20 priority hazards 
(fires in national parks and state forests, for example, are classified separately under the TEMP due to response 
requirements), of both natural and human-induced origin. As set out in Figure 2.5, those hazards of natural origin 
formed the basis of the 2012 report, with the exception of Heatwave and Coastal Erosion/Inundation which are 
new additions to the TSNDRA. 
Figure 2.5 provided the basis for breakout group discussions in the initial workshop, which centred upon the two 
natural hazards not included in the previous assessment (Coastal Erosion/Inundation and Heatwave), as well as the 
two ‘grey area’ hazards: Pandemic and Biosecurity. It was also noted that the project team expertise centred upon 
natural hazards only (the scope set out in the initial project proposal), with resource implications likely limiting the 
more extensive analysis of ‘new’ hazard areas to 1 or 2 of the four identified.
It was agreed by each group that the natural hazards that were included in 2012 remained priorities and should be 
re-assessed, while heatwaves were also noted to be an emerging risk and high priority for the State, and should be 
included in TSNDRA 2016. The group rationale for this inclusion can be summarised as:
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• Recent research (since 2012) has identified heatwave as placing a high load on the health  
system (as described by the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) including 
Ambulance Tasmania).
• Heatwaves have recently been defined at a Federal level as a rapid onset natural hazard with  
clear parameters (Extreme Heat Factor Days).
• The current project team has improved capacity and expertise to assess heatwaves as a hazard.
Coastal inundation was agreed to be a better definition than the previously-used separate hazard titles of coastal 
erosion and tidal surge events. There was consensus that it should be included in TSNDRA 2016 to complete the 
TEMP priority list of natural hazards, particularly as the project team has internal capacity and expertise in this area. 
Pandemic influenza was agreed to be a priority hazard, noting that influenza is the most likely cause of pandemics 
and the focus of global pandemic preparedness. It was also acknowledged that the range of forms of pandemics 
would require a variety of different scenarios to properly assess the different controls, consequences and likelihoods 
of such events occurring. It was flagged that as the TSNDRA project team lacked expertise in this area, assessment 
would require support, including access to data, from the health sector. DHHS subsequently committed to  
this arrangement. 
Given the very different nature of pandemic influenza to other hazards, assessment was undertaken as a parallel 
project by DHHS, with coordination and guidance by the TSNDRA project team to ensure consistency with other 
components of the review and the NERAG.
Figure 2.5 Conceptual diagram of natural and human induced hazards. 
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2.4 NERAG 2015 revised state-level  
consequence scale
Under the NERAG 2015, developing consensus on the thresholds for consequence categories (from catastrophic  
to insignificant) is a prerequisite step prior to development of hazard scenarios and the conduct of hazard 
workshops. Although under NERAG 2015 these categories are pre-defined, there is some scope to adjust these  
to suit individual state contexts, although it was acknowledged that any changes reduce comparability between 
states. These consequence categories have been defined under the NERAG 2015 and are described in full in  
Tables 2.1-2.5. Below is a brief description of each category as they are referred to throughout TSNDRA 2016:
1. People 
1.1 People – Death: The number of deaths expected as a direct consequence of the hazard.  
1.2 People – Injury: The number of injuries or illnesses expected as a direct consequence  
 of the hazard. 
2. Economic 
a. Economic – General: The loss in economic activity and/or asset value as a direct    
 consequence of the hazard.  
b. Economic – Industry: The economic impact on important industries to the State as a direct   
 consequence of the hazard.
3. Environmental 
3.1  Environment – Species: The loss of ecosystems or species from a region as a direct    
 consequence of the hazard. 
3.2  Environment – Value: The loss of environmental values of interest as a direct consequence   
 of the hazard.
4. Public Administration 
4.1 Public Administration: The decreased capacity of governing bodies and utilities to deliver   
 core functions as a direct consequence of the hazard. 
5. Social Setting 
5.1  Social – Community Wellbeing: The decreased capacity of a community to function  
 as normal without the need for alternative arrangements as a direct consequence of the hazard. 
5.2 Social – Cultural Significance: The loss of culturally significant objects, or the interruption of   
 cultural events as a direct consequence of the hazard.
It is important to mention that secondary impacts of an event were explicitly excluded from the assessment  
process (e.g. a death due to complications after a victim’s initial admission to hospital; deaths due to contaminated 
water following a flood). This is especially important in relation to the interpretation of results for heatwave and 
pandemic influenza.
 Tables 2.1-2.5 summarise the new consequence categories by impact sector as defined by NERAG 2015i, with the 
value used in practice throughout the process in parentheses where applicable. 
i.  AS/NZS ISO 31000:2009 – Reproduced under SAI Global copyright Licence 1411-c083
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Table 2.1 Consequence categories for ‘People’ sector as defined by NERAG 20157.
People – Death People – Injury or illness
Catastrophic Deaths directly from 
emergency > 1 in 10,000 
people (>50 people)
Critical injuries with long-term or permanent incapacitation 
> 1 in 10,000 people (>50 people)
Major Deaths directly from 
emergency > 1 in 100,000 
people (>5 people)
Critical injuries with long-term or permanent incapacitation 
> 1 in 100,000 people (>5 people) – OR – Serious injuries 
> 1 in 10,000 people (>50 people)
Moderate Deaths directly from 
emergency > 1 in 1,000,000 
people (>0.5 people)
Critical injuries with long-term or permanent incapacitation 
> 1 in 1,00,000 people (>0.5 people) – OR – Serious 
injuries > 1 in 10,000 people (>5 people)
Minor Deaths directly from 
emergency > 1 in 10,000,000 
people (>0.05 people)
Critical injuries with long-term or permanent incapacitation 
> 1 in 100,000 people (>0.05 people) – OR – Serious 
injuries > 1 in 10,000 people (>0.5 people)
Insignificant Deaths directly from 
emergency > 1 in 100,000,000 
people (>0.005 people)
Critical injuries with long-term or permanent incapacitation 
> 1 in 100,000 people (>0.005 people) – OR – Serious 
injuries > 1 in 10,000 people (>0.5 people)
Table 2.2 Consequence categories for the ‘Economic’ sector as defined by 
NERAG 20157.
Economic activity/value Economic impact on an important industry
Catastrophic Economic decline and/or loss of asset 
value greater than 4% GSP (~$1b)
Failure of a significant industry or sector as a direct 
result of the emergency event
Major Economic decline and/or loss of asset 
value greater than 4% GSP (~$100m)
Significant structure adjustment required by an 
identified industry to respond and recover from  
the emergency event
Moderate Economic decline and/or loss of asset 
value greater than 4% GSP (~$10m)
Significant industry or business sector impacts  
resulting in medium term (>1 year), directly  
attributable profit reductions
Minor Economic decline and/or loss of asset 
value greater than 4% GSP (~$1m)
Significant industry or business sector impacts  
resulting in medium term (<1 year), directly  
attributable profit reductions
Insignificant Economic decline and/or loss of asset 
value greater than 4% GSP (~$100k)
Inconsequential business sector disruption due  
to emergency event
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Table 2.3 Consequence categories for the ‘Environment’ sector as defined by 
NERAG 20157. 
Loss of species/landscape Loss of value
Catastrophic Permanent destruction of nationally-significant and recognised 
ecosystems or species
Permanent destruction  
of environmental values  
of interest
Major Severe damage/loss of nationally-significant and recognised 
ecosystems or species – OR – state-level permanent destruction
Severe damage to 
environmental values  
of interest
Moderate Significant loss/impairment of nationally-significant and recognised 
ecosystems or species – OR – state-level severe damage – OR – 
regional-level permanent destruction
Significant damage to 
environmental values  
of interest
Minor Significant loss/impairment of significant state-level ecosystems  
or species – OR – regional-level minor damage
Minor damage to 
environmental values  
of interest
Insignificant Minor damage to an ecosystem or species recognised at the local 
or regional scale
Inconsequential impact  
on environmental values 
of interest
Table 2.4 Consequence categories for the ‘Public Administration’ sector as 
defined by NERAG 20157.
Public Administration (one category only)
Catastrophic Governing bodies are unable to deliver their core functions
Major Governing bodies encounter severe reduction in the delivery of core functions – OR – 
Governing bodies are required to divert a significant amount of available resources to deliver 
core functions or seek external assistance to deliver the majority of core functions 
Moderate Governing bodies encounter significant reduction in the delivery of core functions – OR – 
Governing bodies are required to divert some available resources to deliver core functions  
or seek external assistance to deliver some core functions 
Minor Governing bodies encounter limited reduction in delivery of core functions
Insignificant Governing bodies’ delivery of core functions is unaffected or within normal parameters
2016 Tasmanian State Natural Disaster Risk Assessment / Section Two / Methods 21 
Section Two Methods
Table 2.5 Consequence categories for the ‘Social Setting’ sector as defined by 
NERAG 20157.
Loss of community wellbeing Loss of cultural significance
Catastrophic Community connectedness is irreparably 
broken, community function is lost  
and/or disperses
Widespread permanent loss of culturally significant 
objects – OR – Permanent cancellation of a major 
culturally important activity or event
Major Community connectedness is significantly 
broken, extraordinary external resourcing 
required, significant permanent dispersal
Widespread damage or localised permanent loss 
of culturally significant objects – OR – Temporary 
cancellation/significant-delay of a major culturally 
important activity or event
Moderate Community connectedness is broken, 
significant external resourcing required, 
some permanent dispersal
Some damage or localised widespread damage  
to culturally significant objects – OR – Some delay 
or reduced scope of a major culturally important 
activity or event
Minor Community connectedness is damaged, 
some external resourcing required,  
no permanent dispersal
Damage to culturally significant objects – OR – 
Delay of a major culturally important activity  
or event
Insignificant The community of interest’s social 
connectedness is disrupted such that the 
re-prioritisation of existing resources is 
required, no dispersal
Minor damage to culturally significant objects – 
OR – Minor delay of a major culturally important 
activity or event
In general, it was agreed that modification of the consequence scale to suit Tasmanian conditions would not  
be justified given the reduction in comparability with other states. However, the following issues were raised:
• The number of deaths per event was questioned due to Tasmania’s small population, i.e. minor 
events that result in deaths of 1-2 people can result in a moderate rating, which was questioned by 
some as too high. 
• The economic metric recommended in NERAG (gross state product; GSP) was questioned as a 
possibly inappropriate metric to use. Due to the small size of the Tasmanian economy, the trend of 
the GSP is quite erratic and the impact of a natural hazard on GSP may be indistinguishable from this 
noise. However, in order to maintain consistency between the states, these metrics were deemed 
adequate. It was decided that actual numbers would be used alongside the percentage values to 
allow conversion between different metrics in the future if required. 
• It was not clear how socio-psychological impacts were considered under the framework, and what 
datasets could be used to define community cohesion under Social Setting. In practice this was 
guided by expert anecdotal evidence. 
Subsequently, participants agreed that the NERAG consequence scale would not be modified in order to maximise 
the comparability of TSNDRA 2016 with other jurisdiction’s risk assessments, the previous TSNDRA 2012 report, 
and any future revisions. 
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2.5 Hazard-specific experts and stakeholder groups
Following on from the breakout discussions of both hazards and consequences, each group was also asked to 
identify who would be best suited as expert representatives for assessing each hazard’s probable consequences   
and the likelihood of these consequences occurring, beyond those immediately present in the room. This included: 
1) the key experts or expert organisations that related to each priority natural hazard (including the three ‘new’ 
priority hazard areas: heatwave, coastal inundation and pandemic influenza), and 2) organisations or individuals  
that would be familiar with or able to qualitatively consider the consequence categories in relation to these hazards. 
2.6 NERAG 2015 revised state-level likelihood scale
The NERAG process is designed to compare vastly different risks, with different triggers and spatial and temporal 
scales. The likelihood scale defined in NERAG 2015 is presented in Table 2.6ii.
Given that natural hazards are generally considered to be unpreventable, this is effectively an assessment of 
the effectiveness of the controls to reduce the consequences once an event has occurred. As such, likelihood 
is dependent on: 1) the likelihood that an event will occur, and 2) the likelihood those consequences will occur 
considering the strength/expediency of current controls. Such a system makes sense when investigating risks 
that are ‘Almost Certain’ (every year) or ‘Likely’ (every decade); however, given the logarithmic nature of the 
likelihood scales, a control needs to practically remove the consequences altogether to influence the magnitude 
of consequences of natural hazards with likelihoods less than once every 100 years. For example: if tsunamis are 
ranked as ‘Very Rare’, it is not possible for consequences to be ‘Rare’ and would need to reduce the likelihood from 
once every 1,000 years to once every 10,000 years to be effective and thus reduce the likelihood to ‘Extremely 
Rare’ (an unreasonable assumption in most cases); if bushfires are ‘Likely’, consequences cannot be ‘Almost Certain’, 
but they can be ‘Unlikely’ if controls are strong enough to reduce the likelihood of those expected consequences 
tenfold (which is reasonable). In many cases this made the assessment of likelihood straightforward. 
ii.  AS/NZS ISO 31000:2009 – Reproduced under SAI Global copyright Licence 1411-c083
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Table 2.6 Likelihood scale as defined in NERAG 20157.
Likelihood Level
Comparable likelihood measures
Annual 
Exceedance  
Probability (AEP)
Average  
Recurrence  
Interval (ARI)
Frequency
Almost Certain >63% per year ≤ 1 year Once or more per year
Likely 10-63% per year 1-10 years Once per 10 years
Unlikely 1-10% per year 11-100 years Once per 100 years
Rare 0.1-1% per year 100-1,000 years Once per 1,000 years
Very Rare 0.01-0.1% per year 1,000-10,000 years Once per 10,000 years
Extremely Rare 0.001-0.01% per year >10,000 years Once per 100,000 years
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2.7 NERAG 2015 revised state-level controls 
assessment matrix
As set out in NERAG 2015, controls include any process, policy, device or action that modifies risk. However, to 
ensure consistency with 2012, the same three control ‘categories’ were used: 1) Material/Physical Controls, 2) 
Procedural Controls, and 3) Behavioural Controls. Although some controls sit across multiple categories, it was 
explained to participants in each workshop that the objective was to use the categories to ensure a comprehensive 
consideration of control types, rather than allocate controls to a particular control group.
Methods for assessing the impact – or level – of existing controls, however, have been modified significantly under 
NERAG 2015, with the ‘Bow-Tie’ approach from the previous NERAG no longer included within the guidelines.  
The controls assessment approach (NERAG 2012:30) has also been replaced by a multi-criteria analysis method  
as shown in Table 2.7iii (adapted from NERAG 2015:53). The two new criteria used for control assessment were:
• Control Strength: referring to the ability of the control, or group of controls, to achieve  
its objective if it operates as intended and when required; and
• Control Expediency: referring to the ability of the control to be used/deployed readily  
and the control’s acceptability to stakeholders.
Table 2.7 Controls assessment matrix as defined by NERAG 20157.
Control Strength Control Expediency
Very Low Low Medium High
High Low Medium Medium High
Medium Low Medium Medium Medium
Low Very Low Low Medium Medium
Very Low Very Low Very Low Low Medium
iii.  AS/NZS ISO 31000:2009 – Reproduced under SAI Global copyright Licence 1411-c083
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2.8 Hazard specific workshops
The hazard specific workshops were held as mostly half-day workshops within a two week period. Two full-day 
workshops were dedicated to bushfire and heatwave. Bushfire was allocated more time as it was the highest 
priority hazard identified in the 2012 report. Heatwave – a new hazard to be assessed at part of the TSNDRA 
process – was expected to require more time to describe, identify and assess controls and consequences, as little 
research or information was available regarding heatwave impacts on Tasmania. The other seven hazards were  
held in half-day, related workshops (e.g. Landslide in the morning, Earthquake in the afternoon), to allow experts  
to dedicate the entire day if possible, while also providing flexibility to operational personnel. 
Each workshop consisted of four key stages: 1) initial collation of current controls; 2) confirmation and assessment  
of current controls; 3) scenario consequence rating; and 4) subsequent likelihood rating of those consequences 
on any given day (not in the instance of an event, i.e. residual risk). This process is represented in Figure 2.6, with 
further details presented in Appendix A: Methods. 
Figure 2.6 Flow diagram of the data collection process employed during the TSNDRA 
2016 process. 
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2.9 Averaging categorical values across multiple 
breakout groups
With multiple breakout groups, the potential to have differing results was introduced. Therefore, an average value 
for each ‘Consequence’, ‘Likelihood’ and ‘Confidence’ rating of each sub-sector was required from the values 
provided by the different working groups. 
To achieve this, as the NERAG categories are simplifications of a logarithmic continuous scale, it is still sensible to 
find an average between two different values of the same type. Therefore, the categorical values were converted 
to integers (1-5 or 1-6 where appropriate). It was quickly realised that different working groups had differing levels 
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of expertise, so a straight average between groups would be inappropriate to reflect the quality of the information 
collected by participants. Within the NERAG process, the ‘Confidence’ value is used to reflect either the level of 
knowledge about a hazard, or the level of expertise participants believe they have about a hazard. As such, each 
group’s ‘Confidence’ rating was applied as a weighting factor to achieve a weighted-averageiv. This vastly improved 
the overall ratings to better reflect the inputs provided by participants. 
However, this created another problem: how to ensure the weighted-average value is correctly interpreted back 
into the category rating? This may seem a simple problem but it requires specific attention to handle correctly, 
described in detail within Appendix A: Methods. 
2.10 Comparison between 2012 results and 2016 
results
The TSNDRA 2012 results were only reported as true categorical values for each sector (rather than sub-sectors) 
so, where applicable, the maximum risk level sub-sector for TSNDRA 2016 was used. As these values are all perfect 
categorical values, when added to a figure, many values directly overlay each other, impeding interpretation. For 
visualisation purposes, the exact locations of each symbol were slightly adjusted to improve user interpretation.  
As such, symbols inside the same matrix cell (e.g. ‘Major’ consequence, ‘Unlikely’ likelihood) should be interpreted as 
having exactly the same value (e.g. risk level of ‘High’). The 2012 values that cross the boundary between cells were 
rated as halfway between two categories (e.g. ‘Minor/Moderate’) and should still be interpreted as such. 
2.11 Development of the risk register
After summarising the results from the multiple work groups, the TSNDRA review team followed the process  
as described in NERAG 2015 to produce the TSNDRA 2016 risk register(s). 
2.12 Development of risk treatment options
With the risk registers for each hazard in hand, the risk treatment options were developed during a separate 
workshop. This workshop was held on a single day with a large number of participants, in three major sessions, 
namely two treatment-option development sessions and an overall feedback session. 
During the two breakout sessions, each breakout group developed treatment options based on the controls survey, 
comments and rationale (from controls, consequence and likelihood analysis stages) collected throughout the 
previous workshops. The priority ratings from the target hazard’s risk register were used to focus development  
of treatment options for the most at-risk sectors. A casual format allowed individuals to move between groups  
as required. 
iv.   It was recognised that this may be flawed, as some experts were aware of low confidence due to a lack of evidence,  
 or because the mechanisms surrounding the hazard are highly complex introducing uncertainty, rather than a lack of  
 personal knowledge. This was identified as a major limitation of the NERAG process in its current form.
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3 All hazards summary
2016 2012
Maximum Risk Level:  Extreme Extreme*
Maximum Consequence: Catastrophic Catastrophic*
Maximum Likelihood: Almost Certain Likely* 
Average Confidence: High N/A^ 
*  The 2012 values have been re-calibrated following changes in methodology under NERAG 2015 (see Section 2.1)
^ No average confidence values were provided in TSNDRA 2012
3.1 Summary of Tasmania’s natural disaster risks 
TSNDRA 2016 reassessed the risk of bushfire, earthquake, flood, landslide, severe storm and tsunami and 
incorporated the first assessments of coastal inundation, heatwave and pandemic influenza. The relative likelihood 
and consequence each of these hazards would have on various sectors of society in a worst-case scenario were 
assessed. The sectors (and sub-sectors) were: People (Death; Injury); Economy (General; Industry); Environment 
(Species; Value); Public Administration; Social (Community Wellbeing; Cultural Significance). The overall findings  
of the risk assessment process and the regular themes identified across all hazards are summarised below. 
3.2 All hazard comparison
Although each hazard presents its own unique profile of risks to the State, an overall assessment and comparison 
of the total perceived risk from each hazard was requested from the stakeholders and practitioners throughout the 
emergency management sector. 
It is clear that bushfire remains the greatest aggregated risk to Tasmania. It is a ‘High’ or ‘Extreme’ risk across all 
sectors of society, often with catastrophic consequences expected every 30 years (i.e. ‘Unlikely’ likelihood). This 
likelihood is expected to become more frequent with climate change, based on anecdotal evidence from experts 
and the most recent climate projections18 19, transitioning at least into the ‘Likely’ category by 2100 (and possibly  
into ‘Almost Certain’). 
In contrast, it is also evident that earthquake is the lowest risk hazard due to the ‘Extremely Rare’ likelihood and 
the moderate level consequences across the sectors, given the anticipated magnitude of an event. The major/
catastrophic impacts are dependent on an earthquake-induced major dam failure that was deemed by experts 
even less likely than the earthquake itself. Interestingly, participants perceived that if the seismic monitoring system 
throughout Tasmania were decommissioned, all consequence and likelihood estimates would be substantially 
increased. It was identified that the seismic monitoring system is in urgent need of review and management, as it 
is mostly operated by the private sector with no obligation to continue and was almost decommissioned in 2015. 
This system ensures high confidence surrounding the likelihood of geological events, and the absence of this system 
would increase the risk level and priority of treatments for these hazards in future risk assessments. 
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Figure 3.1 Summary of the risk posed by each hazard as assessed in TSNDRA 2016.  
The central position is the average across sectors for both consequence and likelihood. 
The whiskers represent the minimum and maximum ratings across all sectors for  
each hazard.
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An overall summary of the risk estimated for each hazard was requested and is presented in Figure 3.1. The overall 
average positions within the risk matrix do not reflect the most operationally important components of the risk 
profile across the hazards and within each sector. The range of risk – as presented in this aggregated way – is often 
so wide it is no longer useful for decision-making; overall ‘all-hazards’ assessments require reference to a particular 
sector to provide context. These ‘by sector’ results are presented in the companion document, the 2016 Tasmania 
Natural Disaster Risk Assessment – All Hazard Summary. 
3.3 Additional findings
3.3.1 Common issues and themes
During data collection, the integration of expertise and confidence into a single value of ‘Confidence’ was limiting.  
In some cases, experts in the field can be certain of a ‘Very Low Confidence’ rating due to either a lack of 
knowledge, or an understanding of complexities. Similarly, those with limited knowledge can be unaware of 
complexities and overestimate their confidence. This was identified as a limitation of the NERAG process. It is 
recommended future iterations explicitly rate the expertise of different working groups separate to confidence. 
With respect to controls, land-use planning, building codes/controls and settlement planning schemes/codes were 
identified as strong and effective controls for each of the hazards apart from pandemic influenza. Limiting future 
development and vulnerable uses in known at-risk areas was concluded to be the most effective way of protecting 
life and assets and limiting future government liability at least cost. 
With respect to treatments, a ‘multi-hazards’ approach to exercises and business continuity planning within 
government was agreed to be important, with hazard-specific training recommended for key incident management 
personnel (e.g. incident controllers) as well as formalising the arrangements to guide decision-makers in times  
of crisis to ensure rapid decision. Governments typically make decisions slowly, following lots of expert advice.  
During times of crisis, decisions need to be made quickly and decision-makers may struggle to commit to a  
decision. Programs that may encourage or support similar activities within the private sector were also mentioned. 
A multi-hazards approach to household Prevention and mitigation, Preparedness, Response and Recovery (PPRR) 
was also identified as a potential new treatment, such as a ‘hazard response plan’ rather than a specific household 
plan for each kind of hazard. 
Complementary to the multi-hazards approach, the frequency and severity of coincident events were identified as  
a knowledge gap, with broad support for further research in this area across all hazards. It was identified that 
hazards do sometimes co-occur, stretching emergency response capacity statewide. Some hazards, such as 
heatwave and bushfire, are likely to co-occur, but this is not incorporated into the exercise scenarios. However, 
others such as bushfire and flood (as experienced in January 2016) are less obvious, with the expected likelihood 
of such an occurrence poorly understood, especially under the influence of climate change. It was recognised 
coincident events should be incorporated into the cross-agency exercise regime to ensure statewide capacity is 
regularly assessed under different situations to identify areas for improvement. 
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It was noted that environmental damage from natural hazards can be substantial and control activities should 
consider the opportunities for maintaining a robust ecosystem, spatially distributed, which is capable of withstanding 
shocks. This may involve improved protection of existing forest, or active regeneration of targeted areas to improve 
spatial coverage of a particular kind of habitat. 
3.3.2 A note on vulnerable populations
The emergency risk management sector has traditionally approached the identification of population vulnerability 
from a demographic perspective, using data that reveal those most likely to suffer poorer health outcomes relative 
to other population groups in the wake of a disaster. 
These data suggest groups such as the elderly, young people, those from low socio-economic backgrounds and 
those with chronic health conditions are more likely to be over-represented in mortality rates and experience 
greater negative impact as a result of a natural disaster. 
While this definition is simple in approach and based on evidence, it does not necessarily capture the full  
picture of population vulnerability. Everyone has the potential to be vulnerable in particular circumstances and, 
conversely, individuals from identified vulnerable population groups can be particularly resilient. For example, an  
otherwise healthy individual may become vulnerable in a bushfire as they remain in danger to protect livestock  
and infrastructure, while an elderly individual may use their strong existing networks within the community to  
assist them. 
Alongside the recognition of identified vulnerable groups, an individual’s adaptive capacities also need to be 
considered. Overall health and wellbeing, the strength of connections and networks, the ability to recover with 
financial security, and the knowledge of how to make informed decisions all contribute to an individual’s vulnerability 
in preparedness (as well as recovery) from a disaster. 
Vulnerability and resilience are driven by context rather than definition, and are fluid and complex concepts. 
Agencies working in emergency management need to be aware of these issues and adapt strategies accordingly. 
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Section Four
Bushfire risk 
assessment
4
Image: Department of Police, Fire and Emergency Management
2016 2012
Maximum Risk Level:  Extreme Extreme*
Maximum Consequence: Catastrophic Catastrophic*
Maximum Likelihood: Likely Likely*
Average Confidence: High N/A^
*  The 2012 values have been re-calibrated following changes in methodology under NERAG 2015 (see Section 2.1)
^ No average confidence values were provided in TSNDRA 2012
4.1 Context and definition
For the purpose of the TSNDRA, a working definition of bushfire was agreed to include any fire in vegetation 
– irrespective of origin or cause – on the basis that bushfire can occur anywhere in Tasmania where there is 
vegetation, although its impacts are generally only significant when the fire occurs near populated or settled areas.  
It was felt important not to exclude bushfires of human origin from the study due to the high number of fires 
caused as a result of human interaction.
Bushfire has been the most costly natural disaster hazard in Tasmania’s history, in both economic and human terms. 
Bushfire has directly claimed the most lives of any natural hazard in Tasmania (noting that it is difficult to directly 
associate deaths with Heatwave and Pandemic), and is said to carry an average annual cost of at least $15 million20. 
Bushfires in Tasmania are most commonly associated with dry conditions during summer and autumn. Peak bushfire 
danger periods vary between years according to the rainfall distribution over spring to autumn. Large differences in 
rainfall distribution across the State affect when and where bushfires occur, and also the susceptibility of vegetation 
to fire. Tasmania is considered periodically vulnerable to bushfire due to the level of vegetation cover across the 
State, the unique population spread and the relationship between high rainfall/low evaporation on fuel loads21. 
The south-eastern part of Tasmania is considered more exposed to bushfire hazard than other parts of the  
State18 19. This region generally experiences less rainfall and drier conditions. As Figure 4.1 illustrates, Forest Fire 
Danger Index (FFDI) ratings of over 100 (Catastrophic) have been recorded in the south-east. As the chart shows, 
the north and north-west parts of the State generally experience lower FFDI ratings.
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Figure 4.1 Maximum fire danger recorded in Tasmania 2000-201022.
4.2 Previous significant events
The south-eastern corner of the State has also experienced the most significant bushfires in the past. In particular 
the fires of 1967 represent the most catastrophic natural hazard event to have impacted Tasmania. On ‘Black 
Tuesday’, 7 February 1967, the FFDI peaked at 128, over 110 fires swept through Hobart and surrounding areas 
and killed 62 people. More recently, the 2013 bushfires that burned across the State significantly impacted the 
Dunalley township. This event prompted the 2013 Tasmanian Bushfire Inquiry23 that included more than 100 
recommendations, most of which have been, or are being, adopted by the appropriate agencies.
As part of the workshop process, an analysis of previous significant fire events was undertaken. The major bushfire 
events from the state-level perspective are presented in the Table 4.1, with a map describing the known ‘fire history’ 
over the last 40 years presented in Figure 4.2. 
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Table 4.1 Major fire events in the Tasmanian historical record. 
Event Date
Area 
Burnt (ha)
Mortality Rate
People 
Injured
Estimated Cost 
 
January Lightning  
Storms 2016
Jan–Feb 
2016
125,000 (Not assessed at 
time of publication)
Dunalley Bushfires and 
‘The Angry Summer’
Jan 2013 20,000 $90m (2013)
Dolphin Sands Nov 2009 3 homes destroyed
Lohreys Rd, St Marys 
and Kellivie
Dec 2006 30,925 0.02 deaths per 
10,000 people; 1 dead 
(Pop: ~500,000)
26 homes 
destroyed; $50m 
loss in FT 
timber assets
Hobart 17 Jan 1998 ~50 6 homes destroyed 
in Hobart’s 
southern suburbs
Pelverata and  
Bonnet Hill
25 Feb 1991 6 homes destroyed 
 
Kempton 1982 1 fatality State of Emergency 
Declared for the 
region
Zeehan 3 Feb 1981 40 homes 
destroyed
Black Tuesday, Hobart 
and Surrounding Area 
Fires
Feb 1967 264,270 1.7 deaths per 10,000 
people; 62 dead 
(Pop: ~380,000)
900 $45m (1967) 
($485m in 2010 
with inflation)
16 January and Black 
Friday 9 February 1934
Jan-Feb 
1934
Unknown At least one fatality Homes destroyed 
and some loss  
of life
Mt Wellington and 
Hobart Region Fires
Dec 1897 Unknown 0.4 deaths per 10,000 
people; 6 dead 
(Pop: ~160,000)
Unknown Likely to have been 
$47m-$142m in 
today’s terms
Huon – Port Cygnet 
Fires
1854–Jan Unknown 1.6 deaths per 10,000 
people; 14 dead 
(Pop: ~90,000)
10 Likely to have 
been $14-$47m in 
today’s terms
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It was also noted that south-east Tasmania frequently experiences fire weather conditions similar to those 
experienced in 1967, with >100 Forest Fire Danger Index (Catastrophic Forest Fire Danger Rating) ratings recorded 
on “several occasions in the last ten years”22. Many recent fire events were identified that had the potential to 
cause significant impact on the Tasmanian community. These fires may have been more damaging were it not for 
favourable weather changes and/or the effectiveness of the response to the event.
The environmental impact of past fires was also considered, with significant events including the King Island fire 
of 2007 that significantly changed an ecosystem at Lavinia State Reserve. It must be noted the environmentally 
catastrophic bushfires of January 2016 are currently burning within the west coast and central plateau regions as 
this report is being finalised. They were not directly considered during this process as they occurred after the data 
collection and evaluation stages. However, those with relevant expertise considered the impact of such an event 
during the workshop process and categorised bushfire with a catastrophic consequence to the environment sector. 
4.3 Climate change implications
Climate change projections were considered by the working groups when determining likely consequences  
arising from a major bushfire event. While bushfire weather projections conducted for south-eastern Australia 
do not include significant change for Hobart and Launceston, data published by the Climate Futures for Tasmania 
project18 19 24 25 suggest that changes likely to be experienced over the course of the next century may include: 
• more hot days and warm nights, dry days and longer dry spells
• more warm spells and heat waves
• more wet days, but fewer cold spells and cold waves
• an earlier start to high-risk conditions in spring.
These climatic changes may result in an increase in the number of high fire-danger days, which has the potential  
to increase the State’s overall bushfire risk. 
4.4 Current arrangements
Three major agencies provide fire services in Tasmania. They are the Tasmania Fire Service (TFS), Parks and  
Wildlife Service (PWS) and Forestry Tasmania (FT). Processes for managing significant bushfires in Tasmania 
are well-developed, with strong liaison between the three fire agencies and cooperative arrangements in place 
for multi-agency response. The TFS is the designated SEMC Advisory Agency under the Tasmanian Emergency 
Management Plan. The roles for the partner agencies are presented in Table 4.2. 
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Figure 4.2 Representation of past known fire history across Tasmania.  
Source: J Richley, Fuel Reduction Unit, Tasmania Fire Service.
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Table 4.2 Current arrangements for the emergency management of bushfire  
in Tasmania. 
Hazard
SEMC  
Advisory 
Agency
Management Authority
Prevention  
and Mitigation
Preparedness Response
Fire – national parks and other reserves TFS Parks Parks Parks
Fire – declared forest land/state forest TFS Forestry Tasmania Forestry 
Tasmania
Forestry 
Tasmania
Fire – urban and privately managed  
rural land
TFS TFS TFS TFS 
 
While these are the general arrangements, it should be noted that in a response situation where a fire has the real 
potential to impact on lives within the community, TFS assumes responsibility regardless of the land tenure. In such 
cases the TFS Chief Officer would appoint a qualified Incident Controller and appropriately resourced Incident 
Management Team to manage the incident.
4.5 Worst-case scenario
Bushfire was rated an ‘Extreme’ risk in TSNDRA 2012, a classification that was confirmed by a series of severe 
bushfires that impacted across the south-east of the State in 2013. However, the scenario used for bushfire in 2012 
was determined to be consistent, due to the 1967 ‘Black Tuesday’ fires having a more significant impact than the 
2013 event, under equally severe weather conditions. For consistency, it was decided to follow the same scenario 
used in TSNDRA 2012 for TSNDRA 2016. The worst-case scenario for bushfire was: 
• Based on the most significant bushfire event in Tasmania’s history: Black Tuesday fires, 7 February 
1967. Key characteristics associated with this reference event are:
 - a two-day event with a Severe fire danger on Day 1 increasing to Catastrophic on Day 2  
(FDI – 75-100+)
 - a Soil Dryness Index (SDI) of 150+, and a Drought Factor Index of 10
 - multiple fires already burning, including at least two large-scale fires that are beyond 
suppression capability 
 - fires burning across all three regions
 - one fire impacting a major population area, the other an isolated community
 - fires impacting a national park area as well as Forestry assets
 - strong winds pushing fire into highly populated area
 - remote critical infrastructure is threatened, inoperative or damaged.* 
*  This was additional to the 2012 scenario following the experience of the  
Dunalley Bushfires where emergency communications were interrupted.
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Workshop participants were presented with additional information relating to the potential distribution and severity 
of bushfire in Tasmania, based on historical records and analysis of the extreme weather pattern associated with 
the 4 January 2013 event. Recent trends, as well as sub-annual distribution and potential shifts of these trends due 
to climate change, were also considered (in particular the impact on the frequency of dangerous Forest Fire Danger 
Index days). 
4.6 Existing controls
The outcome of the break-out group review of the bushfire controls survey is shown in Table 4.3. It was noted 
by all groups that there was some difficulty assessing the strength of many of the controls from a ‘whole-of-state’ 
perspective; for example, reasonably new programs have not had the test of time to determine their strength. 
Weaknesses in other programs in remote areas were also observed, e.g. the brigade network was seen to reduce  
in effectiveness relative to the proximity to infrastructure and population centres. Other controls were observed to 
be critical in terms of response – for example, the fire trail/break network – however, this could not be accounted 
for in the strength/expediency assessment framework (i.e. a very strong and expedient control could have little 
effect on reducing the likelihood of a worst-case consequence scenario). 
Table 4.3 Bushfire controls (Str. = control strength, Exp. = control expediency).
Bushfire Controls
Material/Physical Str. Exp. Procedural Str. Exp. Behavioural Str. Exp.
Fuel Reduction 
Program
M L Community alerts M M Media liaison M H
Brigade Network M M Fire permit system M M School fire  
education programs
VL VL
State Fire 
Operations Centre
M H Household/property 
insurance
M L Bushfire survival plans M L
Community 
Protection Plans
H H Bushfire response 
plans
M M Community development 
strategies
H L
Regional Fire 
Operation Centres
M L Bushfire mitigation 
plans
M L Fire-ready schools  
and sites
M L
Incident 
Management 
Teams
M H Community education L L Weather warning system L L
NAFC and 
contract aircraft
M H Community 
protection plans
M L Fire-ready neighbourhood 
program
H L
LMA resources M M Land-use planning M L Forced evacuation L VL
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Bushfire Controls
Material/Physical Str. Exp. Procedural Str. Exp. Behavioural Str. Exp.
Fire Management 
Area Committees
M L Building and 
development controls
M L Community education L M
Fire Trails/breaks/ 
and maintenance
M L Total fire bans M M Recovery advice M L
Seasonal 
firefighters
H H Per-incident planning/
exercises
M L Community engagement 
in fuel reduction burning
M L
Additional PWS 
tankers
M H Closing parks/reserves L M Public behaviour change M VL
Prepositioning staff/
resources
M M External training 
programs
M L
Hot day response 
systems
M M TFS website L H
Media and website use L H Seasonal forecast system M M
Clean-up procedures L VL
Fuel stove only areas H H
 
Tasmania’s historical under-insurance, infrequent application of clean-up/decontamination processes, and the limited 
legislative capacity for enforcing evacuations during emergency response were areas of critical control weakness 
that were noted for potential integration with risk-treatment planning. Strengths included community protection 
planning, seasonal firefighter procurement systems (including links with mainland fire services), and media liaison 
with public health.
Key opportunities for improvement in bushfire controls were also identified. Improved engagement through social 
media was an example of a strategy that had the potential to improve a number of areas such as awareness of 
community alerts, fire permit embargos and implementation/use of bushfire response plans. Points of broader 
integration with government, such as better land-use planning, were also seen as having potential; however,  
these are difficult to implement in the short to medium term. Opportunities were identified to increase funding  
in a number of areas including: bushfire mitigation planning; school fire education programs; bushfire ready sites, 
schools and neighbourhoods. It was also recognised that existing programs need to have their funding  
requirements sustained. 
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4.7 Bushfire risk analysis
The risk assessment results for bushfire from TSNDRA 2016 are presented in Figure 4.3. 
The ‘likely’, ‘major’ consequences in the People sector, as well as ‘unlikely’ but potentially ‘catastrophic’ economic 
impact resulting from a bushfire disaster, resulted in bushfire being assessed as an ‘extreme’ risk at a state level. 
Participants expressed a high level of confidence in their analysis of the consequence and subsequent likelihood 
levels determined across these two sectors, with slightly lower confidence in their ability to assess the impacts  
as a percentage of gross state product and the resulting injuries and illnesses than the likely number of deaths and 
impacts on critical industries. It was also noted that long-term impacts on affected populations, both physically  
and mentally, were not well understood.
Group members commented that the decision to limit the worst-case consequence below a ‘Catastrophic’ number 
of deaths (50 or more), as experienced in 1967, was due to stronger controls being in place in relation to this 
hazard. Group members noted the number of deaths in a worst-case scenario would be expected to be “many 
more than six (the cut-off for ‘moderate’ consequence classification), but less than 50 (the cut-off for ‘catastrophic’ 
consequence)”. It was also noted that the scenario did not outline the likely impact on vulnerable people, with pre-
formed plans and personal relationships playing an important role on the ground. The relatively small geographic 
spread of key industries, specifically the mining sector and Norske Skog, were observed as reducing the likelihood  
of the worst-case economic scenarios for industry-specific consequences.
Impacts on Public Administration were expected to fall within the moderate consequence classification; however, 
there was only moderate confidence in the assessment of whether core government functions would be disrupted 
due to a limited understanding of the level of redundancy in the system. 
The three groups assessed the level of environmental impacts (both in terms of species/landscape loss and loss of 
value) very differently, ranging from catastrophic to minor. The group with environmental expertise were extremely 
confident in their assessment of a worst-case scenario resulting in catastrophic environmental damage (specifically, 
significant loss/impairment of nationally-significant ecosystems) to organo-soils (peats), rainforest and alpine 
ecosystems. However, this was tempered by a belief that the majority of the Tasmanian environment is resilient 
or adapted to fire. Assessment of likelihood had a similarly wide spread, ranging from ‘not very confident’ to ‘very 
confident’ across the groups, aligning with the level of expertise. The cyclical nature of ecosystem succession in the 
light of fire regimes was noted as complicating the assessment of environmental impacts relating to this hazard, with 
certain species being adapted to, or dependent on, burning cycles.
Social impacts under a worst-case bushfire scenario were considered to be moderate in consequence, with higher 
confidence in this assessment across the groups in terms of community wellbeing than cultural significance, which 
was observed to be problematic in terms of defining a “major culturally important activity or event”. The high 
rebuild rate at Dunalley following the 2013 fires was used as evidence of a reasonably short recovery period for 
affected communities, while the possible impacts on sporting events during the summer period and festivals (such  
as Taste of Tasmania and Falls Festival) were also noted. The possibility of the catastrophic loss of an entire town 
was mentioned and deemed plausible, although not expected. 
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Figure 4.3 The risk of bushfire to each subsector of society as determined by TSNDRA 
2016. The central position is the confidence-weighted-average across working groups  
for both consequence and likelihood (confidence implied the expertise of the group).  
The whiskers represent the minimum and maximum ratings across groups. Bushfire 
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4.8 Bushfire – differences between 2012 and 2016
The change in the risk of bushfire to each sector between TSNDRA 2012 and TSNDRA 2016 is presented  
in Figure 4.4. 
4.8.1 Participants
Following a recommendation from the author of TSNDRA 2012, the TSNDRA 2016 process made a deliberate 
effort to engage a larger number of experts, with a broader range of expertise than was possible during the  
2012 process. This results in some large changes in the economic and social setting sectors. 
4.8.2 People
A risk of bushfire to people remained unchanged at ‘Extreme’. In TSNDRA 2016, experts agreed the scenario 
considered would result in ‘Major’ (<50 deaths) consequences, which is a reduction from catastrophic (>50 deaths) 
in 2012. Experts believed the general public are more aware of the risk and are also more contactable than ever 
before, reducing the number of people expected to be exposed. However, the likelihood of a catastrophic event 
is increasing, changing from ‘Unlikely’ in 2012 to ‘Likely’ in TSNDRA 2016. This was believed to be driven by broad 
scale climate change. 
4.8.3 Economic
The risk of bushfire to the economy was increased from ‘High/Extreme’ in 2012 to ‘Extreme’ in TSNDRA 2016. 
In TSNDRA 2012, the economic consequences of the scenario were expected to be ‘Moderate/Major’. This was 
upgraded to ‘Catastrophic’ consequences in TSNDRA 2016, with the inclusion of potential loss of an entire industry, 
mostly attributed to an improvement in the expertise engaged. Lower resource (e.g. minerals, timber, woodchips) 
prices in TSNDRA 2016 relative to those in 2012 have affected the profitability of Tasmanian primary industries, 
making many of them vulnerable to operational interruptions of any kind. Experts had an appreciation of private 
assets at risk from bushfire, or protocols that force operational shutdowns during bushfire, that if experienced could 
force the cessation of Tasmanian operations. However, as particular conditions are required, these were considered 
less likely, hence the reduction from ‘Likely’ to ‘Unlikely’ likelihood. 
4.8.4 Environment
The risk of bushfire to the environment remain unchanged at ‘High’. It must be noted, the possibility of the loss 
of habitat/ecosystems/species was considered by TSNDRA 2016. A ‘Catastrophic’ rating was recommended by 
one of the groups, who explicitly considered it ‘Likely’ the irreversible loss of alpine habitat, or a species, would 
occur within the scenario. Unfortunately this was somewhat prescient of the event that occurred in January 2016, 
which resulted in devastating losses within the higher elevations of the Tasmanian World Heritage Area. However, 
averaging across the TSNDRA 2016 groups resulted in a ‘Major’ rating (even after weighting by confidence, in the 
absence of a recorded expertise level). This highlights a limitation within this process when using multiple working 
groups. It is a recommendation that expertise be explicitly recorded by each group for future assessments to ensure 
appropriate weighting of ratings. 
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Figure 4.4 Change in bushfire risk level to each sector of society between TSNDRA 2012 
and TSNDRA 2016 as rated by the NERAG process. Bushfire: change in risk
of each sector between 2012 and 2016
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4.8.5 Public administration
The risk of bushfire to public administration increased from ‘Medium’ in TSNDRA 2012 to ‘High’ in TSNDRA 2016, 
driven by an increase in likelihood as a result of climate change. Experts in the TSNDRA 2016 assessment believe 
the public administration consequences remain ‘Moderate’, although the likelihood of the scenario increases from 
‘Unlikely’ in TSNDRA 2012, to ‘Likely’ in TSNDRA 2016. 
4.8.6 Social setting
The risk of bushfire to social setting increased from ‘Low/Medium’ in TSNDRA 2012 to ‘Medium’ in TSNDRA 2016. 
The social setting in TSNDRA 2016 was informed by the 2013 bushfires that impacted on the Dunalley township. 
This event, being fresh in the minds of participants, improved their ability to rate the social consequences, especially 
with regard to the longer-term impacts. Coupled with this, social setting expertise was engaged and in attendance. 
As such, consequences increased from ‘Insignificant/Minor’ to ‘Moderate’, although the likelihood was reduced from 
‘Likely’ to ‘Unlikely’. 
4.9 Bushfire risk register
The bushfire risk register, presented in Appendix B: Risk Register, was created by the project team following  
the process described in the NERAG 2015. 
4.10 Proposed bushfire risk treatment options
It is important to note that the proposed risk treatment options, presented in Appendix C: Proposed Treatment 
Options, have been developed for the purpose of informing further discussion at SEMC/Management Authority 
level. It is appropriate that these options be reviewed by the management authorities and referred to SEMC for 
further decision. 
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Section Five
Coastal inundation  
risk assessment
5
Image: Ulverstone Surf Life Saving Club
5 Coastal inundation  
 risk assessment 
2016 2012
Maximum Risk Level:  Extreme N/A*
Maximum Consequence: Catastrophic N/A*
Maximum Likelihood: Unlikely N/A*
Average Confidence: High N/A*
* Coastal Inundation was not assessed in TSNDRA 2012
5.1 Context and definition
Coastal inundation was not assessed in TSNDRA 2012. However, as it is one of the most visible natural hazards 
linked to climate change – and there is mounting evidence that a treatment plan is required – participants of the 
scoping workshop chose to include it in the TSNDRA 2015/16 state risk assessment process. 
Coastal inundation is defined as the temporary and permanent flooding of a portion of land within the coastal zone 
not caused by a geological event (e.g. a tsunami). Temporary inundation is a storm tide event that, similar to inland 
flooding, is caused by a complex interaction of riverine, coastal and oceanic factors on a range of timescales (see 
Figure 5.1). These factors may include any one or combination of: tides; storm surge, waves (wind waves and swell); 
large-scale climate modes; coastline geometry (e.g. bathymetry); rainfall; sea level rise; and coastal geomorphology/
erosion. Permanent inundation is the permanent loss of land to the sea due to erosion of the land either by 
continuous processes, or a rapid onset event. Only rapid onset events are considered an emergency hazard within 
the context of TSNDRA. 
Annual tidal cycles ebb and flow in response to the phase of the solar, lunar and longer-term ocean cycles (such as 
the El Niño-Southern Oscillation). Each location has a somewhat unique tidal range, depending on local and regional 
bathymetry. The bathymetry of the area also influences the way oceanic waves disperse energy on meeting the 
coastline, where regions with shallow coastal waters reduce the magnitude of energy that reaches the high-tide 
mark, protecting the coastline. 
Large low pressure systems (i.e. storms) also have a positive influence on the observed sea level, temporarily raising 
local conditions by tens of centimetre (the inverse barometer effect: a fall in surface pressure of 1 hPa = 1 cm rise in 
sea level). As storms are often associated with high rainfall, low-lying areas around rivers are particularly susceptible 
to storm-surge inundation, as river levels rise from out-flowing and in-flowing waters. High winds during these 
storms can also push the water against the coast as well as generate or amplify swell and wave action. The most 
destructive coastal inundation event is a storm tide, which is when the highest spring tides coincide with severe 
storm surges. These events bring about abnormally high sea level, resulting in significant inundation of low-lying 
areas. Recent modelling suggests the north coast of Tasmania is the most susceptible to storm tide (see Figure 5.2). 
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Figure 5.1 Oceanic phenomena that contribute to the total water levels at the coast 
during an extreme sea level event, their causes and the time and space scales over which 
they operate. 
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Figure 5.2 Storm tides around Tasmania, formed by the highest spring tides occurring 
coincidentally with severe storm surges. 
 
Source: figure adapted from McInnes et al. 201127.
5.2 Previous significant events
As part of the TSNDRA 2016 project, a limited sourcing of historical coastal inundation events impacting Tasmania 
was undertaken. Historical information, taken from Sharples 200628, is presented in Table 5.1. While storm surges 
have flooded many low-lying coastal areas in Tasmania during the 20th century, in some cases closing roads and 
causing property damage, the records of such events are mostly anecdotal and there has been no systematic 
analysis of historical storm-surge flood records for Tasmania.
No further assessment was undertaken of these events for TSNDRA 2016, however, and it is noted that this 
remains a notable gap in knowledge. 
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Table 5.1 Notable coastal inundation events in the Tasmanian historical record 
(summary information taken from Sharples 2006)28. 
Event Type Year/Date Impact Summary
Storm surge Late 1980s and early 
1990s
Several storms during the late 1980s and early 1990s caused 
flooding at Lauderdale, with a 1994 storm closing the main 
South Arm road at Lauderdale, and another in 1991 washing 
debris across the road. During the 1991 storm, wind-driven 
waves were reported breaking on the driveway of the 
Lauderdale BP Service Station – on the landward side of the 
main South Arm Road – but the wind abated prior to high 
tide, resulting in less flooding than would otherwise have 
occurred (The Mercury, 7 August 1991, pp. 1-2).
Storm surge 25 July 1988 The highest recorded tide at Hobart – caused by a deep 
low pressure system passing south of Tasmania – reached 
1.32m above AHD on 25 July 1988, causing flooding at both 
Lauderdale and further south at Bicheno Street on the south 
side of Pipe Clay Lagoon. At Bicheno Street, some residential 
properties lie 0.8m – 0.9m above AHD, and are thus 
vulnerable to flooding. 
Elsewhere in Tasmania, the same storm surge event flooded 
several homes at West Strahan to above floor level, pushed 
water to the doorsteps of homes at Kingston Beach, covered 
waterfront reserves in Sandy Bay (including Marieville 
Esplanade), flooded a house at Old Beach, covered part of 
the Huonville to Cygnet Road, submerged some Battery 
Point streets in Hobart, and flooded several basements on 
Hobart’s waterfront (The Mercury, 26 July 1988, p. 1).
Storm surge 1967 and 1970 Flooding in Lauderdale during 1967 and 1970 resulted in 
properties and buildings on South Terrace and Bayview Road 
(south side of the canal) being flooded to depths of “over a 
foot” in some places, and caused local residents to demand 
that the local government “solve” the problem (The Mercury 
“Eastside News” 2 November 1967 (p. 4), 29 October 1970 
(p. 1), 5 November 1970 (p. 2)).
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5.3 Climate change implications
There is a growing understanding of coastal extremes, especially in the face of climate change and sea level rise. 
Climate change projections were considered by the risk study team when determining the likely consequences 
arising from a coastal inundation event (Figure 5.3). Data published by Climate Futures for Tasmania27 suggest that 
by 2030 a 1% AEP event based on late 20th century conditions will occur around twice to 10 times more often  
(i.e. between 2% to 10% AEP) if sea level rise follows the upper end of the projected range29. By 2090, a 1% AEP 
event based on late 20th century conditions could become a 20% AEP event and up to several times a year if the 
high-end projections for sea level rise eventuate. As a proactive response to this, Tasmania has adopted a Sea Level 
Rise Planning Allowance27. 
Figure 5.3 A) Annually and globally averaged sea level change observed compared to 
average over the period 1986-2005. B) Future range in sea level rise as projected by 
IPCC CMIP5 AR5 models. 
Source: For more details refer to the IPCC source document29.
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5.4 Current arrangements
The State Emergency Service (SES) provides the main coastal inundation response capability in Tasmania, primarily 
through its volunteer workforce. This response is delivered in conjunction with local council arrangements.
For coastal inundation, the Department of Primary Industries, Parks, Water and Environment (DPIPWE) is the 
designated SEMC Advisory Agency under the TEMP. Local councils are inherently responsible for prevention and 
mitigation activities, guided by state-level frameworks. However, the Department of Police, Fire and Emergency 
Management (DPFEM)/SES often take a leadership role in respect to coordinating effort in coastal inundation risk 
mitigation. The arrangements as described in the TEMP are presented in Table 5.2. 
Table 5.2 Current arrangements for the emergency management of coastal 
inundation in Tasmania. 
Hazard SEMC Advisory 
Agency
Management Authority
Prevention and Mitigation Preparedness Response
Coastal Inundation DPIPWE DPIPWE – Resource 
Management and 
Conservation Division
DPFEM DPFEM
5.5 Worst-case scenario
• The scenario is a hypothetical storm-tide event resulting in a localised temporary sea level  
anomaly of ~2 m along the northern Tasmanian coast. Key characteristics associated with  
this reference event are:
 - Most of the northern coastline as well as Flinders Island are significantly affected (as well  
as parts of Victoria), with additional inundation along the eastern and south-eastern coastlines.
 - There is widespread damage to low-lying areas that are inundated, with some  
buildings destroyed.
 - Some areas are inaccessible for 12-24 hours.
 - The event occurs during a spring ‘king tide’ and is associated with moderate  
to severe storm damage.
 - This event has an Annual Exceedance Probability (AEP) of 1% (1:100 ARI).
 - Following the current projected pathway, this scenario is expected to become  
sub-annual by 2100. 
Workshop participants were presented with additional information relating to the nature of coastal inundation 
including specifics concerning a storm-tide event versus a storm surge or an unusually high tide, the projected 
impacts of climate change, and the complex interaction of these events with coastlines. 
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5.6 Existing controls
The outcomes of the expert review of the coastal inundation controls survey are shown in Table 5.3. In general, 
behavioural controls were generally considered well developed, with political will, public awareness and education  
and community engagement all well developed or expedient in implementation. Political will was an interesting  
control that catalysed much discussion. 
Government has a broad awareness of the risk from natural hazards and is seeking to address the consequences in a 
proportional manner. It should be noted, however, that this is a sensitive area where the action of Government may be 
percieved to be impacting property rights or the liability to Government.
Areas for improvement include the development of evacuation plans by at-risk households and implementation  
of the prevention, preparation, response and recovery strategies at a household level. Weather forecasting and  
warnings systems were identified as well-developed, well-tested, strong and effective controls. 
Few physical controls were considered effective, as they are expensive and politically difficult to build and once  
built are only effective to a finite extent. One physical control that was identified as strong and relatively easy to 
implement was “keeping drainage channels clear”. This is labour intensive with ongoing maintenance, but would  
help the recession of the inundation, thus limiting the impact. 
Table 5.3 Coastal inundation controls (Str. = control strength, Exp. = control 
expediency).
Coastal Inundation Controls
Material /Physical Str. Exp. Procedural Str. Exp. Behavioural Str. Exp.
Building codes / 
Standards
L L Coastal erosion / 
Hazard maps
M H Community 
observations of 
shoreline shifts
H H
Sea wall L VL Coastal development 
limit legislation
- - Resident coast shift 
awareness
H L
Erosion protection M VL Management plans VL VL Evacuation plans L L
Relocation / Buy out M L BoM early warning 
system
H H Household 
preparation / 
maintenance
VL VL
Raised access routes M VL Evacuation plans L L Political will H H
Modifying 
infrastructure
M L Statewide coastal 
policy
M L Public awareness H H
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Coastal Inundation Controls
Material /Physical Str. Exp. Procedural Str. Exp. Behavioural Str. Exp.
Planning standards M VL Evacuation zones and 
safe havens
H H Public education 
resources
H H
Temporary defences H M Coastal inundation 
mapping
H H
Weather forecasting 
/ warnings
H H Recovery centres M H
Coastal levees L H Community 
evacuation plans
L -
Keeping drainage 
lines clear
H M
Tide flaps L L
Early warning system H H
Floating 
infrastructure 
(future)
M L
5.7 Coastal inundation risk analysis
Few of the consequences of coastal inundation were considered greater than ‘Major’, and the likelihood of this 
worst case scenario was defined as 1:100 years, or ‘Unlikely’. As these events can be predicted with some accuracy 
with approximately 24-36 hours warning, and they occur gradually (therefore, people can safely evacuate), it was 
estimated there could be about five deaths (‘Major’), mostly due to vehicles attempting to negotiate flooded areas. 
A similar number of injuries to the base levels experienced in bad weather were expected (‘Moderate’). 
Minimal loss of livestock was expected as farmers would have adequate warning to relocate stock to higher 
ground. Fixed assets at risk of such hazards, such as low-lying crops, infrastructure (e.g. bridges, roads, buildings) 
and soils could be substantial, especially within the ports or along coastal roads. There was some disagreement 
within the groups as to whether the economic impact would be ‘Moderate’ (<$100 million), ‘Major’ (<1$ billion) 
or ‘Catastrophic’ ‘(>$1 billion). Ultimately it was agreed the event would be of ‘Major’ consequence, but with 
high uncertainty due to a lack of evidence. It was noted that many insurance companies explicitly exclude coastal 
inundation from their policies, so those households that are impacted would probably have limited support, even if 
they were insured. 
Environmental impacts were focused on ecosystems, with sand dunes and kelp forests most at risk. Sand dunes are 
constantly undergoing the process of construction and destruction. In areas where this process is not impeded it is 
expected to continue. However, human development has, in some places, halted this process and, as such, in those 
regions the sand dunes would not recover, resulting in a ‘Major’ to ‘Catastrophic’ impact on environmental value. 
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Kelp forests again are adapted to such extreme events; however, invasive species (such as sea-urchins) can severely 
reduce the capacity of a kelp forest to regenerate, ultimately resulting in a transition into a bare rock ecosystem, 
again resulting in significant loss of environmental value. Such a process is highly speculative but was considered 
worth mentioning in the risk assessment process. 
Public administration was expected to be able to manage this event and continue with day-to-day business, as it was 
expected to be well within the capabilities of existing staff and infrastructure. Power and water supplies were not 
expected to be broadly affected, although in some regions all utilities would be disrupted for at least a short period 
(some possibly for an extended time). Impact on communities was considered minimal, even in those coastal villages 
/ centres that will be completely inundated. 
Although not necessarily the case, there was a general belief that these areas predominantly consisted of holiday 
homes (shacks), with communities linked to nearby towns. Some land may be washed away, resulting in permanent 
dispersal; however, it was thought residents would choose to move into nearby towns, or invest in a different site, 
therefore, consequences are limited at a state level. It was mentioned by some of the workshop participants that,  
in some cases, it would be cheaper to relocate these communities than attempt to protect/rebuild them with 
physical infrastructure. Culturally significant impacts include the loss of Aboriginal middens along the coast. Some 
may be lost completely, some partially damaged, but given the number of sites it was not expected to be of high 
significance at the State level.
5.8 Coastal inundation comparison between  
2012 and 2016
Coastal inundation was not considered in TSNDRA 2012. As such, a comparison between 2012 and 2016  
was not possible. 
5.9 Coastal inundation risk register
The coastal inundation risk register, presented in Appendix B: Risk Register, was created by the project  
team following the process described in the NERAG 2015. 
5.10 Proposed coastal inundation risk  
treatment options
It is important to note that the proposed risk treatment options, presented in Appendix C: Proposed Treatment 
Options, have been developed for the purpose of informing further discussion at SEMC/Management Authority 
level. It is appropriate that these options be reviewed by the management authorities and referred to SEMC for 
further decision. 
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Figure 5.4 The risk of coastal inundation to each subsector of society as determined by 
TSNDRA 2016. The central position is the confidence-weighted-average across working 
groups for both consequence and likelihood (confidence implied the expertise of the 
group). The whiskers represent the minimum and maximum ratings across groups. Coastal Inundation 
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Section Six
Earthquake risk 
assessment
6
6 Earthquake risk assessment
2016 2012
Maximum Risk Level:  High High*
Maximum Consequence: Major Major*
Maximum Likelihood: Very Rare Very Rare*
Average Confidence: High N/A^
*  The 2012 values have been re-calibrated following changes in methodology under NERAG 2015 (see Section 2.1)
^  No average confidence values were provided in TSNDRA 2012
6.1 Context and definition
Earthquakes in Australia are usually caused by movements along fault lines that occur as a result of compression 
in the Earth’s crust30. Earthquakes are most common at plate margins. Australia does not sit on a plate margin; 
however, it remains vulnerable to intra-plate earthquakes. While not as common, major earthquakes with 
magnitudes of 7.0 or more are known to occur in intra-plate regions. Lower magnitude earthquakes can also have 
significant impacts, for instance the 5.6 magnitude earthquake that struck Newcastle in 1989 and resulted in the loss 
of 13 lives.
The significance of an earthquake is generally considered according to its magnitude or size. Magnitude is a measure 
of the energy released by the earthquake, and is calculated using a measurement of the amplitude of seismic waves 
recorded on a seismograph and the distance of the seismograph from the earthquake. For every unit increase in 
magnitude, there is roughly a thirty-fold increase in the energy released. For instance, a magnitude 6.0 earthquake 
releases approximately 30 times more energy than a magnitude 5.0 earthquake, while a magnitude 7.0 earthquake 
releases approximately 900 times (30x30) more energy than a magnitude 5.0.
The magnitude of an earthquake is not the only measure of its significance. The impact of an earthquake is usually 
determined by the level of shaking, or the ‘felt intensity’ experienced at different distances from the epicentre of  
the quake. Since the early 20th century, the Modified Mercalli (MM) intensity scale has been used to rate the level 
of effects felt by people from an earthquake (see Figure 6.1). 
While there are several factors that influence the amplitude of shaking felt at a location, the below table depicts 
the usual relationship between the magnitude of an earthquake and the intensity of it as likely to be experienced by 
people near its epicentre. The descriptors associated with the MM intensity scale are also shown below (see Figure 
6.2). The scale highlights that earthquakes of a magnitude of less than 4.0 are considered unlikely to cause damage.
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Figure 6.1 Approximate relationship between Modified Mercalli (MM) and magnitude. 
Moment
Magnitude
1.0 – 3.0
3.0 – 3.9
4.0 – 4.9
5.0 – 5.9
6.0 – 6.9
7.0+
I
II – III
IV – V
VI – VII
VII – VIII
IX or higher
Typical Maximum Modified  
Mercalli Intensity
Source: Geoscience Australia30.
Figure 6.2 Modified Mercalli (MM) intensity scale descriptors used to describe  
the magnitude of an earthquake. 
 L. Instrumental Generally not felt by people unless in favorable conditions.
II. Weak Felt only by a few people at best, especially on the upper floors of buildings. Delicately suspended objects may swing.
III. Slight Felt quite noticeably by people indoors, especially on the upper floors of buildings. Many do not recognize it as an earthquake.  Standing motor cars may rock slightly. Vibration similar to the passing of a truck. Duration estimated.
IV. Moderate Felt indoors by many people, outdoors by few people during the day. At night, some awaken. Dishes, windows, doors disturbed; walls make cracking sound. Sensation like heavy truck striking building. Standing motor cars rock noticeably. Dishes and windows rattle alarmingly.
V. Rather Strong Felt inside by most, may not be felt by some outside in non-favorable conditions. Dishes and windows may break and large bells will ring. Vibrations like large train passing close to house. 
VI. Strong Felt by all; many frightened and run outdoors, walk unsteadily. Windows, dishes, glassware broken’ books fall off shelves’ some heavy  furniture moved or overturned; a few instances of fallen plaster. Damage slight.
VII. Very Strong Difficult to stand’ furniture broken; damage negligible in building of good design and construction; slight to moderate in well-built ordinary structures; considerable damage in poorly built or badly designed structures; some chimneys broken. Noticed by people driving motor cars.
VIII. Destructive Damage slight in specially designed structures; considerable in ordinary substantial buildings with partial collapse.  Damage great in poorly built structures. Fall of chimneys, factory stacks, columns, monuments, walls. Heavy furniture moved.
IX. Violent General panic; damage considerable in specially designed structures, well designed frame structures thrown out of plumb. Damage great  in substantial buildings, with partial collapse. Buildings shifted off foundations. 
X. Intense Some well built wooden structures destroyed; most masonry and frame structures destroyed with foundation. Rails bent. Large landslides.
XI. Extreme Few, if any masonry structures remain standing. Bridges destroyed. Rails bent greatly. Numerous landslides,  cracks and deformation of the ground.
XII. Cataclysmic
Total destruction – Everything is destroyed. Lines of sight and level distorted. Objects thrown into the air. The ground moves  
in waves or ripples. Large amounts of rock move position. Landscape altered, or levelled by several meters. In some cases,  
even the routes of rivers are changed.. 
Source: Geoscience Australia31.
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While the scale reflects the expected intensity of an earthquake, it is important to note that small earthquakes can 
still have an impact.
Earthquakes have not caused significant damage in Tasmania in recent history. There are only a few identified faults 
in Tasmania. While some faults appear to have been active in recent history, they have not been studied in detail. 
Several geological studies of the Lake Edgar Fault have been undertaken. This fault is located 80 km west of Hobart 
and has been shown to have moved at least three times in the last 60,000 years with the last movement around 
18,000 years ago, causing earthquakes with a magnitude of around 7.0 on each occasion. A very small earthquake 
also occurred in that location in 2000. 
The current Australian design standard for buildings is based on an earthquake hazard map produced by 
Geoscience Australia (GA). This map32 shows Tasmania to have a relatively low exposure to earthquake when 
compared to other parts of Australia. While instrumentally recorded seismicity is low, there is evidence that 
Tasmania has previously experienced earthquakes up to 7.0 in magnitude. Records held by Geoscience Australia 
show 46 Tasmanian earthquakes above magnitude 3.0 since 1900. There have also been earthquakes in the late 
19th century that caused building damage in Launceston along with other smaller earthquakes felt in populated 
areas. Other previous Tasmanian earthquake events are summarised in the next section.
6.2 Previous significant events
The most significant events from a state-level perspective are reproduced in Table 6.1 below.
While very few structures are capable of withstanding shaking at an intensity of VIII (MM) or above, older buildings 
that do not comply with current standards are more susceptible to earthquake damage than newer buildings. 
Tasmania has a large number of older buildings constructed using unreinforced masonry. Buildings of this type were 
over-represented in the damage statistics arising from the 1989 Newcastle earthquake33, and more recently the 
2010 Kalgoorlie/Boulder event34.
The figure below (Figure 6.3) highlights the spread of all historical earthquakes recorded across Tasmania,  
plotted according to the location of the epicentre of the earthquake and its magnitude.
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Table 6.1 Analysis of previous significant earthquake events in Tasmania.
Event Year Magnitude
Depth 
(km)
Impact Summary
Maximum MMI 
(Felt Intensity)
Mole Creek 2004 2004 4 10 Mole Creek. Felt in other NW 
towns as well as Hobart. 
I-II
Lake Sorell 2002 2002 4.3 10 Lake Sorell. Felt widely in Tasmania. II-III
Lake Edgar 2000 2000 3.5 12 Small quake recorded at Lake Edgar 
fault.
N/K
Launceston 1997 1997 4.2 5 Launceston. Felt widely throughout 
Tasmania. 
II-III
East of Flinders 
Island earthquake
1929 5.0 – 5.6 10 Damage to Launceston Hospital, 
a church and other houses in that 
area. Impacts in Hobart – rattling of 
windows and tremors felt.
V-VI
Earthquake in NE 
Tasmania
1928 5.4 10 Severe shaking felt at Fingal and 
Midlands, where articles dislodged 
from shelves.
IV-V
Earthquake off 
Port Arthur
1927 4.3 10 Articles on shelves in Port Arthur 
displaced. Felt in Hobart.
IV-V
West Coast 1924 1924 5.2 0 Magnitude determined from 
isoseismal map.
V
Queenstown 
1908
1908 5 0 Magnitude determined from 
isoseismal map. 
V
Tasman Sea 
Earthquake 
Swarm
1883-
1892
6.9 N/K Epicentre of swarm was east of 
Flinders Island. Buildings damaged in 
Launceston during 1884.
VI-VII
Lake Edgar 
(18000 yrs. ago)
N/K 6.8-7.0 N/K N/K – Last major movement of this 
fault line.
N/K
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Figure 6.3 Historical earthquakes recorded across Tasmania. 
Source: Geoscience Australia.
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6.3 Climate change implications
Climate Change predictions were considered by the risk study team when determining the likely consequences 
arising from a major earthquake event. Research has suggested that long-term climate change may lead to an 
increased risk of earthquake in regions experiencing uplift as overlying ice volume is reduced35 or as a result of 
increased tectonic plate motion36. However, the scientific evidence supporting any link between rapid climate change 
and geological movements that induce earthquake in Tasmania was not sufficient for the purposes of influencing any 
aspect of this risk assessment. 
6.4 Current arrangements
Under the Tasmanian Emergency Management Plan, DSG’s Mineral Resources Tasmania (MRT) division has 
responsibility for advice to SEMC, and is the lead management authority in respect to prevention and mitigation. 
Under current arrangements, see Table 6.2, the SES has responsibility for preparedness activities, and Tasmania 
Police takes the lead for response to earthquake events.
Table 6.2 Current arrangements for the emergency management of earthquake 
in Tasmania.
Hazard SEMC Advisory Agency Management Authority
Prevention and Mitigation Preparedness Response
Earthquake DSG (MRT) SES SES DPFEM
Mitigation of earthquake risk is predominantly served through compliance with building design standards. These 
standards are informed by the level of exposure to the hazard (refer to earthquake hazard maps mentioned above). 
6.5 Worst-case scenario
Although Tasmania has not experienced any previous earthquakes that are considered to have had a significant 
impact, it is clear that Tasmania has an earthquake risk. Current earthquake research, the existence of known  
faults and the lessons learned following intra-plate region earthquakes in other parts of the world demonstrates  
the potential for a major earthquake to impact Tasmanian communities. 
For the purpose of assessing state-level risk and based on the available data, the risk study team considered what 
would be a realistic worst-case scenario for earthquake in Tasmania. Two hypothetical scenarios were identified  
and subsequently used in the assessment:
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• Scenario #1 – Dam Failure Key characteristics associated with this reference event are:
 - A complete rupture (earthquake) of the fault situated in SW Tasmania occurs (see below map). 
 - This results in an earthquake of magnitude 7.0 or higher at that location.  
 - One or more of the major dams at that location fails (piping failure).  
 - The assessment considered the impact of shaking expected to be felt by nearby communities, 
along with the impact of inundation arising from the dam failure.  
 - The initiating event is assessed as having an Annual Exceedance Probability (AEP) of 0.004% 
(1:25,000 years), based on current research.
• Scenario #2 – City Epicentre Key characteristics associated with this reference event are:
 - An earthquake occurs close to a major population centre such as Hobart, at a magnitude  
based on an AEP of 0.04% (1:2,500 years).  
 - This return period equates to an earthquake magnitude of 5.5, which has been experienced  
in Tasmania on three previous occasions in its known history.  
 - A level of ground shaking is assumed. Based on the proximity of the hypothetical earthquake  
to Hobart, the scenario assumes a MM felt intensity of VI is experienced in the city of Hobart.   
The workshop participants were provided with additional information relating to the potential distribution and 
severity of earthquake in Tasmania based on historical records and research. The geographic distribution of 
earthquake risks as well as the causes of recorded events were discussed in order to frame the overall nature  
of the hazard. 
6.6 Existing controls
The outcomes of the expert review of the earthquake controls survey are shown in Table 6.3. In general, physical 
and behavioural controls have very low strength and expediency in Tasmania. This was perceived to be due to a 
general lack of awareness by the public that earthquakes can occur in Tasmania. Relevant organisations (e.g. Hydro 
Tasmania, the emergency response network) are aware of the risk and have many procedural controls that are 
generally considered strong and expedient, being well-developed parts of day-to-day protocols. Improving the 
understanding of the local geological features and the risks they present would benefit the PPRR process. 
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Table 6.3 Earthquake controls (Str. = control strength, Exp. = control expediency).
Earthquake Controls
Material / Physical Str. Exp. Procedural Str. Exp. Behavioural Str. Exp.
Pre-1990 building code VL VL Seismic monitoring 
network
H H Household response 
preparation and 
awareness
- -
Post-1990 building code M M Infrastructure 
maintenance
H H Household 
maintenance
- -
Structural stability H L Land use planning 
schemes
H VL Media liaison systems - -
Assessing hazards VL VL Household / property 
insurance
M L Community warnings - -
Eliminating utilities L VL Recovery L VL Community 
resilience
- -
Community warnings VL VL Activate SDP H H Targeted awareness 
programs
- -
Reconnaissance - - Maintenance of 
infrastructure
H H
Control affected areas VL VL Earthquake hazard 
maps
VL VL
Recovery VL H Fault studies – 
monitoring
L L
Retrofitting of old 
structures
VL VL Emergency 
management plans
H H
Automatic systems / 
Mechanical shutdowns
M M Incident management 
arrangements
H H
Funding arrangements H L
Exercise programs H M
Building standards H H
Dam safety legislation H H
National road / 
bridges specifications
H H
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6.7 Earthquake risk analysis
The workshop participants divided into two groups, each considering a single scenario. Each group had good 
confidence in most sectors, agreeing that the controls in place were likely to mitigate most of the more catastrophic 
risks associated with dam failure, hence the lower likelihood rating (see Figure 6.4). The most devastating impacts of 
the earthquake scenarios considered were associated with a major dam failure. An earthquake alone was expected 
to be of minor to moderate impact across all sectors. However, due to high construction standards, dam failure was 
considered unlikely with an earthquake of the magnitude presented in the scenario. 
In the instance of an ‘extremely rare’ event of dam failure, loss of life was expected to be limited to major  
(<49 people). The area of impact was considered to be quite constrained, with time available for evacuation. 
Although earthquake specific community warning systems are not practised in Tasmania, the regular practice of 
community warning and evacuation associated with bushfire was considered a good analogue. Such an event would 
have potentially devastating economic impact on industry, and some of these may choose to leave Tasmania, rather 
than rebuild. The loss of a major dam would probably impact on the state electricity supply, which in turn might 
result in unrecoverable operational losses for some large industrial operations. Directly affected primary industries 
(agriculture and aquaculture) and some critical infrastructure (bridges and roads) were expected to take 5-10 years 
to rebuild or recover, with financial and expert assistance required from the Commonwealth. The economic cost 
of rebuilding the dam would be $1 billion alone, while all other economic impacts could total around $100 million. 
Rebuilding of a dam was deemed possible, but likely to be extremely slow and difficult due to the complex 
environmental and engineering requirements associated with such large projects.
`Environmental experts did not identify a species or region that would be completely lost or destroyed.  
Some consideration was given to marine reserves in the impact zone, or the Lake Pedder Galaxid; however, it  
was unknown if either of these would be impacted in any serious way. Culturally, a loss of significant industry would 
force people to relocate, impacting on the cohesion of those societies, but this would be localised, not statewide. 
Some historical sites or heritage-listed buildings are at risk of damage or complete destruction. It was deemed 
unlikely that any major cultural events would be significantly affected (unless timing was coincidental).
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Figure 6.4 The risk of earthquake to each subsector of society as determined by 
TSNDRA 2016. The central position is the confidence-weighted-average across working 
groups for both consequence and likelihood (confidence implied the expertise of the 
group). The whiskers represent the minimum and maximum ratings across groups. 
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Figure 6.5 The risk of the sub-hazard Earthquake – Dam Failure to each subsector 
of society as determined by TSNDRA 2016. The central position is the confidence-
weighted-average across working groups for both consequence and likelihood 
(confidence implied the expertise of the group). The whiskers represent the minimum 
and maximum ratings across groups. Earthquake  Dam Failure 
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Figure 6.6 The risk of the sub-hazard Earthquake – City Epicentre to each subsector 
of society as determined by TSNDRA 2016. The central position is the confidence-
weighted-average across working groups for both consequence and likelihood 
(confidence implied the expertise of the group). The whiskers represent the  
minimum and maximum ratings across groups. Earthquake  City Epicentre 
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6.8 Earthquake comparison between 2012 and 2016
The change in the risk of earthquake to each sector between TSNDRA 2012 and TSNDRA 2016 is presented in 
Figure 6.7 and 6.8. 
6.8.1 Participants
Following a recommendation from the author of TSNDRA 2012, the TSNDRA 2016 process made a deliberate 
effort to engage a larger number of experts, with a broader range of expertise than was possible during TSNDRA 
2012. This results in some large changes in public administration, which are described below (see Figure 6.7). 
6.8.2 General
Earthquake incorporates two distinctly different hazards: Earthquake – City Epicentre; and Earthquake – Dam 
Failure. These hazards were considered in isolation within TSNDRA 2012 and this approach was repeated in 
TSNDRA 2016. The likelihood of any earthquake was reduced from ‘Rare’ to ‘Very Rare’. In the instance of 
‘Earthquake – Dam Failure’, the likelihood was reduced even further, to ‘Extremely Rare’, as experts believed  
the major dams in Tasmania are engineered to withstand the magnitude of earthquake considered in the scenario. 
6.8.3 People
City Epicentre: A risk level of ‘Medium’ remained unchanged. For the scenario considered, workshop participants 
expected a large number of structural failures at any location in Tasmania. As a result, more than five deaths were 
expected, but less than 50 deaths. This is an increase from ‘Moderate’ in TSNDRA 2012 to ‘Major’ in TSNDRA 
2016. However, the likelihood of such an event was decreased from ‘Rare’ in TSNDRA 2012 to ‘Very Rare’ in 
TSNDRA 2016. 
Dam Failure: The risk level decreased from ‘Medium’ in TSNDRA 2012 to ‘Low’ in TSNDRA 2016. This decrease 
is due to a decrease in both consequence (from ‘Major’ to ‘Moderate’) and likelihood (from ‘Very Rare’ to 
‘Extremely Rare’). Consequences were rated lower, as emergency response for a major dam failure at vulnerable 
locations around the State had recently been exercised and, given the warning times available, it seemed reasonable 
that people could be moved out of the danger zone before rapid inundation occurred. 
6.8.4 Economic
City Epicentre: The risk level decreased from ‘High’ in TSNDRA 2012 to ‘Medium’ in TSNDRA 2016 due  
to a reduction in the expected likelihood from ‘Rare’ to ‘Very Rare’. 
Dam Failure: A risk level of ‘Medium’ remained unchanged despite a decrease in the expected likelihood  
from ‘Very Rare’ to ‘Extremely Rare’. There was no change in the expected consequences. 
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6.8.5 Environment
City Epicentre: A risk level of ‘Very Low’ remained unchanged. This was due to an increase in expected 
consequences from ‘Insignificant’ to ‘Minor coupled with a decrease in expected likelihood from ‘Rare’  
to ‘Extremely Rare’. 
Dam Failure: The risk level increased from ‘Low’ in TSNDRA 2012 to ‘Medium’ in TSNDRA 2016. This was due  
to an increase in expected consequences from ‘Moderate’ to ‘Major’, despite a decrease in expected likelihood from 
‘Very Rare’ to ‘Extremely Rare’, in accordance with the reasons above. 
6.8.6 Public administration
City Epicentre: The risk level decreased from ‘High’ in TSNDRA 2012 to ‘Low’ in TSNDRA 2016. This was due 
to a decrease of expected consequences from ‘Major’ to ‘Moderate’, where the expectation was that government 
could continue operations regardless of the impacts. However, the major driver for the decrease in risk is from  
a very large decrease in likelihood from ‘Rare’ to ‘Very Rare’. 
Dam Failure: The risk level decreased from ‘Medium’ in TSNDRA 2012 to ‘Low’ in TSNDRA 2016. This is due  
to a decrease in both expected consequences from ‘Major’ to ‘Moderate’ as well as a decrease in likelihood from 
‘Very Rare’ to ‘Extremely Rare’, in accordance with the reasons above. 
6.8.7 Social setting
City Epicentre: A risk level of ‘Medium’ remained unchanged. This is despite an increase in expected consequences 
from ‘Moderate’ to ‘Major’ as the knowledge is improved on the social impacts of natural disasters. However, as 
likelihood decreases from ‘Rare’ to ‘Very Rare’, the risk level remains the same. 
Dam Failure: The risk level decreased from ‘Medium’ in TSNDRA 2012 to ‘Low’ in TSNDRA 2016. The expected 
consequences decreased from ‘Major’ to ‘Moderate’ as vulnerable communities are made more aware of the risk, 
so the level of preparation is improving. The expected likelihood decreased from ‘Very Rare’ to ‘Extremely Rare’,  
in accordance with the reasons above. 
6.9 Earthquake risk register
The earthquake risk register, presented in Appendix B: Risk Register, was created by the project team following  
the process described in the NERAG 2015. 
6.10 Earthquake risk treatment options
It is important to note that the proposed risk treatment options, presented in Appendix C: Proposed Treatment 
Options, have been developed for the purpose of informing further discussion at SEMC/Management Authority 
level. It is appropriate that these options be reviewed by the management authorities and referred to SEMC for 
further decision. 
72  2016 Tasmanian State Natural Disaster Risk Assessment / Section Six / Earthquake risk assessment
Section Six Earthquake risk assessment
Figure 6.7 Change in Earthquake – City Epicentre risk level to each sector of society 
between TSNDRA 2012 and TSNDRA 2016 as rated by the NERAG process. Earthquake  City Epicentre: change in risk
of each sector between 2012 and 2016
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Figure 6.8 Change in Earthquake – Dam Failure risk level to each sector of society 
between TSNDRA 2012 and TSNDRA 2016 as rated by the NERAG process. Earthquake  Dam Failure: change in risk
of each sector between 2012 and 2016
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Section Seven
Flood risk  
assessment
7
Image: Department of Police, Fire and Emergency Management
7 Flood risk assessment
2016 2012
Maximum Risk Level:  High High*
Maximum Consequence: Catastrophic Major*
Maximum Likelihood: Likely Likely*
Average Confidence: High N/A^
*  The 2012 values have been re-calibrated following changes in methodology under NERAG 2015 (see Section 2.1)
^  No average confidence values were provided in TSNDRA 2012
7.1 Context and definition
A number of definitions of flooding exist and are used for different purposes. As previously mentioned, the 
TSNDRA has adopted a definition that enables consideration of flooding risk in general terms, allowing an event-
centric assessment from the state-level perspective. In the TSNDRA context, flooding is defined as a general and 
temporary condition of partial or complete inundation of normally dry land areas from overflow of inland waters 
from the unusual and rapid accumulation or run-off of surface waters from any source. 
Water management in Tasmania is a major activity. Tasmania supports 12% of Australia’s freshwater resources in an 
area of less than 1% of the total Australian land area. The State has an extensive network of rivers and streams with 
approximately 150,000 kilometres of waterways. The two major river systems in Tasmania are the Derwent and the 
South Esk. There are many smaller systems, especially in the western region, which flow to the west coast. 
The combination of mountainous topography, prevailing westerly winds, and annual storm cycles results in a large 
variation in rainfall across Tasmania. Splitting Tasmania into three regions of east, west and north gives roughly 
equal areas but significantly different annual totals and seasonal variations of rainfall. The west receives prolonged 
heavy rainfall events, especially in winter, associated with a westerly airstream, whereas the north generally receives 
shorter duration rainfall events in mid to late autumn in moist north-easterly airstreams, commonly associated with 
cut-off low pressure systems. These cut-off lows can occasionally produce extreme rainfall events in east and south-
east Tasmania and into the midlands, but these events are less frequent in the north.
Tasmanian rivers and catchments are subject to flooding following heavy rainfall events, particularly after a period 
of more than a few days’ heavy rain in one area. Individual catchment behaviours are sometimes difficult to predict, 
with river systems differentially able to cope with heavy rainfall events depending on where precisely the rain 
falls and the prevailing conditions. Communities downstream of large catchments, particularly those situated on 
floodplains, are exposed to flooding from time to time.
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7.2 Previous significant events
In terms of previous impacts, most communities situated on floodplains around the State have experienced some 
level of flooding over the past century. It was noted that while the majority of flooding events produce localised 
minor to moderate impacts, Tasmania has experienced one flood that resulted in catastrophic consequences from 
the state-level perspective.
The most significant flooding event in Tasmania was the widespread flooding that affected the north-east and parts 
of the north-west during April 192937. More than 500 mm of rain fell over three days, resulting in flooding to most 
rivers. Launceston was flooded and approximately 4500 people were temporarily displaced. This flood resulted in 
22 deaths. 
While many parts of the north were flooded, the most significant impacts were realised in Derby, where the failure 
of the Briseis Dam resulted in 14 people being killed, and in Gawler, where the driver of a truck tried to cross a 
flooded bridge and was swept away, killing the truck’s eight occupants.
In 2011 there was a series of floods that impacted mostly north-eastern Tasmania during the months of January, 
March and August. In isolation, each of these floods had only relatively minor impacts, however the cumulative effect 
of these floods was significant for local communities. The resulting damage to local infrastructure and property 
from the 2011 floods resulted in several requests for Natural Disaster Relief and Recovery Arrangements (NDRRA) 
assistance, highlighting the state-level significance of these events. 
As stated, the cumulative effect of hazard events that impact an area in a short space of time is difficult to assess as 
part of the TSNDRA methodology; however, the recent events provided valuable lessons and learnings which were 
discussed and highlighted during the flood risk assessment. The complete flood history for Tasmania is available from 
the Bureau of Meteorology website38, and a summary of some of the most significant events is provided in Table 7.1. 
Table 7.1 Analysis of previous significant flood events in Tasmania’s history. 
Broad Flood Type Year Month/Date Impact Summary
Riverine flooding 1970 Aug Record flooding occurred in the Mersey and Meander 
Rivers, with extensive damage at Deloraine. One man, 
employed by the Hydro, died at Devils Gate Dam after 
he was washed off a ladder by flood spill. A police officer 
managed to escape from his car as it was swept down 
Buttons Creek. Nineteen people were trapped on the 
back of a truck in water up to their knees for six hours 
overnight on Railton Rd at Sherwood. A father and son 
were trapped on the roof of their house in Railton with 
flood waters up to their feet. In the Latrobe district, 100 
people were evacuated from 40 houses by trucks, boats 
and helicopters.
Riverine flooding 1960 Apr At Macquarie Plains 12 homes were destroyed.
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Broad Flood Type Year Month/Date Impact Summary
Riverine flooding 1929 Apr Eight lives were lost near Ulverstone when a motor 
truck plunged into the flooded Gawler River after 
the approaches to the bridge had been washed away. 
Considerable portions of the Longford, Inveresk, Invermay 
and other low-lying parts of Launceston were flooded to 
a depth upwards of ten feet. Approximately 4,500 people 
in Launceston were evacuated. The Duck Reach Power 
Station and Cataract Gorge suspension bridge were 
washed away.
Dam safety 
emergencies
2011 Jan More than 100 farm dams in the north-west were 
overtopped, some of which were at a high risk of failure. 
One bridge was washed away.
Dam safety 
emergencies
1929 Apr The Bresies Dam disaster claimed 14 lives in Derby.
Dam safety 
emergencies
1921 Jul The Serpentine Mine dam failure flooded the main street 
of Zeehan.
Other 2011 22-27 March Major flooding occurred in the South Esk River basin. Peak 
heights in the upper and middle reaches were comparable 
to the major floods of May 1969 and just slightly below 
those of April 1929. At Longford major flooding occurred, 
with the observed peak the third highest level on record 
after May 1969 and April 1929. The flooding caused 
significant damage to roads and bridges, and many roads 
were closed and some towns temporarily isolated.
Other 2011 12-17 January Major flash flooding and major flooding in the Mersey 
and Meander Rivers resulted in 100 homes and business 
being evacuated. The most badly affected areas included 
St Helens, Scamander, Railton, Penguin, Wynyard, Forth, 
Gunns Plains and Cooee. Roads, bridges and rail lines were 
washed away, isolating some families in the north-west for 
weeks. St Helens was cut off and several sections of the 
Tasman Highway were destroyed. Tourist attractions such 
as the Gunns Plains Caves and Wings Wildlife Park were 
inundated with water and closed for weeks. On 14 January 
over 50 Railton homes and businesses were damaged by 
floodwaters.
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Broad Flood Type Year Month/Date Impact Summary
Other 2005 October St Helens, Binalong Bay and Poole were isolated due to 
road closures and damage to local bridges. A bridge on the 
Leven River was washed away. There is a report of a car 
being swept away in the NW, although the two occupants 
swam to safety.
Other 1944 5-Jul Floodwaters completely destroyed the Marlborough 
Highway Bridge over the Ouse River. People were 
evacuated from their homes in the Mersey River basin.
Other 1885 28-29 November Many bridges washed away over local rivers  
around Hobart.
Other 1852 17-24 July Two lives were lost at Broadmarsh On the South Esk 
River, the Fingal Bridge was washed away.
Other 1852 11-18 August Launceston suffered its highest and most destructive 
flood to date in 1852. Three lives were lost at Avoca (not 
confirmed) and two lives were lost at Longford.
7.3 Climate change implications
Climate change predictions were considered by the risk study team as part of its assessment of the likely 
consequences arising from a significant flooding event. Current modelling suggests there will be fewer rainy days 
across the State but more frequent and intense extreme rainfall events. This is particularly so in the south-west 
and north-east, but also in the Central Highlands. According to the Climate Futures for Tasmania project39, these 
changes are “likely to increase the risk of flooding”. 
Flood modelling undertaken for catchments of the Mersey River, Forth River, Huon River and Derwent River 
suggested that climate change was unlikely to have a significant impact on flooding in large catchments that have 
significant upstream storage capacity. Significant changes are predicted for flood levels in smaller flood-prone 
catchments that do not have significant upstream storages. More frequent and intense rainfall events may also 
increase the risk of flash flooding. These predicted changes were taken into account as part of the TSNDRA 
assessment of flooding. 
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7.4 Current arrangements
The State Emergency Service (SES) provides the main flood response capability in Tasmania, primarily through  
its volunteer workforce. This response is delivered in conjunction with local council arrangements.
For riverine flooding, the SES is the designated SEMC Advisory Agency under the TEMP, and DPIPWE holds the 
responsibility for flooding of dams. Local councils are responsible for prevention and mitigation activities, including 
risk assessments, while SES often take a leadership role in respect to coordinating effort in flood risk mitigation.  
The arrangements to manage the PPRR for flood in Tasmania is presented in Table 7.2. 
Table 7.2 Current arrangements for the emergency management of flooding in 
Tasmania. 
Hazard SEMC Advisory Agency Management Authority
Prevention and Mitigation Preparedness Response
Flood (Dams) DPIPWE DPIPWE DPIPWE TASPOL (assisted 
by the dam 
owner)
Flood (Rivers) SES Councils SES SES
7.5 Worst-case scenario
With consideration to historical flooding events, climate change implications and current arrangements, a realistic 
worst-case scenario was designed for use in the flooding risk assessment workshops. The scenario was designed in 
consultation with SES, DPIPWE and the Bureau of Meteorology and was later validated by the risk study team. The 
scenario used for the assessment was described as follows:
• The flooding scenario to be considered is based on the most significant flooding event in Tasmania’s 
history – the Floods of 3-7 April 1929. Key characteristics associated with this reference event are:
 - A low pressure weather system(s) moves over Tasmania bringing moisture from the tropics  
and producing intense heavy rainfall in a short period of time. 
 - The rainfall continues for more than three days, and results in major flooding of multiple 
catchment areas across the State. 
 - The riverine flooding impacts more than one township, and has the potential to breach existing 
levee systems.
 - The flooding also leads to at least one dam failure in a catchment. This failure produces a  
flash flood that inundates at least one downstream community.
80  2016 Tasmanian State Natural Disaster Risk Assessment / Section Seven / Flood risk assessment
Section Seven Flood risk assessment
 - Localised flash flooding is also present in more than one area.
 - Multiple residential dwellings and businesses are inundated.
The scenario was designed to ensure that all relevant preventative, preparatory, response and recovery  
controls would come into play, while retaining the characteristics of a realistic feasible flooding event. 
7.6 Existing controls
Flood hazard had a large number of controls identified, as shown in Table 7.3. Although a number of material/
physical controls were seen as being particularly strong, the classification of both control strength and expedience as 
medium or low suggests that a number of treatments could be implemented to further reduce the likelihood  
of severe consequences resulting from this hazard scenario. 
Physical flood controls were observed to be highly fragmented in a statewide context, with many operated, 
maintained and owned by private landholders. The difficulty in establishing permanent levee systems reflected this. 
Such systems need to acquire land, often in rural areas surrounding townships. Dams were also noted to serve a 
dual purpose during time of flood even though their role is not flood mitigation. This conflict of interest may lead 
to complex and expert-driven operation for flood defence. Other mechanisms such as detention basins were seen 
as effective in less significant flooding scenarios, but in the case of the scenario considered would have little impact. 
High costs were also noted in many of the hard infrastructure options (stormwater drainage, raised access routes, 
etc.). 
Floodplain modelling and mapping was seen to be both a limitation and a key research question. The current state 
of such mapping was described as “haphazard”, of mixed geographic coverage and age, and without a standardised 
approach or methodology. Challenges in releasing such maps for broader use due to perceived insurance, land 
valuation and planning concerns were a compounding constraint noted by both groups. 
There was an observed weakness in the strength of planning schemes, as shown in Table 7.3. The upward 
integration of these datasets into a wider risk management framework was also noted as an opportunity that could 
fall under the wider remit of the Disaster Resilient Australia agenda.
Although rainfall/river gauges were seen as a critical control, with knock-on effects on forecasting and warning 
systems, funding cutbacks were noted as limiting the ability to monitor stream flow. The situation is further 
complicated by distributed ownership and maintenance falling across departments, utilities and local councils. 
Centralisation of this dataset under one agency was flagged as a potential opportunity to strengthen this control. 
Spatial variation in local knowledge – particular in new subdivision areas – was noted to lead to a lack of knowledge 
of floodplain areas, exposure, and consequently household awareness. In contrast, local councils were noted as 
relying on the knowledge of long-established farming communities in mapping and responding to flood areas.  
In both instances, potential treatments could focus on better taking account of (and educating about) local flood 
conditions. 
The Launceston Flood Management Act 201540 is the new act, providing a range of new functions and powers  
to the Regional Controller, Launceston City Council, and LFA. 
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Table 7.3 List of controls currently active to mitigate flood risks or consequences 
(Str. = control strength, Exp. = control expediency). 
Flood Controls
Material / Physical Str. Exp. Procedural Str. Exp. Behavioural Str. Exp.
Permanent levee 
systems
M L Dam maintenance 
and audit programs
M M Community 
awareness 
programs
M L
Raised access routes H L Floodplain models 
and mapping
L L Household 
preparedness
M L
Sandbag stockpiles L VL Flood response 
plans
M L Local knowledge of 
floodplains
M L
Building code H L Water 
Management Act
L L Community 
resilience
M M
Total flood warning 
system
H H Response capability H M Targeted 
awareness 
programs
H L
Land use and 
building controls
H L Recovery 
arrangements
H M Floodplain 
behaviour 
awareness
H L
Dams VL VL Floodplain studies M M Warning / alert 
access
M L
Detention basins L VL Community flood 
response plans
L M Media liaison 
arrangements
M L
Diversions H L Plans / Dam Safety 
Act
M M Response advice H M
Flood barriers H M Flood risk 
management 
framework
L L Recovery advice M L
Investment in 
infrastructure
H L Rainfall / Flood 
forecasting
M M Community 
awareness of info 
sites
M L
Alternative access 
routes / roads
H L Weather warnings 
and broadcasts
M M Awareness 
of clean-up 
procedures
L L
Vessels (SAR) VL VL Planning schemes VL L Emergency 
response training
H H
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Flood Controls
Material / Physical Str. Exp. Procedural Str. Exp. Behavioural Str. Exp.
Evacuation centres H H Rainfall / river 
gauges
M H Personnel 
interagency 
networks
H H
Recovery centres H H Interagency 
coordination
M H
Portable levee 
systems
H M NDRP funding 
arrangements
M M
Utility zoning (re: 
flood zones)
H H Rapid impact 
/ damage 
assessments
M H
Clearance / cleaning 
of creeks
H L NDRRA program M M
Flood insurance L L
Levee gate systems L L
Levee maintenance 
/ audit
L VL
Flood evacuation 
plans
M M  
7.7 Flood risk analysis
A summary of the assessed risk of flooding by sector is shown in Figure 7.1. Confidence in assessments of a worst-
case scenario varied significantly with sector. Some detailed studies provided firm evidence for both consequence 
and likelihood in the people category, while environmental impacts were viewed as being largely unknown. Studies 
specific to Trevallyn Dam, for example, indicate multiple fatalities being likely following a dam failure, putting this 
impact firmly in the ‘Catastrophic’ category, with the waterfront taking less than 20 minutes to travel to Launceston 
thus making preventative controls extremely challenging. A second group, however, dropped their classification 
to ‘Moderate’, with significant disagreement within the group (and limited awareness of the study cited above). 
Scotts Peak Dam failure was thought to have a similar result, although in both cases these eventualities were 
viewed as being ‘Very Rare’ (with an Annual Exceedance Probability of less than 1%) which is a limiting factor in 
this assessment. In the case of a non-dam failure event, the view that human behaviour would lead to a loss of life 
regardless of controls was noted to lead to a higher likelihood for less severe consequences (such as 1-2 deaths from 
drownings due to a car driving into flood water).
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Figure 7.1 The risk of flood to each subsector of society. The central position is the 
confidence-weighted-average across working groups for both consequence and likelihood 
(confidence implied the expertise of the group). The whiskers represent the minimum 
and maximum ratings across groups. Flood 
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Worst-case economic consequences were similarly severe, falling into the ‘Major’ category due to damage to 
roads, houses, Queen Victoria Museum and other infrastructure in central Launceston. Damage to the aquaculture 
industry was estimated to fall in the $100 million range on its own, with the cumulative impacts across all industries 
not considered to total greater than $1 billion. This level of impact was considered to be rare, with an increasing 
exposure as asset volumes increase over time not able to be accounted for through the NERAG 2015 processes. 
It was also considered that little that could be done in terms of controls to protect potentially affected industries 
(agriculture and aquaculture). 
Most species were thought to be well adapted to flooding; however, the knock-on effect of human development 
reducing species strength was seen to potentially lead to already endangered species being wiped out. As a result, 
confidence in the ‘Moderate’ classification of worst-case environmental impacts was ‘Low’. Sediment impact on 
marine communities, in particular, was cited as an area for future research. There were instances of specific species 
that were susceptible to extinction from flood hazards. However, it was recognised that these did not have to be  
a worst-case scenario – almost any flood would be enough. It was the view of DPIPWE experts these species are  
in grave danger of extinction. 
Public administration impacts were assessed as ‘Catastrophic’, ‘Major’ and ‘Moderate’ by the three groups,  
each with a high level of confidence. Limited local expertise in flooding and dam-failure recovery was viewed as  
stretching resources, as well as the requirements for large-scale infrastructure rebuilding that might result from  
a worst-case event.
It was suggested that there have been incidents of farmers not returning to the land following significant floods, 
although these reports remain unsubstantiated. Culturally significant events and the potential loss of the Queen 
Victoria Museum and Gallery, however, resulted in ‘Moderate’ and ‘Major’ worst-case cultural consequences, but 
these were viewed as being very specific flood conditions, with a likelihood classification of ‘Rare’ as a result.
7.8 Flood – differences between 2012 and 2016
The change in the risk of flood to each sector between TSNDRA 2012 and TSNDRA 2016 is presented  
in Figure 7.2. 
7.8.1 Participants
Following a recommendation from the author of TSNDRA 2012, the TSNDRA 2016 process made a deliberate 
effort to engage a larger number of experts, with a broader range of expertise than was possible during the 
TSNDRA 2012 process. This results in some large changes in the economic and social setting sectors. 
7.8.2 General
The likelihood of the scenario considered was reduced across all the sectors from ‘Unlikely’ in TSNDRA 2012 
to ‘Rare’ (and in one case to ‘Very Rare’) in TSNDRA 2016. This is primarily due to the statewide scope of the 
assessment, the ‘worst-case’ nature of the scenario required and the localised nature of typical flood events. It was 
recognised smaller more frequent, localised events could result in significant consequences but, given the statewide 
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nature of the assessment, these level events fell outside of the project scope and were recommended more 
appropriate for regional or municipality level assessments. 
A comparison of the results from TSNDRA 2012 and TSNDRA 2016 risk assessment is presented in Figure 7.2. 
7.8.3 People
The risk of flood to people remained unchanged at ‘Medium’. In TSNDRA 2016 experts agreed the scenario 
considered would result in ‘Major’ consequences (>5 deaths), which is an increase from ‘Moderate’ (<5 deaths) 
in TSNDRA 2012. This increase is largely due to the expected impact of this scenario on the greater Launceston 
region, with many households inundated. Participants considered more than five unavoidable deaths, but less than 
50, a reasonable assessment due to a general improvement in emergency broadcast systems and public awareness 
since 1929, despite the increase in the number of people vulnerable to this hazard. The largest consequences were 
associated with cascading dam failure. The likelihood of such an event was expected to decrease substantially, 
changing from ‘Unlikely’ in TSNDRA 2012 to ‘Very Rare’ in TSNDRA 2016. DPIPWE are currently undertaking  
a statewide analysis of this risk.
7.8.4 Economic
The risk of flood on the economy remained unchanged at ‘High’. Consequences remained ‘Major’, but likelihood  
was reduced from ‘Unlikely’ in TSNDRA 2012 to ‘Rare’ in TSNDRA 2016. This change had no impact on the  
overall risk rating. 
7.8.5 Environment
The risk of flood on the environment saw a dramatic shift from ‘Low’ in TSNDRA 2012 to ‘High’ in TSNDRA 2016. 
This change is attributed to an increase in expected consequences from ‘Insignificant/Low’ in TSNDRA 2012 to 
‘Major’ in TSNDRA 2016. This large change is due to engaged experts from DPIPWE who could identify species  
at risk of local and global extinction from flood event hazards at numerous sites around Tasmania. 
7.8.6 Public administration
The risk of flood on public administration increased from ‘Medium’ in TSNDRA 2012 to ‘High’ in TSNDRA 2016. 
This change was due to an increase in consequence, despite a decrease in likelihood. Expected consequences 
increased from ‘Moderate’ to ‘Major’ as recent work informed the impact such a scenario would have on fresh 
drinking water supplies. Although this was tempered by a decrease in likelihood from ‘Unlikely’ to ‘Rare’, the overall 
risk still increased. 
7.8.7 Social setting
The risk of flood on social setting decreased from ‘High’ in TSNDRA 2012 to ‘Medium’ in TSNDRA 2016 due to a 
decrease in both consequence and likelihood. Expected consequences were decreased from ‘Major’ to ‘Moderate’. 
The scenario was not expected to force the permanent relocation of people away from a community or significantly 
disrupt any culturally significant events for more than a single season/year. Likelihood was decreased from ‘Unlikely’ 
to ‘Rare’, due to the required scale for the scope of this assessment. 
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Figure 7.2 Change in flood risk level between TSNDRA 2012 and TSNDRA 2016 as rated 
by the NERAG process. Flood: change in risk
of each sector between 2012 and 2016
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7.9 Flood risk register
The flood risk register, presented in Appendix B: Risk Register, was created by the project team following  
the process described in the NERAG 2015. 
7.10 Proposed flood risk treatment options
It is important to note that the proposed risk treatment options, presented in Appendix C: Proposed Treatment 
Options, have been developed for the purpose of informing further discussion at SEMC/Management Authority 
level. It is appropriate that these options be reviewed by the management authorities and referred to SEMC for 
further decision. 
Section Eight
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Maximum Risk Level:  Extreme N/A*
Maximum Consequence: Major N/A*
Maximum Likelihood: Likely N/A*
Average Confidence: High N/A*
* Heatwave was not assessed in TSNDRA 2012
8.1 Context and definition
Heatwaves were not considered in TSNDRA 2012. Their exclusion from TSNDRA 2012 was due to a combination 
of factors including limited awareness of the exposure/danger of heatwave in Tasmania and limited data on the 
impacts of historical events available within the Tasmanian context. Of relevant significance, heatwave has only 
been included as a hazard in the TEMP since 2015 in Issue Eight. Heatwaves, until recently, also lacked a consistent 
definition in the broader Australian context, with the Bureau of Meteorology (BoM) only developing a clear 
definition of a heatwave using the Excess Heat Factor (EHF) index in 201313. The EHF takes into account local 
variability, night-time and day-time temperatures, and the adaptation of individuals and infrastructure to heat  
over time. 
It is now recognised that the physiological impacts of extreme heat have killed more Australians than all other 
natural disasters combined over the last century9. Night-time temperatures are a critical factor in these mortality 
rates, with higher temperatures preventing recovery from the impacts of heat stress on core body temperatures 
and function. The impact of heatwaves also varies with both demographics and existing physical conditions: those 
most at risk are the very young, elderly, lower socio-economic groups, those who work outside, and those who 
have existing illnesses41.
Analysis of extreme heat data subsequent to TSNDRA 2012 has also demonstrated some of the additional impacts 
of heatwaves on institutional capacity and key controls such as emergency response units. As shown in Table 8.1, 
extreme heat events in Hobart in the summers of 2011-12 and 2012-13 resulted in a 25-30% spike in ambulance  
call-outs, putting strain on the ambulance service. 
Heatwaves are caused by a combination of factors, including large-scale climate variability, antecedent soil 
moisture, persistent high-pressure systems and localised effects such as hard surfaces, evapotranspiration rates 
and topography. Climate records show an increase in heatwave frequency and intensity in Australia, with the 
annual number of heatwave days observed in Hobart having increased from 4 to 5 over the last half-century, and 
the average peak day intensity rising by 1.7 °C42 43. This increase in the likelihood of heatwave events occurring 
in Tasmania provides additional justification for the inclusion of heatwave hazard in TSNDRA 2016, beyond the 
improving availability of data cited above. 
8 Heatwave risk assessment
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Table 8.1 Ambulance call-outs during extreme heat events in Hobart. Source: 
Campbell 201544.
HOBART Average daily ambulance call outs (n) Extreme heat event
Summer period Non-heatwave periods
Heatwave 
periods
Start date End date
08–09 51.43 – – –
09–10 56.02 – – –
10–11 56.00 – – –
11–12 60.69 81.00 25/02/2012 26/02/2012
12–13 60.97 72.50 3/01/2013 4/01/2013
13–14 63.89 – – –
14–15 66.78 – – –
Average 59.40 76.75
8.2 Previous significant events
A thorough investigation to identify historical heatwaves in Tasmania has not been conducted, although preliminary 
studies have been completed for some locations. These are presented in Table 8.2. The most recent extreme 
heatwave event in Tasmania, which occurred over the 34 January 2013, was responsible for a significant increase  
in presentations and call-outs within the medical sector, resulting in high workloads. This event is described in  
the worst-case scenario below. 
Table 8.2 Previous events of heatwave in targeted locations around Tasmania45. 
Location Days in Historical Record
Number of Extreme 
Heatwaves (EHF > 2T)
Extreme Heatwaves Per Year
Hobart 34,907 43 0.45
Bushy Park 18,836 32 0.62
Launceston 27,146 48 0.65
Burnie 17,739 27 0.56
Swansea 20,661 35 0.62
Strahan 4,348 11 0.92
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8.3 Climate change implications
The Climate Futures for Tasmania project found that for most regions of Tasmania under the high A2 emissions 
scenario, the number of summer days warmer than 25 °C is projected to double or triple, relative to the recent 
past46 47. Some areas of Tasmania will see an expansion of the ‘summer season’ by 40 additional days per year by 
the end of the 21st century. The largest increases in extreme temperatures are projected to occur in the spring and 
autumn months, with increases of greater than 4.0 °C. This increase is substantially greater than the projected mean 
temperature change. The greater temperature changes in these seasons imply an extension of the summer season, 
with heatwaves occurring more frequently. For example, the number of heatwaves at Launceston is projected 
to increase progressively throughout the century, occurring on average twice per year by the end of the century, 
approximately four times more frequently than currently experienced. 
8.4 Current arrangements
Under the TEMP, the DHHS Public Health Services is the designated SEMC Advisory Agency, as well as the 
Management Authority for prevention and mitigation, preparedness and response. Accordingly, DHHS assumes 
overarching management responsibility, and takes a leadership role in developing and coordinating PPRR 
arrangements for heatwaves. 
Due to the recent inclusion of heatwave into the TEMP, formal incident management arrangements are in the early 
years for the State; however, collaboration between key stakeholders is emergent. The arrangements for heatwaves 
are detailed in the State Special Emergency Management Plan: Tasmanian Public Health Emergencies Management 
Plan 2014 under the TEMP, along with the Heatwave Incident Associate Plan 2014. A key aspect of this hazard 
management is that it is recognised heatwave is highly likely to co-occur with bushfire, and as such, responding 
organisations should consider surge capacity to ensure preparedness and planning are robust and functional. 
Table 8.3 Current arrangements for the emergency management of heatwave in 
Tasmania. 
Hazard SEMC Advisory 
Agency
Management Authority
Prevention and Mitigation Preparedness Response
Heat stress related 
mortality and 
morbidity
DHHS DHHS DHHS DHHS
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8.5 Worst-case scenario
The scenario developed for use in TSNDRA 2016 is detailed below. An event similar to the scenario presented 
occurred in the period immediately following the release of TSNDRA 2012, with a number of heat-related records 
being broken. It is also of note that although the scenario that occurred in 2013 was in parallel with the severe 
bushfire events commonly known as the Dunalley Bushfires, the NERAG 2015 structure does not allow for the 
consideration of cascading consequences from multiple hazards. Similarly, severe storm, flooding and landslide 
impacts can have compounding consequences if occurring simultaneously. 
• The scenario is based on the most recent significant heatwave event, which occurred over 3-4 
January 2013 (the week of the Dunalley Bushfires). Key characteristics associated with this event are: 
 - Temperatures in the east, south-east and Derwent Valley districts rise into the mid-30s on  
Day 1 and into the low 40s on Day 2 as a high pressure system over the Tasman Sea combined 
with an approaching low pressure trough and cold front directing a very hot northerly airflow 
over Tasmania. 
 - Hobart and several other centres in the south-east record the warmest temperature  
on record.
 - Minimum temperatures are also quite warm in the south-east on Day 2 with temperatures  
not dropping below 20 degrees Celsius between 9 am on Day 1 and 9 am on Day 2. 
 - Record temperatures in Tasmania are part of a heatwave that affects much of Australia. 
 - There is a significant increase in heat-stress related emergency illness and death.
 - Severe to Catastrophic fire danger protocols are in effect.
 - Given the time of year, a high number of tourists (Tasmanian, interstate and international 
travellers) are distributed throughout Tasmania, often in heat-exposed and remote areas. 
 - A major outdoor multi-day festival is being held (such as the Taste of Tasmania, or the Marion 
Bay Falls Festival). 
8.6 Existing controls
Table 8.4 shows the controls identified for heatwaves through the controls survey and refined through the 
workshop process. Due to the lack of previously-identified controls, and the general lack of procedures relating to 
extreme heat, the number of controls associated with this hazard is relatively limited.
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Table 8.4 Heatwave controls (Str. = control strength, Exp. = control expediency).
Heatwave Controls
Material/Physical Str. Exp. Procedural Str. Exp. Behavioural Str. Exp.
Emergency response 
resources (e.g. 
ambulance units)
M M Community alerts H H Community 
knowledge of heat 
behaviour
M L
TasNetworks control 
operations
H M Emergency management 
plans
M M Workplace knowledge 
of heat behaviour
M L
Public cool spaces L VL Training for responders H M Media awareness / 
liaison
M L
Medical Priority 
Dispatch System 
(MPDS) protocol
M L Effective response plan M M Tourist knowledge of 
heat behaviour
M VL
A/C power availability H H Forecasting and alerts  
for EMS
H H Community education 
programs
L VL
Extreme heat 
equipment standards
M M Research and 
understanding
H M Personnel knowledge 
of assets
H H
Public health 
resources
M M Exercises to test 
arrangements
H VL Operating assets to 
avoid fail
H H
Emergency hospital 
planning
M M Media engagement 
protocols
M M Training for 
responders
H H
Public advice  
(radio / website)
M H Interoperability and 
support
M M Agreements with bus 
services
H H
Drinking water 
availability
H M Heat-stress 
response plans
M L
Access to  
swimming areas
H L Heat-alert systems H H
Heat procedures  
for asset operations
H H
Asset heat-threshold 
monitoring
H M
Asset auto-detection 
systems
H H
Contact with  
vulnerable people
H VL
Manual load shedding H M
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In general, the utilities sector was a key strength in terms of hazard response. The physical infrastructure, existing 
procedures and personnel training were all in place for managing extreme heat conditions. A number of these 
controls were automated, reducing the dependency on personal knowledge or human error. Many of these 
processes had been adopted following the bushfires across south-eastern Australia during the severe 2009 extreme 
heat event. The interaction with extreme wind and bushfire, however, was flagged as being more problematic, with 
the intersection of these three hazards seen as presenting different problems to the network than when assessed 
individually. Failure of the electricity network was also noted to have critical knock-on effects in terms of household 
cooling through fans and air-conditioning, with network damage being both a direct consequence resulting from the 
hazard, and a crucial control factor. Access to drinking water was also seen as a strength.
A number of control weaknesses were associated with the lack of public awareness of the risks associated with 
extreme heat: a result of limited historical exposure, the lack of clear definition mentioned above, and the lack of 
‘visibility’ of extreme heat events. One example flagged was that Tasmania does not have an embedded cultural 
behaviour of going to shopping centres and publicly accessible cool spaces during a heatwave. Beaches, however, 
were seen as a key ‘cool space’ resource during extreme heat given the lower ocean temperatures, although 
proximity is obviously an important factor for accessibility. However, this behaviour in itself is a public health risk 
given the increased risk of severe sunburn.
Public health systems as a whole were central to many of the controls, with a medium level of strength and 
expedience observed in most categories identified. Good emergency response procedures for vulnerable groups 
were noted to be in place through St John Ambulance Services and the Australian Red Cross (well developed/
integrated in other jurisdictions, although not necessarily a regular protocol in Tasmania).
Opportunities were identified to exist through the appropriation of existing response and emergency management 
frameworks (for instance, community alert systems used for fire and flooding). The ability for BoM to forecast 
extreme heat with increasing accuracy in advance of heatwave events was also seen as a potential opportunity for 
future collaboration around warning systems and pre-event mitigation (for instance, through increased resourcing, 
early warning systems, or identification of cool spaces in built-up areas). There was also an awareness that, given 
the State’s cool-climate reputation, many tourists and short-term visitors do not expect – and are therefore not 
prepared for – extreme heat. Collaboration with tourism operators and event managers can also reduce visitor 
exposure.
8.7 Heatwave risk analysis
The most severe consequences that participants thought possible as a result from the worst-case heatwave scenario 
described above were associated with death, injury and/or illness, as shown in Figure 8.1. However, the lack of local 
evidence on the basis of the 2013 event meant that this assessment was largely anecdotal and would ideally be 
supported by further research. Groups were highly confident in greater than five deaths (‘Major’) attributed  
to heatwaves at least every 10 years (likely); however, catastrophic consequences were discussed at length, with  
a conservative approach agreed given the lack of evidence. One group was, however, only moderately confident in  
a similar categorisation of human impacts in the injury/illness category. 
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Other sectoral consequences were assessed as varying significantly (with the localised loss of crops – particularly 
stone and berry fruit seen to be highly exposed depending on the time of year) with flow-on impacts through 
occupational health and safety issues associated with field hands and outdoor workers. The general economic 
impact was considered to be greater than $100 million, while long-term damage to critical industry or commercial 
sectors was viewed as limited, with an ability to bounce back in subsequent seasons without the need for any 
structural change.
Environmental consequences were classified as likely to be ‘Minor’ and up to ‘Moderate’, with most ecosystems 
adapted to temporary heat effects. However, the participants identified the ‘Moderate’ evidence as anecdotal with  
a general absence of research in the field, which was flagged by the participants as an area for improvement. Further 
research was thought to be needed with regard to specific nationally or locally significant species present in some  
of the cooler climate areas. It was noted that climatic shifts which affect overall ecology throughout the year were  
to be considered separately from sub-seasonal extreme heat.
Community wellbeing was thought to be difficult to assess, particularly given the varied impacts of heat on 
community members, with some questions as to whether communities within the State (for instance, sub-groups 
such as mental health patients, or the elderly) would register in a statewide assessment. Better engagement with 
elderly community members was also seen by some as a potential positive impact during a heatwave event if 
promoted and managed effectively.
There was little variation between the likelihood of the heatwave occurring (once every 2-5 years) and sectoral 
consequence, with all falling within the ‘likely’ category (a 1-10% Annual Exceedance Probability) (see Figure 8.1).
8.8 Heatwave comparison between 2012 and 2016
Heatwaves were not considered in TSNDRA 2012. As such, a comparison between 2012 and 2016  
was not possible. 
8.9 Heatwave risk register
The heatwave risk register, presented in Appendix B: Risk Register, was created by the project teamfollowing  
the process described in the NERAG 2015. 
8.10 Proposed heatwave risk treatment options
It is important to note that the proposed risk treatment options, presented in Appendix C: Proposed Treatment 
Options, have been developed for the purpose of informing further discussion at SEMC/Management Authority 
level. It is appropriate that these options be reviewed by the management authorities and referred to SEMC  
for further decision. 
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Figure 8.1 The risk of heatwave to each subsector of society as determined by TSNDRA 
2016. The central position is the confidence-weighted-average across working groups  
for both consequence and likelihood (confidence implied the expertise of the group).  
The whiskers represent the minimum and maximum ratings across groups. Heatwave 
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9
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9 Landslide risk assessment
2016 2012
Maximum Risk Level:  High High*
Maximum Consequence: Catastrophic Major*
Maximum Likelihood: Almost Certain Likely*
Average Confidence: Highest N/A^
*  The 2012 values have been re-calibrated following changes in methodology under NERAG 2015 (see Section 2.1)
^  No average confidence values were provided in TSNDRA 2012
9.1 Context and definition
Landslide is generally defined as the movement of earth, rock or debris down a slope, and can also be referred to 
as ‘slope failure’. While it is acknowledged that many landslide events can involve a combination of failure modes 
(complex, or transitional slope failures), landslide research tends to recognise five distinct types of landslide that 
present a hazard or risk to communities. The five main types are: Slides (Shallow and Deep-Seated); Flows (Debris 
and Earth); Falls (Rock, Earth, Debris); Topples; Spreads. 
Slides involve movement of material along recognisable shear surfaces or zones and are usually considered within 
two categories – shallow and deep-seated. Shallow slides are more common than deep-seated and more frequently 
associated with property damage. Larger deep-seated slides are more easily recognised and are generally slow-
moving with impacts realised over a longer term. Both types of slide are known to occur in populated and settled 
areas across Tasmania.
Flows refer to the movement of earth or debris in a fluid motion and are generally associated with heavy rainfall. 
An initial shallow slide can develop into a rapid flow if there is excess water on the ground. A debris flow occurs 
when rocks and other debris mix with water and flow down a slope until it meets some type of barrier or the slope 
flattens out. 
Falls and topples involve a detachment and rapid movement of earth from a steep slope, are short in duration but 
can cause significant damage to anything located downslope of the earth movement location. Large rockfalls can 
sometimes produce an avalanche. The precise impact of a fall or topple will depend on what happens to be in that 
location at the time of the event. These sorts of events generally present risk on steep slopes and cliffs, which are 
prevalent across the Tasmanian landscape. 
A spread refers to a slope failure or displacement of earth on a relatively flat or level area of land. Spreads can  
occur anywhere across Tasmania but have been noticeable in several areas of the north-west landscape. Spreads  
are typically very slow moving and so can present a risk to property but not necessarily to human life.
Where a slope failure event involves either a combination of types or transition from one landslide type to another, 
it is referred to as a complex or transitional landslide event. An example is the 1872 event in Humphrey’s Rivulet, 
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Glenorchy, where it is believed an initial debris flow created a debris dam in the rivulet, which then burst and 
created a flash flood comprising water, earth and debris.
Figure 9.1 depicts the basic approach to categorising landslides and is consistent with the way landslides are 
identified within Tasmania. 
Figure 9.1 Landslide categorisation. 
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9.2 Previous significant events
The most significant events from a state-level perspective are reproduced in Table 9.1. It should be noted that the 
statewide total known landslide damage is included as a single event (1950-present) to illustrate the overall impact 
of landslide from a state perspective. Other landslide events are then discussed individually for contextual purposes.
Mineral Resources Tasmania (MRT), a division of the Department of State Growth, has evidence of over 150 
buildings in Tasmania that have been damaged or destroyed by landslide since the 1950s. As shown in Table 9.1, 
this includes 125 residential premises, with the majority of the damage recorded in the areas of Lawrence Vale 
(Launceston), Beauty Point and Taroona. Limitations in the reporting and recording process for landslide damage 
suggest the figures are probably higher. In addition to building damage, it is acknowledged that damage  
to infrastructure has occurred throughout Tasmania over many years49.
The only significant sudden impact event that was identified during the analysis of previous events was the 
Humphrey’s Rivulet debris flow that occurred in Glenorchy in 1872. The other landslides referred to in the table 
are deep-seated, slow-moving landslides that caused damage to property over a long period of time. They are listed 
here mainly for contextual purposes and to inform discussion around the nature of landslide hazard in Tasmania.
It was noted that over the years there have been many rockfall, debris flow and other slope failure events that have 
occurred around the State; however, these events are generally low impact and tend to be managed and resolved 
within the capacity of local resources.
9.3 Climate change implications
Climate change predictions were considered by the project team when determining the likely consequences arising 
from a major landslide event. Data published by the Climate Futures for Tasmania project25 were used to inform the 
study. Current predictions suggest a rise in mean sea level, combined with a drier, warmer climate, but with more 
frequent heavy rainfall events24. 
Sea level rise has the potential to cause coastal erosion and instability which could lead to an increased risk  
of landslide in vulnerable areas. Any change to rainfall patterns is likely to influence the frequency and severity 
of landslide hazards and, while a drier climate has the potential of reducing the likelihood of landslide activity, an 
increase in the frequency and intensity of heavy rainfall events may lead to a greater chance of debris flow and  
other slope failures. Research also suggests that shallow slides may be more likely in a warmer, drier climate 
scenario, particularly in areas with shallow slopes of reactive clay soils33.
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Table 9.1 Analysis of previous significant landslide events in Tasmania.
Event Date
Buildings Destroyed,  
Demolished or Damaged
People Injured
Landslide Damage
(State Total)
1950-Present Total of 150 buildings damaged, 
including 125 houses, 76 of 
which have been destroyed or 
demolished.
Nil
Humphreys Rivulet 
Debris Flow Event
1872 Several houses and farms 
destroyed or damaged. Bridges 
damaged. Many buildings and 
properties inundated, likely due 
to debris dam failure.
Nil
Lawrence Vale Landslide 
Area
1950-Present 43 houses destroyed, demolished 
or removed due to extensive 
damage.
Nil
Beauty Point Landslides 1950-Present 15 houses and a police station 
destroyed/ demolished. 13 houses 
damaged and a further 15 moved. 
Streets and roads requiring repair. 
Nil
Taroona Landslides 1950-Present 10 houses damaged, 1 
demolished. Damage to school 
and local infrastructure.
Nil
 
9.4 Current arrangements
Department of State Growth’s MRT division has primary responsibility for management of landslide and other 
geological hazards from a state research and policy development perspective. It is worth noting that this capability 
is relatively unique in that few other jurisdictions in Australia maintain a landslide hazard advice, mapping and 
awareness capability. Most other jurisdictions choose to outsource specific tasks as required. 
Under the TEMP, Department of State Growth is the designated SEMC Advisory Agency for landslide with MRT 
specifically responsible for prevention and mitigation. Local council has responsibility for landslide preparedness 
predominantly as a result of its role in land-use planning and development approval. It is noted that landslide risk  
in Tasmania is generally mitigated through controls associated with land use and development. The plan outlines  
the responsibilities, presented in Table 9.2.
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Table 9.2 Current arrangements for the emergency management of landslide in 
Tasmania. 
Hazard SEMC Advisory 
Agency
Management Authority
Prevention and Mitigation Preparedness Response
Landslide DSG (MRT) DSG (MRT) Councils TASPOL
MRT continues to undertake research into areas of Tasmania known to have experienced landslides or considered 
potentially susceptible to slope failure based on its geology. Over the years MRT has produced a suite of documents 
designed to help understand and articulate landslide hazard, particularly focused on informing decisions relating to 
the use, development and zoning of land. This includes the Tasmanian Landslide Map Series (see Figure 9.2) which 
comprises a landslide inventory, information maps and advisory maps that are used to inform site assessments and 
the development of planning schemes.
The MRT landslide database categorises landslides according to whether they are recent or active, which means 
they are known to have moved or are moving at present, or where there is evidence of slope failure but no known 
evidence of recent movement (Activity Unknown). 
This information is used to identify areas of land with known or potential instability, or ‘landslide zones’, of which 
there are three main types in Tasmania:
• Proclaimed (Declared) Landslip A and B areas – areas proclaimed under the authority of  
the Mineral Resources Development Act 1995, designed to restrict use of unstable land
• Zones on advisory maps – including susceptibility mapping products
• Known landslides – including the landslide inventory maps, as illustrated in the below table  
(note the red points denote where damage was actually caused).
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Figure 9.2 Landslides events across Tasmania. Yellow points are records of known 
landslides. Red points are records of known landslide damage to buildings and 
infrastructure (at least 125 houses)49. Approximately 2,700 landslide occurrences  
are stored in the MRT landslides database (as of April 2013); in reality many more  
will not have been reported or mapped.
9.5 Worst-case scenario
With consideration to historical landslide events, potential climate change implications and Tasmania’s current 
emergency management arrangements, the TSNDRA 2016 workshop participants considered and validated three 
scenarios considered realistic worst-case events. 
• Scenario #1 – Debris Flow A significant debris flow event impacting on a downstream community. 
The scenario was based on a historical event, the 1872 Humphrey’s Rivulet Debris Flow that 
impacted the Glenorchy area. Key characteristics associated with this reference event are: 
 - Initiated by an Annual Exceedance Probability (AEP) of 1% (1:100 ARI) rainfall event (~110-200 
mm of rain), a debris flow of ~100,000 m3 follows a rivulet through a heavily developed and 
populated area on the slopes of Mt Wellington.
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 - Triggers are primarily heavy and intense rainfall, compounded by the presence of debris  
in the watercourse.  
• Scenario #2 – Deep-Seated Landslide A sudden slide within a significant community 
development. The scenario considered feasible is for a 5-10 m deep failure of a section of land, with 
sudden overnight slide of approximately 30-40 m. Key characteristics associated with this reference 
event are: 
 - In this scenario it is considered approximately 4-5 residential properties would be destroyed  
or significantly damaged. 
 - For the purpose of the assessment, the example used was the steep escarpments in the 
Parklands suburb of Burnie, a landslide-prone area in which there are several properties at risk. 
• Scenario #3 – Rockfall The scenario considered feasible is a sudden rockfall above a roadway 
causing a fully-occupied vehicle to crash, either from rocks and debris directly striking the vehicle  
or as a consequence of the rocks and debris blocking the roadway. Key characteristics associated 
with this reference event are: 
 - Rockfalls are generally triggered by heavy and intense rainfall events, but can be compounded 
by fires or other activities that reduce vegetation/cover on the landscape. 
 - Vulnerable areas considered as part of the scenario discussion include: St Marys Pass; sections 
of the Lyell & Murchison Highway on the west coast; and any of Tasmania’s roads that have 
been cut into or through the hillside. Such areas are prevalent throughout Tasmania given  
the terrain. 
 - The trigger event considered was an AEP 10% (1:10 ARI) equivalent rainfall event. 
Workshop participants were presented with additional information relating to the potential distribution and severity 
of landslide in Tasmania based on historical records and recent research. This included recent work by Mineral 
Resources Tasmania concerning the risk of debris flows, especially around Mt Wellington. This helped to frame  
the scope of the landslide and focus the areas to consider in assessing the risks. 
9.6 Existing controls
The outcomes of the breakout-group review of the landslide controls survey are shown in Table 9.3. It was noted 
by all groups that there was some difficulty assessing the strength of many of the controls from a ‘whole-of-state’ 
perspective given the local nature of landslide hazard. 
Physical controls were seen to be relatively high impact. Land-use planning, weather observations, knowledge  
of landslide zones and regular monitoring of those known zones were generally considered effective controls. 
Limited efficacy was believed to be gained by plantations / reforestation and catch fences. These are easy to  
erect and prevent some smaller rockfalls, but they are ineffective for larger events. 
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Landslide risk maps are readily available and often used, for example during the building approvals process. 
Arrangements to respond to a natural hazard event are well developed in general; however, landslide specific 
response is not regularly drilled and could be improved. There is also room for improvement in the Tasmanian 
building code, education of regulators and development of regular monitoring (which is currently inconsistent). 
There is currently very limited capacity to insure against landslide risks, but this would need to be addressed 
through legislation. 
Community awareness is very low, with limited general knowledge of the risks presented by landslide in Tasmania, 
or how a household could aim to prevent, prepare, respond or recover from the event. 
9.7 Landslide risk analysis
During the risk analysis activity, participants were divided into three groups, with each focusing on one of the three 
scenarios. Participants assessing the debris flow scenario estimated 50-60 deaths in the Glenorchy area due to the 
rapid onset and limited capacity to provide warning to exposed people, as shown in Figure 9.3. Economic impacts 
were quite localised but devastating, thereby increasing their impact.
Participants assessing deep-seated landslide suggested the scope of impact would be quite localised, but could 
impact on 20-30 people (4-5 households). Deaths seemed unlikely as there are often warning signs with these 
kinds of landslides and those at the highest risk in Tasmania have been informed of their situation. The scenario 
terminology of a ‘deep-seated’ landslide was challenged as the participants felt it more important to define the 
‘volume’ and ‘speed-of-onset’ of an event rather than its broader characterisation; both shallow and deep landslides 
can be equally devastating. It was recommended the scenario description be adjusted to reflect this in the  
final report.
Participants assessing rockfall quickly determined that it did not fall within the significance of a statewide risk and 
recommended this should not be considered in this or future statewide risk assessments. The scenario described 
dictated the level of human injury at <5 people, so a moderate impact. This seemed too high to the participants, 
but fits within the classification system. No economic impacts were expected.
Economic impacts were seen to be minimal, even in the case of a road closure as this would only be quite 
temporary (1-7 days) with alternative routes available in most cases. In all considered scenarios, consequences were 
considered either insignificant or minor for environmental, public administration or social sectors of Tasmania due to 
the localised nature of any one event. For example, of the 12-20 species that are known to occupy only a single site, 
none are within a suspected landslide zone. The minor and moderate level risks associated with rockfall and broad-
rapid onset landslide offset the potentially devastating effects of a debris flow. 
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Table 9.3 Landslide controls (Str. = control strength, Exp. = control expediency).
Landslide Controls
Material / Physical Str. Exp. Procedural Str. Exp. Behavioural Str. Exp.
Building codes / 
standards
M M Mapping H H Community 
awareness programs
L M
Stabilisation plantations L VL Land-use planning 
schemes
M M Preparedness / 
maintenance
VL L
Stabilisation 
mechanisms
H L Arrangements and 
response
H H Knowledge of 
hazard
L M
Catch fences / barriers L H Household / 
property insurance
VL VL Community 
resilience
VL VL
Drainage control M L Planning controls H H Targeted awareness 
programs
VL VL
Land use planning H H Known landslide 
monitoring
L L
Weather observations H H Education of 
regulators
M L
Monitoring / landslide 
gauges
H H Building Act (TAS) M M
Maintenance of 
infrastructure
M L
Site-specific risk 
assessments
H H
Emergency 
management plans
M M
Landslip zones 
management
L L
Incident 
management 
arrangements
H H
Funding 
arrangements
H H
Exercise programs VL VL
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Figure 9.3 The overall risk of landslide (across all sub-hazards) to each subsector  
of society as determined by TSNDRA 2016. The central position is the confidence-
weighted-average across working groups for both consequence and likelihood 
(confidence implied the expertise of the group). The whiskers represent the  
minimum and maximum ratings across groups. Landslide 
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Figure 9.4 The risk of Landslide – Debris Flow to each subsector of society as deter-
mined by TSNDRA 2016. The central position is the confidence-weighted-average across 
working groups for both consequence and likelihood (confidence implied the expertise  
of the group). The whiskers represent the minimum and maximum ratings across groups. 
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Figure 9.5 The risk of Landslide – Deep-Seated to each subsector of society as 
determined by TSNDRA 2016. The central position is the confidence-weighted-average 
across working groups for both consequence and likelihood (confidence implied the 
expertise of the group). The whiskers represent the minimum and maximum ratings 
across groups.  Landslide  Deep Seated 
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Figure 9.6 The risk of Landslide – Rockfall to each subsector of society as determined by 
TSNDRA 2016. The central position is the confidence-weighted-average across working 
groups for both consequence and likelihood (confidence implied the expertise of the 
group). The whiskers represent the minimum and maximum ratings across groups. 
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9.8 Landslide comparison between 2012 and 2016
9.8.1 Participants
Following a recommendation from the author of TSNDRA 2012, the TSNDRA 2016 process made a deliberate 
effort to engage a larger number of experts, with a broader range of expertise than was possible during TSNDRA 
2012. This could be responsible for most of the changes, which are described below (also see Figures 9.7 to 9.9).
9.8.2 General
Landslide incorporates three distinctly different hazards: Landslide – Debris Flow; Landslide – Deep-Seated; and 
Landslide – Rockfall. These hazards were considered in isolation within TSNDRA 2012 and this approach was 
repeated in TSNDRA 2016. The different sub-hazards have distinctly different profiles and direction of change.  
Also, following TSNDRA 2012, new research has significantly improved the understanding of both Landslide – 
Debris Flow and Landslide – Deep-Seated. 
With regards to Landslide – Rockfall, as it was considered within TSNDRA 2012, it was decided worthwhile to be 
included in TSNDRA 2016. However, it is the recommendation of expert participants that rockfall should not be 
considered in future reviews, as rockfall hazards are typically highly localised, with localised consequences and are 
not expected to ever require a statewide response. Furthermore, rockfall hazards are routinely managed as core 
business of the State Roads division of government. 
9.8.3 People
Landslide – Debris Flow: The risk of debris flow to people remained unchanged at ‘High’. Despite the expected 
consequences increasing from ‘Major’ to ‘Catastrophic’, driven by recent research informing the speed of onset,  
a steady expectation of likelihood resulted in no-change in the overall risk. 
Landslide – Deep-Seated: The risk of deep-seated landslide to people remained unchanged at ‘Medium’.  
Although consequences were increased from ‘Moderate’ to ‘Major’, the likelihood of such consequences was 
decreased substantially from ‘Unlikely’ to ‘Rare’. Deep-seated landslides are often preceded by numerous physical 
warnings that encourage those in the area to evacuate, reducing the likelihood of worst-case impacts. 
Landslide – Rockfall: The risk of rockfall to people remained ‘Medium’, despite a decrease in the likelihood of  
from ‘Unlikely’ to ‘Rare’. The scenario dictated a particular consequence, which must be at least ‘Moderate’; 
however, experts were aware that these incidents happen occasionally and are part of the core business of 
emergency services and State Roads. 
9.8.4 Economic
Landslide – Debris Flow: The risk of debris flow to the economy remained unchanged at ‘High’, with no changes 
to either expected likelihood or consequences. 
Landslide – Deep-Seated: The risk of deep-seated landslide on the economy was increased from ‘Low’ in 
TSNDRA 2012 to ‘Medium’ in TSNDRA 2016 due to an increase in likelihood. Recent research has identified more 
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areas at risk of landslide. Furthermore, lobbying by property developers has limited the capacity of councils to 
implement planning schemes and prevent approval of development within known landslide zones. In some cases, 
areas at risk of landslide that have been developed have not implemented appropriate engineering and hydrological 
solutions to limit future damage or impacts. As such, the risk to the economy is increasing. 
Landslide – Rockfall: The risk of rockfall to the economy remained unchanged at ‘Low’, despite an increase in 
likelihood from ‘Unlikely’ to ‘Likely’. Experts agreed it was reasonable to expect an isolated community to have an 
access road cut off by a rockfall about every 10 years. However, they commented that the road would only ever be 
closed for a short period of time (2-7 days), or alternative access routes would be available so consequences would 
remain as insignificant. 
9.8.5 Environment
Landslide – Debris Flow: The risk of debris flow to the environment increased from ‘Very Low’ in TSNDRA 2012 
to ‘Low’ in TSNDRA 2016, exclusively due to the increase in likelihood of an event. Recent research has identified 
many areas around Tasmania susceptible to debris flow, the vast majority of which are in isolated areas. This 
increases the expected occurrence and therefore the expected impact on the natural environment. 
Landslide – Deep-Seated: The risk of deep-seated landslide to the environment remained unchanged at ‘Low’ 
despite an increase in likelihood from ‘Unlikely’ to ‘Likely’. Environmental impacts are still considered insignificant 
from this hazard as all endangered species are not in at-risk areas (i.e. populated flat areas) or widely dispersed  
to escape extinction from a single event (e.g. spotted handfish). 
Landslide – Rockfall: The risk of rockfall on the environment remained unchanged at ‘Low’. There was no change 
to consequence or likelihood. 
9.8.6 Public administration
Landslide – Debris Flow: The risk of debris flow on public administration was decreased from ‘High’ in TSNDRA 
2012 to ‘Medium’ in TSNDRA 2016 due to a decrease in the expected consequences from ‘Major’ to ‘Moderate’ 
and no change in likelihood. Recent work within councils to identify and manage the risk of debris flow has improved 
the understanding and impact an event will have on a broad scale. Although such an event will be devastating, it  
is expected to be highly localised, with capacity from throughout the State available to assist in response and 
recovery activities. 
Landslide – Deep-Seated: The risk of deep-seated landslide on public administration was increase from ‘Low’ in 
TSNDRA 2012 to ‘Medium’ in TSNDRA 2016. This was due to an increase in likelihood, from ‘Unlikely’ to ‘Likely’. 
Although the expected consequences decreased from ‘Minor’ to ‘Insignificant’, the high likelihood of the event 
ensures a ‘Medium’ risk rating. Experts were aware that government is already addressing deep-seated landslide 
issues, with the expectation this workload will increase with time. However, it was also believed this was within 
capability to absorb. 
Landslide – Rockfall: The risk of rockfall on public administration was increased from ‘Very Low’ in TSNDRA 
2012 to ‘Low’ in TSNDRA 2016 due to an increase in likelihood from ‘Rare’ to ‘Unlikely’. Consequences remain 
insignificant as they fall within the core business of all responsible agencies. 
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9.8.7 Social setting
Landslide – Debris Flow: The risk of debris flow on social setting was reduced from ‘Low/Moderate’ in TSNDRA 
2012 to ‘Low’ in TSNDRA 2016 due to a decrease in expected consequences. Any impact of debris flow on a 
community is expected to be short-to-medium term, with no permanent displacement of residents or businesses. 
Landslide – Deep-Seated: The risk of deep-seated landslide on social setting remained unchanged at ‘Low’ despite 
an increase in likelihood from ‘Unlikely’ to ‘Likely’. 
Landslide – Rockfall: The risk of rockfall to social setting was increased from ‘Very Low’ in TSNDRA 2012 to  
‘Low’ in TSNDRA 2016 due to an increase in likelihood from ‘Rare’ to ‘Likely’. This large change in likelihood is  
due to the consideration of a road closure impacting on an isolated community about once every decade,  
but with consequences expected to remain as ‘Insignificant’ (i.e. an inconvenience). 
9.9 Landslide risk register
The Landslide risk register, presented in Appendix B: Risk Register, was created by the project team following  
the process described in the NERAG 2015. 
9.10 Proposed Landslide risk treatment options
It is important to note that the proposed risk treatment options, presented in Appendix C: Proposed Treatment 
Options, have been developed for the purpose of informing further discussion at SEMC/Management Authority 
level. It is appropriate that these options be reviewed by the management authorities and referred to SEMC for 
further decision. 
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Figure 9.7 Change in Landslide – Debris Flow risk level to each sector of society between 
TSNDRA 2012 and TSNDRA 2016 as rated by the NERAG process. Landslide  Debris flow: change in risk
of each sector between 2012 and 2016
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Figure 9.8 Change in Landslide – Deep-Seated risk level to each sector of society 
between TSNDRA 2012 and TSNDRA 2016 as rated by the NERAG process. Landslide  Deep Seated: change in risk
of each sector between 2012 and 2016
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Figure 9.9 Change in Landslide – Rockfall risk level to each sector of society between 
TSNDRA 2012 and TSNDRA 2016 as rated by the NERAG process. Landslide  Rock fall: change in risk
of each sector between 2012 and 2016
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Section Ten
Pandemic influenza  
risk assessment
10
Image: Richard Bugg, Ambulance Tasmania
10 Pandemic influenza  
 risk assessment 
2016 2012
Maximum Risk Level:  Extreme N/A*
Maximum Consequence: Catastrophic N/A*
Maximum Likelihood: Unlikely N/A*
Average Confidence: Highest N/A*
* Pandemic Influenza was not assessed in TSNDRA 2012
10.1 Context and definition
TSNDRA 2012 included a recommendation to consider adding pandemic influenza to future iterations of the 
TSNDRA. It was noted that human pandemic influenza is a threat and preparedness must be maintained.
A pandemic is an outbreak of disease affecting a large number of people over a wide area, usually crossing 
international borders. Increasingly, pandemic influenza is being considered in the context of natural hazards  
and all-hazards emergency management frameworks. While it is a naturally-occurring hazard, there are two 
important differences between pandemic influenza and other natural hazards, which have important implications  
for preparedness:
1. Most natural hazards affect a defined, often localised area, whereas a pandemic affects a large area, 
with global impact. Accordingly, the Tasmanian response to pandemic influenza will align with the 
national response informed by evidence available at the time.
2. Most natural hazards have relatively short emergency response phases followed by potentially lengthy 
recovery periods, whereas pandemic influenza is likely to have a protracted response phase, with illness 
potentially progressively affecting communities in waves for up to four-to-six months, at least until  
a pandemic vaccine is developed and widely available. 
Influenza is a highly infectious, potentially serious illness caused by influenza viruses. It spreads easily through 
respiratory droplets (for example from an uncovered cough), including up to 24 hours before the onset of 
symptoms. It typically exhibits sudden onset of fever, cough, fatigue and body aches, and is generally seasonal –  
in temperate climates affecting communities mostly over winter months. 
The main controls for influenza are pre-existing community immunity developed by people being infected by 
influenza viruses over time, and vaccine. Influenza viruses are constantly evolving, necessitating yearly updates  
to the vaccine. 
Influenza viruses can also undergo sudden, major changes resulting in substantially new human influenza viruses. 
There may be limited pre-existing community immunity to a new influenza virus and it may take up to six months 
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for vaccine to be developed and widely available. In the interim, illness can spread quickly, triggering a pandemic – 
with illness potentially more severe than seasonal influenza, including in the young, fit and healthy. 
The World Health Organisation (WHO) coordinates global surveillance of circulating influenza viruses and  
monitors the emergence of new viruses that may have pandemic potential. While other diseases may cause 
pandemics, the WHO perceives influenza as the most likely cause and pandemic PPRR focuses on influenza.  
A pandemic caused by another disease may require different treatments and controls.
Workshop participants noted that extensive research continues globally on pandemic controls and their 
effectiveness, and evidence-based recommendations are provided in the Australian Health Management Plan for 
Pandemic Influenza (2014) (AHMPPI). Participants agreed any new controls and treatment options would need  
to be considered in line with national and global evidence and considered by relevant national specialist committees. 
10.2 Previous significant events
When a pandemic occurs, Tasmania will be affected. There were three pandemics in the 20th century,  
and so far there has been one in the current century. The impact of these pandemics is outlined in Table 10.1. 
Table 10.1: The impact of the most recent pandemics and seasonal influenza. 
Event Impact
Spanish Flu (1918) Caused an estimated 20-50 million deaths worldwide (more than the 
First World War); significant community, social and economic disruption. 
Asian Flu (1957-58) Caused an estimated 1-2 million deaths worldwide. Spread limited by 
development of a vaccine; deaths limited by the availability of antibiotics 
to treat secondary infections. A second wave of illness appeared to have 
more impact than the first.
Hong Kong Flu (1968-1970) Caused an estimated 1-4 million deaths worldwide. A second wave  
of illness caused more deaths than the first wave.
Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Caused an estimated 284,000 deaths (potentially up to 575,400 deaths) 
globally50 with an estimated infection rate of 24% and mortality rate of 
.02% of those infected51. Many general practices in Tasmania reported 
surges in patients with influenza-like illness. 
Yearly seasonal influenza Causes 250,000 to 500,000 deaths globally per annum52, mostly  
in elderly people and people with pre-existing medical conditions.
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10.3 Climate change implications
Climate change was not considered for the 2015 pandemic risk assessment. Although there is conjecture about the 
potential for climate change to influence the frequency of pandemics, there is no evidence to link climate change and 
the emergence of new influenza viruses. It is not possible to attribute environmental factors in isolation from other 
more likely influences, such as economic and demographic variables, the rapid expansion of industrial production of 
livestock and changes in population dietary habits53.
10.4 Current arrangements
Effective pandemic preparedness requires effort across whole-of-government. Accordingly, under the TEMP, 
the Department of Premier and Cabinet (DPAC) is the SEMC Advisory Agency for pandemic influenza and the 
management authority for preparedness. DHHS is the management authority for prevention and mitigation and 
response phases, working closely with the Tasmanian Health Service. Table 10.2 shows the management authority 
for pandemic influenza across emergency stages.
Table 10.2: Pandemic influenza management authority across emergency stages.
Hazard SEMC Advisory 
Agency
Management Authority
Prevention and Mitigation Preparedness Response
Pandemic 
influenza
DPAC DHHS DPAC DHHS
Tasmania’s pandemic response will align with the national response. It will be managed within Tasmania’s existing 
emergency management framework using the five potential emergency response levels: Standby, Levels 1-3, and 
Stand-down. Movement between levels will be driven by the command, control and coordination requirements  
at the time. A Level 3 response is unlikely but may be triggered by a severe pandemic.
The incident controller for pandemic influenza is generally the Director of Public Health, who has statutory 
authority under the Public Health Act 1997. If a whole-of-government Level 3 response is activated, the response  
will be controlled by the State Controller (Commissioner of Police) with support from the State Health Commander 
(likely to be the Director of Public Health).
Further detail about the pandemic emergency management arrangements is provided in the SSEMP: Tasmanian 
Public Health Emergencies Management Plan and its Associate Plan: Tasmanian Health Action Plan for Pandemic 
Influenza 2016.
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10.5 Worst-case scenario
It is assumed that pandemic influenza will be highly infectious and spread easily. The worst-case scenario is for the 
pandemic to cause severe illness in a high proportion of people infected. In this scenario, the level of impact may 
be similar to that of the 1918 pandemic, overwhelming the health system and causing significant disruption to the 
economy, workplaces and society. The focus would be on maintaining essential services.
A more likely scenario is a pandemic of mild to moderate clinical severity. However, even if most people infected 
experience mild to moderate illness, as experienced in 2009, some will suffer severe illness and there may be 
significant morbidity that may push health services to capacity for a time and potentially beyond capacity briefly. 
Strategies to support at-risk groups may be required.
Two scenarios were considered by workshop participants, using information provided in the AHMPPI. 
• Scenario #1: Clinical severity is low
 - Most people infected with the virus will experience mild to moderate illness. 
 - People in ‘at-risk’ groups of severe illness (for example, the aged and infants) may experience 
severe illness. 
 - Strategies to support at-risk groups may be required. 
 - At the peak of the pandemic, and particularly for a highly transmissible virus, health services 
(especially GP, emergency care, acute care and respiratory illness services) are likely to be 
stretched to capacity. 
 - The impact on the community may be similar to severe seasonal influenza or pandemic  
H1N1 (2009). 
• Scenario #2: Clinical severity is high
 - Widespread severe illness will cause concern and challenge the health sector. 
 - General practice, emergency departments, hospital services, pharmacies and aged care facilities 
will be stretched to capacity to support essential care requirements. 
 - Heavy prioritisation will be essential within hospitals to maintain essential services. 
 - The demand for specialist equipment and staff is likely to be greater than capacity. 
 - Pressure on health services will be more intense, rise more quickly and peak earlier the more 
infectious the virus is. 
 - Healthcare staff may be ill or have to care for ill family members, further exacerbating pressures 
on healthcare providers. 
 - The community focus will be on maintaining essential services. 
 - The level of impact may be similar to that of the 1918 H1N1 Spanish flu pandemic.
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10.6 Existing controls
A list of Tasmania’s existing controls for pandemic influenza was provided to workshop participants for analysis in 
two groups. It was acknowledged that some controls (for example, the use of personal protective equipment by 
healthcare workers) would be effective at reducing the hazard for individuals and be vital for the health response 
but would have limited effect in controlling a pandemic. When considering the strength of each control, it was 
agreed the focus would be on its strength to reduce the hazard at a population level.
Two particular controls were assessed by participants as having high strength for controlling a pandemic, and this 
assessment aligns with the evidence-based AHMPPI. These are:
• customised pandemic vaccine 
• neuraminidase inhibitors (antivirals).
A number of controls were assessed by participants as having high strength for controlling a pandemic, but were 
generally regarded as less effective by the AHMPPI. While many of these are important activities likely to be 
undertaken during a pandemic to protect individuals and minimise or manage consequences, they may have limited 
effect on the course of an influenza pandemic at a population level because of the highly transmissible nature of 
most influenza viruses. 
Across all controls, four were assessed by participants as high strength but low expediency. A focus on improving 
the expediency of these controls, where possible, is important. These controls are:
1. Tasmanian Health Service primary health facilities (including district hospitals, community health 
centres, multipurpose centres) and flu clinics (when activated during a response)
2. Vaccine, which may take 4-6 months to be developed and widely available
3. Respiratory etiquette (note there is a lack of evidence to support this as an effective control at the 
population level, and there was inconsistent assessment of this control by participants)
4. The Biosecurity Act 2015 (Commonwealth).
A further nine controls were assessed as high strength but medium expediency. A focus on improving the 
expediency of these controls is important. These controls are:
1. Ambulances
2. GP clinics
3. Emergency departments
4. Antivirals (assuming they are available in large enough quantities, able to be administered to patients 
within 48 hours of symptom onset and antiviral resistance does not develop)
5. Business continuity planning
6. Expert committees and networks (Australian Health Protection Principal Committee, the 
Communicable Diseases Network of Australia, and the Public Health Laboratory Network)
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7. Hand hygiene (note there is a lack of evidence to support this as an effective control  
at the population level, and there was inconsistent assessment of this control by participants)
8. Existing health sector knowledge
9. Public Health Emergency Operations Centre.
The Tasmanian Health Action Plan for Pandemic Influenza 2016 was assessed as a medium-strength control.  
It was noted this plan is not (at the time of the workshop) operational and has not been tested; this is a priority.
Participants assessed key public information tools (TasALERT, the Tasmanian Emergency Information Service, 
Public Health Alerts) as having medium strength in controlling a pandemic, noting they may help individuals protect 
themselves and minimise the load on services, but are unlikely to save lives in isolation from other controls or 
generate such high levels of compliance as to significantly stall the progress of a pandemic at a population level. 
However, there was inconsistency in the assessment of the expediency of public information. Group 1 assessed 
public information as highly expedient, with processes and resources in place and routinely used to distribute 
information quickly and easily. Group 2 assessed public information as having low expediency because of the  
need for lead time to ensure message uptake and community knowledge.
There was also inconsistency in the assessment of hand and respiratory hygiene. Group 1 assessed hand hygiene 
and respiratory etiquette as being highly expedient and important for protecting individuals, but having low strength 
in reducing the spread of influenza at a population level. Group 2 assessed hand hygiene and respiratory etiquette as 
having low to medium expediency but high strength in controlling a pandemic. (Nationally, communication strategies 
to improve public hand hygiene and cough etiquette during a pandemic are recommended. This measure is considered easy 
to implement and provides the public with a method of reducing their individual risk. Some studies have shown a mild to 
moderate benefit in settings such as households and workplaces, if practised frequently54.)
Table 10.3 outlines the existing pandemic controls and their strength and expediency as assessed  
by workshop participants.
Table 10.3: Pandemic influenza controls and their assessed strength and 
expediency (Str. = control strength, Exp. = control expediency).
Pandemic Influence Controls
Material/physical Str. Exp. Procedural Str. Exp. Behavioural Str. Exp.
Personal protective 
equipment for healthcare 
workers
M M Emergency 
management 
framework
H H Restriction of 
hospital visitors
H H
Emergency departments H M Evidence-based 
research
H H Public information M L
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Pandemic Influence Controls
Material/physical Str. Exp. Procedural Str. Exp. Behavioural Str. Exp.
GP clinics H M AHMPPI M M Border control M L
Ambulances H M Surveillance M H Hand hygiene H M
Antivirals H M Hospital pandemic 
plans
M H Workplace 
knowledge
M L
Hospital wards M M Business continuity 
planning
H M Health sector 
knowledge
H M
Hospital isolation rooms L L Australian infection 
control guidelines
M L Community 
knowledge
M L
Hospital equipment (e.g. 
ventilators)
L VL Pandemic exercises and 
staff training
M L Respiratory hygiene H L
Healthdirect Australia L H Expert committees and 
networks *
H M Home isolation of 
cases
M L
GP Assist (an after-hours 
GP support service)
M M State Service 
interoperability 
arrangements
L M Home quarantine 
of case contacts
M L
Tasmanian Health 
Service primary health 
facilities and flu clinics
H L State Special Emergency 
Management Plan: 
Human Influenza 
Pandemic Emergencies
L M Cancellation of 
mass gatherings
M L
The Tasmanian 
Emergency Information 
Service
M H Tasmanian Health 
Action Plan for 
Pandemic Influenza 
2016
M M Social distancing – 
1 metre
L VL
Hand, respiratory 
hygiene facilities
L H Tasmanian Notifiable 
Diseases Database
L M Public health alerts M H
TasALERT M H Hospital influenza 
patient management 
protocols
M M
 
   
Vaccine, when available H L Public Health Act 1997 H H    
Public information 
material, signage
L H Biosecurity Act 2015 H L    
Testing laboratories VL M       
Public Health Emergency 
Operations Centre
H M       
* Expert networks and committees include the Australian Health Protection Principal Committee,  
the Communicable Diseases Network of Australia and the Public Health Laboratory Network. 
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10.7 Pandemic influenza risk analysis
Group 1 used the high clinical severity scenario and Group 2 used the mild to moderate severity scenario to assess 
the likelihood and consequences of an influenza pandemic against the NERAG 2015 categories: environment, social 
setting, economy, public administration and people.
10.7.1 Consequence
Participants were extremely confident an influenza pandemic could have catastrophic consequences in terms  
of the numbers of deaths and critical illnesses with long-term or permanent incapacitation, including in young  
and previously-healthy adults.
Participants were very confident an influenza pandemic could have moderate to major consequences for the 
Tasmanian economy, through loss of productivity that may occur with high levels of staff absenteeism across sectors 
during waves of illness. While no specific industry is likely to fail, sectors hardest hit would be the government health 
sector, which participants estimated may incur 10-20 per cent extra costs over a 12-month period, including for staff 
overtime payments, influenza-specific health services, vaccination services and antivirals; and the tourism sector, 
which may experience a downturn in visitor numbers due to a global reduction in people movement.
Participants were very confident an influenza pandemic could have moderate to major consequences for public 
administration across all sectors because of high rates of temporary staff absenteeism due to illness, potential home 
quarantine, caring for household members who are sick or caring for children unable to attend school or childcare 
due to staff shortages. Vital support services, including information technology and payroll services, may also be 
affected at times.
Participants were extremely confident an influenza pandemic would have insignificant impact on the environment, 
and were on average very confident it would have a minor impact on social settings including community wellbeing 
and major cultural events. It was noted the impact on cultural events may be higher if waves of illness occur over 
summer months.
10.7.2 Likelihood
Participants agreed all pandemic consequences are unlikely because using the NERAG assessment guidelines and 
based on intervals between past pandemics, the overall probability of a pandemic is unlikely. It was agreed the 
controls in place are not capable of reducing the likelihood of a pandemic, but could reduce the impact on the 
population in general.
Participants were extremely confident in their assessment of the likelihood of potential consequences across 
most categories (people, environment, public administration, social and community wellbeing, and social cultural 
significance), and very confident to extremely confident in their assessment of the likelihood of potential 
consequences to the economy.
Using the qualitative risk matrix shown in Figure 10.1, participants assessed the overall level of risk for people  
as ‘Catastrophic’, for public administration as ‘Major’, for the economy as ‘Moderate’, for social settings as ‘Minor’ 
and environment as ‘Insignificant’.
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Figure 10.1 The risk of pandemic influenza to each subsector of society as determined by 
TSNDRA 2016. The central position is the confidence-weighted-average across working 
groups for both consequence and likelihood (confidence implied the expertise of the 
group). The whiskers represent the minimum and maximum ratings across groups. Pandemic 
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10.8 Pandemic influenza risk register
The pandemic influenza risk register, presented in Appendix B: Risk Register, was created by the project team 
following the process described in the NERAG 2015. 
10.9 Pandemic influenza proposed risk  
treatment options
It is important to note that the proposed risk treatment options, presented in Appendix C: Proposed Treatment 
Options, have been developed for the purpose of informing further discussion at SEMC/Management Authority 
level. It is appropriate that these options be reviewed by the management authorities and referred to SEMC for 
further decision. 
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Section Eleven
Severe storm  
risk assessment
11
Image: Department of Police, Fire and Emergency Management
11 Severe storm risk assessment
2016 2012
Maximum Risk Level:  Extreme Medium*
Maximum Consequence: Major Moderate*
Maximum Likelihood: Likely Likely*
Average Confidence: High N/A^
*  The 2012 values have been re-calibrated following changes in methodology under NERAG 2015 (see Section 2.1)
^  No average confidence values were provided in TSNDRA 2012
11.1 Context and definition
No single location in Tasmania is more than 115 km from the ocean. This proximity to the ocean results in Tasmania 
exhibiting a temperate maritime climate where temperature is moderated by the surrounding seas. Tasmania 
lies in the ‘Roaring 40s’ belt of westerly airflow. The cycle of westerly winds is a key driver of the seasonal rainfall 
pattern, especially in the western and central regions of Tasmania. These persistent westerly systems are related to 
features of the general circulation of the atmosphere in the southern hemisphere. The principal characteristic of the 
Tasmanian climate is the interaction between prevailing westerly wind and the mountain ranges near the west coast 
and the central plateau, which results in Tasmania experiencing regular storms and severe weather. 
Storms affect all parts of Tasmania; however, as mentioned above, different areas of the State have varying levels 
of exposure to different storm scenarios. The north-east of the State is exposed to slow-moving low pressure 
systems that sit off the east coast of Australia and generate water-laden easterly winds that bring heavy rainfall. 
These systems are known as ‘east coast lows’. The north-east is also affected by the westerly frontal systems 
and occasionally fronts that move up from the south. The south-east is reasonably protected from the prevailing 
westerlies due to the mountain ranges in the west, but is affected by east coast lows, although to a lesser extent 
than the north-east. The west and north-west coast is particularly exposed to the prevailing storm weather. 
The TSNDRA is interested in state-level risks, therefore it was agreed that the focus of the study would be storms 
that are of a severe nature. Severe storm events, although widely recognised as a long-standing feature of the 
Tasmanian climate, vary significantly in their nature and as a consequence have wide-ranging possible impacts. 
As defined by the Bureau of Meteorology, a storm event is classified as severe if it produces one or more of the 
following phenomena: 
• a tornado
• hail with a diameter of 2 cm or greater 
• wind gusts of 90 km/h or greater 
• very heavy rain, resulting in flash flooding.
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11.2 Previous significant events
An analysis of previous significant storm events was undertaken. It was noted that the majority of storm events 
produce localised minor to moderate impacts; however, public concern is usually significant in the face of such 
events. A small number of people have been killed during storm events in Tasmania, with the most severe impacts 
usually relating to roofing damage and damage caused through power loss.
A number of significant events have been experienced across the State over the last half-century, with impacts  
on housing, food crops/exports, transport networks and a number of recorded deaths. Damage estimates from  
a 2001 event in Launceston recorded an estimated $2 million of damage, requiring a statewide emergency response. 
A similar event in 2008 led to 65,000 households losing power, while disruptions to major events such as Taste of 
Tasmania and the Hobart Cup have also occurred. Although beyond the State’s direct control, the storm event 
that hit the 1998 Sydney to Hobart Yacht Race resulted in the sinking of five boats, six deaths and a rescue effort 
involving more than 50 military and civilian aircraft and marine vessels – Australia’s largest ever peacetime rescue 
operation. A list of previous significant storm events is attached to the appendices. The list of recent significant 
storm events is provided in Table 11.1.
Table 11.1 Analysis of previous significant severe storm events in Tasmania.
Event Impact
March 1980 (Hobart) Several houses unroofed and 2 houses totally destroyed due to gale 
force winds. 50% of the apple export crop ruined.
November 1992 (Smithton) Extensive damage to a dozen homes and local infrastructure occurred 
when a tornado cut inland of Smithton. Wind gusts of up to 280 km/h.
December 2001 (Launceston) Tornadoes believed to be present in the storm that damaged 114 
houses in the Launceston suburbs of Summerhill and Prospect. 
Emergency workers came from across the State for temporary repairs. 
Estimated $2m damage bill.
June 2003 (Hobart) A young girl killed by a falling branch at Waterworks Reserve during a 
gusty wind event in Hobart.
April 2008 (Tasmania) An overnight event wreaked havoc across Tasmania, damaging over 
1,000 houses and leaving 65,000 customers without power for less than 
a day, and 1,000 customers for more than a day. Short-term closure of 
tourism sites. Roads closed for short periods. Gusts recorded of up to 
177 km/h. $2m in damage claims by RACT, and similar rates for other 
insurers. $1m repair costs reported by Aurora.
April 2009 (north coast) A line of severe thunderstorms swept over the north coast producing 
several tornadoes, including wind gusts recorded at second highest ever.
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Event Impact
July 2014
(Tasmania)
A series of six cold fronts, associated with low pressure systems to 
the south of Tasmania crossed the State between 27 and 31 July 2014. 
Damaging winds and widespread showers and rain were associated 
with these cold fronts. Wind gusts up to 160 km/hr at Maatsuyker 
Island on 29 August were the highest recorded since 1963.
On the evening of 28 July sudden violent gusts of wind occurred  
at Round Hill.
One member of the public died during the clean-up of storm damage 
on private property. 
1 home was destroyed and 1 caravan that was a primary place of 
residence was also destroyed. 6 primary places of residence with 
damaged and not habitable. 341 primary places of residence were 
damaged including 12 units at the Karingal Aged Care facility in 
Devonport. Damage was reported at the Launceston Gardens 
Villages aged care facility. 2 businesses at Round Hill near Burnie were 
destroyed and statewide a further 9 businesses were damaged.
TasNetworks customers across the State experienced lengthy 
disruptions to supplies. Many roads were temporarily blocked by fallen 
trees or power lines in the north-west region. Only two roads were 
closed for greater than 24 hours. Storm damage was sustained to the 
Launceston Airport car park. Several cars were significantly damaged  
by falling trees. 
Damage was reported to 64 schools across the State. King Meadows 
High School suffered significant storm damage and had to be evacuated. 
Damage was reported at a childcare centre in South Launceston. The 
Turners Beach Bowls Club and Turners Beach Memorial Hall/Scout Hall 
were damaged. The Central Highlands Council Chambers and Hall in 
Hamilton were damaged.
Mt Field National Park was temporality closed due to the falling of 
many tall trees. Cradle Mountain was temporarily closed due to snow. 
A barge washed up on Maria Island. All Launceston parks and reserves 
were closed due to severe winds and for the purposes of protecting  
the community.
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11.3 Climate change implications
Climate change predictions suggest a very minimal decrease in mean wind speed across Tasmania by the end  
of the century55. There is also expected to be more frequent intense rainfall events in the future. While this  
suggests a greater risk of flooding, it is also relevant to a discussion about storm risks and so was considered  
during the assessment. 
11.4 Current arrangements
The State Emergency Service (SES) provides the main storm response capability in Tasmania.  
This is delivered primarily through its volunteer workforce in conjunction with local council arrangements.
The SES is the designated SEMC Advisory Agency under the TEMP (see Table 11.2). Local councils are responsible 
for prevention and mitigation activities, including risk assessments; however, the SES often takes a leadership role in 
respect to coordinating efforts in storms risk mitigation.
Table 11.2 Current arrangements for the emergency management of severe 
storm events in Tasmania. 
Hazard SEMC Advisory Agency Management Authority
Prevention and Mitigation Preparedness Response
Severe Storm SES SES SES SES
11.5 Worst-case scenario
With consideration to historical storm events and advice from the Bureau of Meteorology, a realistic worst-case 
scenario was designed for use in the severe storm risk assessment workshops. The scenario was designed in 
consultation with the workshop participants and was later validated during the assessment. The scenario used  
for the storms assessment was described as follows:
• The storm scenario considered was based on the most potentially damaging storm conditions  
that have been observed in Tasmania. Characteristics of this storm were:
 - A broad-scale active frontal system or squall line moves across Tasmania from the west to east.
 - The storm produces severe thunderstorms and tornadoes that impact upon at least  
one community. 
 - Such storms are quite frequent historically, but usually impact unsettled areas and have  
rarely caused significant damage in the built environment.
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The scenario was designed to ensure that all relevant PPRR controls would come into play, while retaining  
the characteristics of a realistic feasible storm event. While the scenario implies a focus on the northern part  
of the state, the workshop team discussed previous events in the south and ensured the assessment addressed  
the broader state-level risks from this hazard.
11.6 Existing controls
Severe storm controls identified by participants were heavily focused on procedures and processes, with few formal 
behavioural controls in place (as reflected by more generic behavioural control classifications, such as ‘community 
resilience’ and ‘community acceptance’). 
A large number of physical controls were, however, seen to be highly effective in reducing the likelihood of exposure 
to severe storm damage and consequences, with aspects of built form, as well as the enforcement of the building 
standards that underpin the built form itself, seen as being both strong and expedient. The full list of identified 
controls is shown in Table 11.3. 
Participants observed some difficulty in identifying the operating thresholds for infrastructure – particularly drainage 
systems – in coping with heavy rainfall and high wind speeds, with overflows being empirically observed to occur 
frequently but with limited consequence. While a wide range of controls was in place, a notable gap between 
the general strength of controls and their expedience was evident. For instance, SES staff training and Storm 
Preparation Awareness Programs were categorised as being very strong, but under-resourced. Other areas were 
seen as too challenging, for instance participants noted that maintaining and distributing sandbag stockpiles was 
difficult to implement and not cost effective. 
Early warning systems were seen as easy to use, however variability in their accuracy made building responses from 
these challenging. Similarly, Municipal Emergency Management Plans were noted as being up to date and  
well maintained, however lacking in capacity to respond, therefore limiting their implementation. 
Private insurance was again observed to be patchy across the State, both in terms of under-insurance and areas with 
perceived poor levels of general insurance cover uptake. Limits within insurance contracts in terms of the types  
of storm damage covered were also raised. 
The limited use of National Disaster Resilience Grants Program funding to support research into the impacts and 
frequency of severe storms was seen as a weak current control that could be strengthened, with the potential to 
have significant impacts on response processes, as well as better understanding of exposure across the State. It was 
suggested that analysis of the response phase immediately following events, including clean-up, and procedures such 
as Rapid Impact and Damage Assessments, would be of significant benefit in improving their actions both national 
and local governments in subsequent storm events. Community-level and private sector preparations for severe 
storms were also seen as a key limitation that could be improved. 
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Table 11.3 Severe storm controls (Str. = control strength, Exp. = control 
expediency).
Severe Storm Controls
Material/Physical Str. Exp. Procedural Str. Exp. Behavioural Str. Exp.
Drainage systems M M Agency training H L Storm preparation 
awareness programs
M M
Sandbag stockpiles L L Drainage 
maintenance 
schedules
M M Shared responsibility H M
Building standards H H Exercising H VL Recovery advice L H
Planning standards H H Extreme wind 
hazard mapping
H M Media and 
communications
L L
Weather forecasts M H Situation awareness 
by Control Room
M H Household preparation M L
Power restoration 
procedures
H H Insurance H M Community resilience H M
Asset design 
standards
H M Interagency 
coordination
H H Community acceptance - -
Storm shutters H H Local council 
planning schemes
H M Clean-up programs - -
Hail covers M L Municipal emergency 
management plans
M H Awareness of clean-up 
procedures
- -
Government 
generators
H M NDRP funding 
arrangements
H L
Post-event 
improvements
- - Rapid impact / 
damage assessment
M H
Clearance around 
power lines
M L SES permanent staff 
training
H VL
Evacuation centres - - BoM advice 
management by SES
H L
SES volunteer 
training
H H
SOPs for adverse 
conditions
L L
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Severe Storm Controls
Material/Physical Str. Exp. Procedural Str. Exp. Behavioural Str. Exp.
State emergency 
management plans
M H
Storm preparation 
awareness programs
H VL
Storm response 
plans
- -
Warning systems H H
Water Management 
Act
- -
Weather forecasts / 
GIS displays
H H
Weather monitoring 
stations
H H
11.7 Severe storm risk analysis
Relative to the other hazard categories expert participants were notably confident in their assessment of severe 
storm risks, as is evident in Figure 11.1. In terms of economic impacts, for instance, there was strong consensus 
that while combined losses from crops, infrastructure and housing could reach multiples of $10 million, such 
losses were unlikely to reach the $100 million mark required to shift the consequences into the ‘Major’ category. 
Notably, rebuilding and crop loss was not viewed as extending beyond a one year period. The likelihood of storms 
occurring at critical cropping times reduces the risk classification, falling within the ‘Likely’ category on an annual 
basis. Complications arose regarding the impacts of storm surge on critical marine industries such as oyster farming; 
however, the higher of the discussed consequence categories (‘Moderate’) was selected to reflect this. Group 2 
observed that a worst-case scenario seriously impacting on a specific industry sector involved in primary production 
was “once in a decade”. 
Participants cited data that even without severe storms, between five and 50 trees fall each month onto roads. 
Flying debris during storm events was considered a critical issue. Nonetheless, the historical rarity of deaths 
resulted in the assessment that people consequences could reach into the ‘Major’ category in a worst-case scenario, 
with more than five people being killed. Long-term or critical injury was viewed as being more limited (rated at 
‘Moderate’). An increasing population and behaviour change were assessed as increasing the number of people 
exposed, and it was also observed that “...there are always going to be people that will place themselves at risk”.
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While habitat loss was not seen as a direct consequence, the potential to trigger an oil spill through shipping  
was considered by one group. Localised impacts on already fragile species or habitat, leading to loss of value,  
were also assessed as potentially having a minor consequence at a state level. There was also seen to be little  
that could be done by the SES in this area, particularly in relation to remote ecosystems. Groups were split in 
assessing the likelihood of worst-case consequences, with the two categories assessed as either ‘Rare’ or ‘Likely’  
by the groups respectively.
Public administration impacts were viewed to have most impact through inter-state requests for assistance, with 
utilities potentially needing interstate help to return services within an acceptable timeframe. Business continuity 
planning was felt to adequately limit this risk, although questions were raised as to what whole-of-government 
arrangements were in place with regard to back-up power generation. As a result of strong controls and a lack  
of precedent, the worst-case public administration consequences were considered to be unlikely in a given year  
(less than a 10% AEP).
Some disagreement existed regarding the potential consequences for events of cultural significance. Although 
permanent dispersal was seen as very unlikely by both groups, precedents such as Salamanca Markets being closed 
due to wind, as well as relocation of parts of Taste of Tasmania, were viewed as likely consequences, with any 
cancellation of major events such as Falls Festival and the Sydney to Hobart Yacht Race viewed as having large 
potential cultural – as well as economic – impacts. However, in general the short-term nature of storm events 
meant that postponement rather than cancellation was seen to be more likely. Given the different frequency of 
these events (Salamanca Markets weekly; Taste of Tasmania once per year), the groups found establishing an overall 
likelihood for a ‘generic’ cultural event challenging. Both groups agreed that worst-case consequences were unlikely 
in any given year. 
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Figure 11.1 The risk of severe storm to each subsector of society as determined 
by TSNDRA 2016. The central position is the confidence-weighted-average across 
working groups for both consequence and likelihood (confidence implied the ex-
pertise of the group). The whiskers represent the minimum and maximum ratings 
across groups.  
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11.8 Severe storm comparison between 2012 and 2016
11.8.1 Participants
Following a recommendation from the author of TSNDRA 2012, the 2016 process made a deliberate effort to 
engage a larger number of experts, with a broader range of expertise than was possible during the 2012 process. 
This results in some large changes in the economic and social setting sectors (also see Figure 11.2). 
11.8.2 People
The risk of severe storm to people increased from ‘Medium’ in 2012 to ‘High’ in 2016 due to an increase in 
likelihood from ‘Unlikely’ to ‘Likely’. Experts believed the scenario was more likely than previously considered, 
although the consequences were generally unchanged. 
11.8.3 Economic
The risk of severe storm to the economy increased from ‘Medium’ in 2012 to ‘High’ in 2016 due to an increase in 
consequence from ‘Minor’ to ‘Moderate’. A better appreciation for the impact a severe storm can have on forestry, 
aquaculture and agricultural produce, as well as the potential to interrupt or cancel large outdoor festivals, was 
incorporated into the 2016 assessment, increasing the expected consequences. 
11.8.4 Environment
The risk of severe storm to the environment remained unchanged at ‘Low’. An increase in expected consequences 
from ‘Insignificant’ to ‘Minor’ was offset by the decreased likelihood of these consequences from ‘Likely to ‘Unlikely’. 
This recognises the capacity of severe storms to do significant damage to the natural environment, but it is relatively 
uncommon for that damage to be broad scale enough, or destructive enough, to cause ecological shifts. 
11.8.5 Public administration
The risk of severe storm to public administration remained unchanged at ‘Low’. An increase in expected 
consequences was offset by a decrease in expected likelihood. 
11.8.6 Social setting
The risk of severe storm to social setting was increased from ‘Low’ in 2012 to ‘Medium’ in 2016. This was due to 
a large increase in expected consequences from ‘Insignificant’ to ‘Moderate’. The 2016 participants place greater 
emphasis on the risk to cultural events around the State. Many communities rely on large festivals as an opportunity 
to bring the community together as well as to encourage the local economy. Severe storms have historically been  
a risk to such events, reducing visitor numbers, or cancelling events completely. This aspect was incorporated into 
the assessment in 2016. 
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Figure 11.2 Change in severe storm risk level to each sector of society between 
TSNDRA 2012 and TSNDRA 2016 as rated by the NERAG process. Storm: change in risk
of each sector between 2012 and 2016
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11.9 Severe storm risk register
The severe storm risk register, presented in Appendix B: Risk Register, was created by the project team following 
the process described in the NERAG 2015.
11.10 Proposed severe storm risk treatment options
It is important to note that the proposed risk treatment options, presented in Appendix C: Proposed Treatment 
Options, have been developed for the purpose of informing further discussion at SEMC/Management Authority 
level. It is appropriate that these options be reviewed by the management authorities and referred to SEMC  
for further decision. 
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Section Twelve
Tsunami risk  
assessment
12
Image: Department of Police, Fire and Emergency Management
12 Tsunami risk assessment
2016 2012
Maximum Risk Level:  High Medium*
Maximum Consequence: Catastrophic Major*
Maximum Likelihood: Very Rare Very Rare*
Average Confidence: Highest N/A^
*  The 2012 values have been re-calibrated following changes in methodology under NERAG 2015 (see Section 2.1)
^  No average confidence values were provided in TSNDRA 2012
12.1 Context and definition
Tsunami is a Japanese word meaning ‘harbour wave’. A tsunami is a series of waves generated by sudden movement 
of the sea floor, usually as a result of an earthquake56. Volcanic eruptions, landslides and meteorite strike can also 
cause tsunamis. Tsunamis are different to wind-generated ocean waves that only cause movement of water near  
the surface. A tsunami involves movement of water from the surface to the sea floor33. 
In the deep ocean, the wave height of a tsunami is usually less than 2 metres. As a tsunami leaves deeper water  
and approaches shallower waters around a coastline it slows down and grows in height, creating a wall of water  
that can be very destructive33. Harbours, bays and lagoons can create a funnelling effect that amplifies the impact  
of the tsunami.
Tsunami risk is generally associated with large earthquakes that occur in subduction zones33. While Tasmania has not 
been significantly impacted by a tsunami in its recent history, its proximity to the subduction zones that stretch from 
Papua New Guinea to New Zealand give rise to the potential for tsunami activity, particularly along the east coast.
Research into tsunami activity in Tasmania indicates that unusual wave activity has been detected around the 
coastline on at least sixteen occasions since 1852, and that this activity is likely to have been associated with  
a tsunami event57. Geoscience Australia has identified the greatest tsunami risk to Tasmania is likely to be from  
the tectonically active Puysegur Trench area off the south coast of New Zealand. 
It is important to note that earthquakes occur in the Puysegur Trench quite frequently, but they do not always  
result in a tsunami. If a tsunami were to be generated from this location it would approach Tasmania from across  
the Tasman Sea. The extent of inundation would depend on several factors, including the size of the earthquake,  
the size of the tsunami it generated, the shape of the seabed and topography of the coastline.
While not necessarily significant in terms of understanding tsunami risk, it is interesting to note that the first tsunami 
historically recorded to affect Australia impacted Tasmania in 185858. 
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12.2 Previous significant events
As part of the workshop process, an analysis of previous significant tsunami events was undertaken. Due to the lack 
of historical records, unusual wave activity and tide gauge recordings following international tsunami events were 
included in the analysis. A copy of this analysis is attached in the appendices; however, the most significant events 
from a state-level perspective are reproduced in Table 12.1 below.
Table 12.1 Analysis of previous significant tsunami events in Tasmania.
Event Date Trigger Origin Impact Summary
2012 Puysegur 
Trench event
19 Jan Magnitude 6.2 
earthquake
Puysegur 
Trench
Tide gauge at Southport recorded 170 
mm MWH.
2009 Puysegur 
Trench event
15 Jul Magnitude 7.9 
earthquake
Puysegur 
Trench
NZ shifted 30 cm closer to AUS. 12 cm at 
Spring Bay tide gauge, Southport recorded 
55 cm. First Tsunami warning issued from 
new Joint Australian Tsunami Warning 
Centre (JATWC).
2007 Puysegur 
Trench event
30 Sep Magnitude 7.4 
earthquake
Puysegur 
Trench
Tide gauge at Triabunna recorded 200 
mm fluctuations. Reports from St Helens, 
Spring Bay and Fortescue estimates 300-
350 mm
2004 Boxing Day 
tsunami
26 Dec Magnitude 9.0 
earthquake
Indonesia Tide Gauge at Spring Bay recorded 
600mm MWH
2004 Macquarie 
Island event
23 Dec Magnitude 8.1 
Earthquake
Macquarie 
Island
Tide Gauge at Spring Bay recorded 
150mm MWH
2004 Puysegur 
Trench event
22 Nov Magnitude 7.3 
earthquake
Puysegur 
Trench
Not known
1989 Macquarie 
Island event
23 May Magnitude 8.1 
earthquake
Macquarie 
Island
Various tide gauges showed fluctuations 
up to 300 mm
1960 Chile event 22 May Magnitude 9.5 
earthquake
Chile Tide gauge at Hobart recorded MWH of 
460 mm. Surges in NW 
1953 Bridport 
‘freak wave’
14 Nov N/K Bridport Freak wave observed travelling up Brid 
River, approx. 2.4 m high. Damaged jetty 
and one child on beach was drowned
1858 earthquake, 
Tasmania
5 Feb N/K New Town 
Bay
Tidal ebb and flow noted at New Town 
Bay
1883 Krakatoa 
eruption
27 Aug Volcanic eruption Indonesia Tidal disturbance observed at the Huon 
River, up to 900 mm higher
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12.3 Climate change implications
Climate change projections were considered by the project team when determining the likely consequences arising 
from a major tsunami event. Data published by the Climate Futures for Tasmania project suggest a rise in mean 
sea level is expected as a result of climate change27. Any rise in sea level naturally would increase the inundation 
experienced as a result of a tsunami; however, there is no evidence to directly link the frequency of Tsunami with 
climate variability or change as they are discretely different earth system processes. Climate change is a longer-term 
issue, unrelated to the sudden geological movements that instigate tsunami events. 
12.4 Current arrangements
The Tasmanian Emergency Management Plan establishes the responsibilities with respect to tsunami hazard, 
presented in Table 12.2. 
Table 12.2 Current arrangements for the emergency management of landslide  
in Tasmania. 
Hazard SEMC Advisory Agency Management Authority
Prevention and Mitigation Preparedness Response
Tsunami DPFEM SES SES DPFEM
The Joint Australian Tsunami Warning Centre (JATWC) has responsibility for issuing tsunami warnings.  
The standard defined for the Australian Tsunami Warning System (ATWS) is to provide a minimum of 90 minutes 
warning to Australian coastal communities for tsunami-generated earthquakes occurring on tectonic plate 
boundaries in the Indian, Pacific and Southern Oceans. The JATWC is able to issue initial tsunami warning  
bulletins within 30 minutes of the origin time of earthquakes within the Australian region58.
The Puysegur Trench has the shortest tsunami arrival time under the JATWC estimates. It is presently estimated 
that it would take a tsunami from that zone approximately 2 hours from the time of the earthquake to arrive on  
the coastline of Tasmania. This gives DFPEM and other emergency services approximately 90 minutes to respond  
to the initial threat.
12.5 Worst-case scenario
With consideration to historical tsunami and tidal events, potential climate change implications and Tasmania’s 
current emergency management arrangements, the risk study team agreed on a scenario considered the most 
realistic worst-case event. The scenario was used in the risk assessment workshop, and is summarised as follows:
• Scenario: A major fault movement (earthquake of Magnitude 8.7) occurs in the Puysegur Trench  
off the coast of New Zealand. The whole subduction zone at Puysegur is ruptured. 
2016 Tasmanian State Natural Disaster Risk Assessment / Section Twelve / Tsunami risk assessment 145 
Section Twelve Tsunami risk assessment
• This causes a tsunami that impacts the Tasmanian coastline. 
• Current modelling suggests a wave height at a water depth of 100m to be 4.2 m.
• This magnitude of event equates to an Annual Exceedance Probability of 0.00008% (1:13,000 years). 
• The modelling used is based on the event occurring during the Highest Astronomical Tide (HAT). 
This takes into account the potential for storm surge etc. The group noted there was a significant 
difference in the modelling between the level of inundation expected between a HAT event and  
a Mean Sea Level (MSL) event.
Workshop participants were presented with additional information relating to the potential impacts of this  
worst-case tsunami scenario on Tasmania, including the area of inundation, magnitude of wave energy and  
estimated frequency over long time-periods. 
This scenario has been well modelled, with the impact expected to be of greatest severity in the south and east 
of the State. It was noted that there are two other major faults that could impact on Tasmania on either the west 
coast or the north-east coast. Although there is no available modelling associated with these events, they were 
considered throughout the assessment when the geographic location of impact was important for the consequence 
rating that may apply. For example, the relative impact of a tsunami on the Flinders Island community has different 
implications to that of Hobart due to the cultural significance of the region and the limited capacity for preparation: 
as warning systems may not be effective in contacting isolated parts of the community prior to the event. 
12.6 Existing controls
The outcomes of the break-out group review of the tsunami controls survey are shown in Table 12.3. It was 
noted by all groups that there was some difficulty assessing the strength of many controls from a ‘whole-of-state’ 
perspective, especially as the controls have not been tested in the context of a major tsunami. Many of the controls 
for a tsunami have been tested in response to other hazards, such as different warning systems. These controls are 
well developed, rapidly implemented and well coordinated around the State (although it was recognised there are 
still some small communities that remain a challenge to reach in the relevant timeframe). 
Procedural controls in place for tsunami were generally considered strong and expedient, although tsunami–specific 
training and/or funding programs were limited. Recommendations for improvement included more regular tsunami-
specific training for incident controllers and targeted funding to improve knowledge around the potential risks and 
possible mitigation strategies. Tsunami inundation maps available for operational use were seen as valuable, as were 
revised land-use planning schemes that reflect the relative risk of tsunami, or limit development in known ‘high-risk’ 
areas. 
Current physical controls to mitigate tsunami risk were mostly considered absent, difficult to implement, or both. 
Participants thought this was due to the mitigation measures being expensive and politically difficult to implement, 
coupled with a popular perception (and scientific estimates) that tsunamis are of very low frequency in Tasmania. 
Behavioural controls were considered very low across the board, reflected in a lack of systems to promote 
awareness/knowledge of the tsunami risk in Tasmania with regard to how to prepare, prevent, respond or recover 
from an event. These were identified as an area for improvement. 
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Table 12.3 Tsunami controls (Str. = control strength, Exp. = control expediency).
Tsunami Controls
Material / Physical Str. Exp. Procedural Str. Exp. Behavioural Str. Exp.
Sea walls VL VL Community alerts H H Media liaison M H
Coastal 
embankments
VL VL Development permits L VL Tsunami 
education 
programs
VL VL
Building code / 
standards
VL L Inundation mapping L M Maintenance and 
mitigation
L L
Tsunami detection 
buoys
M M Signage M VL Community 
resilience
VL VL
Tide gauges VL VL Maintenance of 
infrastructure
H H Targeted 
awareness 
programs
VL VL
Satellite data VL L Land-use planning 
schemes
L VL
Recovery resourcing M M Tsunami warning 
service
H H
Seismic monitoring H H
Emergency 
Management plans
M M
Incident management 
arrangements
H M
Funding arrangements H L
Exercise programs H L
Agency Training H H
Insurance H VL
Interagency 
arrangements
H H
Rapid impact / damage 
assessment
H H
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12.7 Tsunami risk analysis
The ‘Extremely Rare’ likelihood of tsunami in Tasmania, coupled with the lower-consequence environmental,  
social and economic impacts, offset the potentially ‘Catastrophic’ impacts in relation to death, injury and economic-
industry (see Figure 12.1). 
Workshop participants expressed the highest level of confidence in their analysis of likelihood, as this was dictated 
by the scientific estimate of the return intervals of tsunami in Tasmania (1:13,000 years), although the two groups 
chose to round this value in different ways (one group considered 13,000 years to be equivalent to 10,000 years, 
while the other considered 13,000 years to be greater than 10,000 years). High levels of confidence also surrounded 
the consequences of a worst-case scenario. 
As the Hobart waterfront is an area at risk, it was considered ‘Likely’ >50 people could be exposed to risk of 
death and injury, resulting in a ‘Catastrophic’ rating. However, it was noted the time-of-day and day-of-year that the 
event occurred would have a large positive or negative impact on the number of people at risk, with potentially 
>10,000 people exposed during an event like the Taste of Tasmania. It was therefore still considered ‘Likely’ to be 
>50 irrespective of timing as many coastal dwellings in the south and east were at risk of rapid inundation. Similarly, 
severe injuries were considered likely.
Economic consequences were deemed to be at least ‘Major’, with an expectation coastal industries such as oyster, 
salmon and fishing would experience devastating loss of critical infrastructure. It seemed likely a large event could 
encourage an industry to relocate to another council, state, or even another country (depending on economic 
conditions at the time).
Participants in the workshop expressed concern regarding a lack of knowledge surrounding the impact of tsunami 
on the environment, with highly uncertain responses (except for if the tsunami triggered a secondary disaster, 
such as an oil spill). Subsequently, the project team obtained perspectives from experts in biological and coastal 
morphological sciences. The red handfish was understood by experts to be the most critically endangered fish 
in Australian waters, as it has been found only on a single 70 m reef near Primrose Sands. If this location were 
impacted significantly, that species would be lost (a catastrophic impact), although the impact of a tsunami on this 
reef is highly uncertain. Otherwise, species are expected to be either resilient enough to survive the event, or 
distributed widely enough to recolonise the affected areas. 
Even most threatened marine species, such as the spotted handfish found only in south-east Tasmania59, 
were thought likely to be impacted, but widely enough distributed to not experience extinction. Insights from 
coastal morphology experts suggested that at-risk areas of environmental value are mainly coastal sand dunes. 
Destruction/reconstruction processes are a natural part of these systems and in many cases were expected to 
continue. However, there are known sites where human development has altered (or halted) the way these 
natural processes work. In these regions, the coastal dune systems would not recover and would be lost (which 
would be a catastrophic impact on environmental-value). Discussions with both biological and coastal morphology 
experts revealed a lack of knowledge of how ecosystem-succession following any natural disaster would play out. 
A destructive tsunami may allow for exotic pests to take hold and destroy currently robust ecosystems in both the 
terrestrial and marine environments. For example, it takes many sea urchins to convert a kelp forest into a bare-
rock-ecosystem, but only a small number to maintain a bare-rock environment if the kelp forest has been destroyed. 
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Such ecosystem change would be a catastrophic loss of environmental value, but this was not taken into account 
during the risk assessment, as it is speculative.
Public administration systems were deemed capable of maintaining operations, although external support in both 
personnel and financial assistance from the Commonwealth would be required throughout the response and 
recovery phases.
Major events may be delayed or cancelled in the year of the event, but not indefinitely. Limited permanent  
dispersal, if any, was expected in most communities. However, the impact on isolated communities, such as those  
on the islands in Bass Strait, could be ‘Catastrophic’, especially if much needed assistance was slow in arriving.  
Some participants at the workshop also suggested that if the Aboriginal community on Cape Barren Island was 
significantly impacted and dispersed, it would be a ‘Major’ cultural disaster for Tasmania and Australia. 
12.8 Tsunami comparison between 2012 and 2016
12.8.1 Participants
Following a recommendation from the author of TSNDRA 2012, the TSNDRA 2016 process made a deliberate 
effort to engage a larger number of experts, with a broader range of expertise than was possible during the 
TSNDRA 2012 process. This results in some large changes in the economic and social setting sectors (also see 
Figure 12.2). 
12.8.2 General
The annual exceedance probability of the tsunami scenario pre-defined the likelihood of event. This translated  
into a decrease in likelihood relative to TSNDRA 2012. The fact tsunami can be caused by other geological events 
(such as an underwater landslide) was considered in this assessment by one of the working groups (but not the 
other) and should be explicitly incorporated into the scenario in future iterations. 
12.8.3 People
The risk of tsunami to people was increased from ‘Medium’ in TSNDRA 2012 to ‘High’ in TSNDRA 2016 due to  
an increase in consequence from ‘Major’ to ‘Catastrophic’, despite a decrease in likelihood to ‘Extremely Rare’. 
Experts believed that the rapid onset of this event (less than 3 hours warning in perfect conditions) limited the 
capacity of the emergency services to inform all vulnerable areas or people and as such it seemed realistic to expect 
more than 50 deaths or serious injuries. As the region of greatest vulnerability includes the Hobart waterfront,  
a busy place at regular times throughout the week and year, the evacuation during a large event was also considered. 
The likelihood of the event was decreased based on the annual exceedance probability defined in the scenario. 
12.8.4 Economic
The risk of tsunami to the economy remained unchanged at ‘Medium’ despite a decrease in the expected likelihood 
from ‘Very Rare’ to ‘Extremely Rare’. 
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Figure 12.1 The risk of tsunami to each subsector of society as determined by TSNDRA 
2016. The central position is the confidence-weighted-average across working groups for 
both consequence and likelihood (confidence implied the expertise of the group). The 
whiskers represent the minimum and maximum ratings across groups. Tsunami 
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12.8.5 Environment
The risk of tsunami to the environment was increased from ‘Very Low’ in TSNDRA 2012 to ‘Low’ in TSNDRA 
2016 due to an increase in expected consequence from ‘Insignificant’ to ‘Moderate’. Experts considered the impact 
of a tsunami on the coastal and marine ecosystems and identified a number of potential species and habitats that 
could be at risk. Although coastal habitats have evolved in a construction-destruction-construction cycle, some 
of these constructive systems have been interrupted by human development or invasive species (both terrestrial 
and marine). This leaves the existing ecosystem vulnerable to destructive forces with no expectation it would 
regenerate. Also, a number of exceedingly rare species are only found in waters surrounding south-eastern 
Tasmania. A significant disruption like a destructive tsunami could result in extinction, although this is just conjecture. 
12.8.6 Public administration
The risk of tsunami to public administration remains unchanged at ‘Medium’ despite a decrease in likelihood  
from ‘Very Rare’ in TSNDRA 2012 to ‘Extremely Rare’ in TSNDRA 2016. 
12.8.7 Social setting
The risk of tsunami to social setting remains unchanged at ‘Low’ despite a decrease in likelihood from ‘Very Rare’  
in TSNDRA 2012 to ‘Extremely Rare’ in TSNDRA 2016. 
12.9 Tsunami risk register
The tsunami risk register, presented in Appendix B: Risk Register, was created by the project team following  
the process described in the NERAG 2015. 
12.10 Tsunami proposed risk treatment options
It is important to note that the proposed risk treatment options, presented in Appendix C: Proposed Treatment 
Options, have been developed for the purpose of informing further discussion at SEMC/Management Authority 
level. It is appropriate that these options be reviewed by the management authorities and referred to SEMC for 
further decision. 
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Figure 12.2 Change in tsunami risk level to each sector of society between TSNDRA 
2012 and TSNDRA 2016 as rated by the NERAG process. Tsunami: change in risk
of each sector between 2012 and 2016
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Section Thirteen
Conclusions13
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13 Conclusions
Natural disasters will continue to occur. How we cope as individuals, communities and governments is reliant upon 
our knowledge of these hazards and the impacts that they may have. By reviewing TSNDRA 2012 and systematically 
working through an updated risk assessment and management process, we can build upon our understanding of the 
nature and extent of the risks and therefore improve our control over their impacts.
For governments, this better understanding of risk can help in prioritising the use of limited funds and resources  
in the most effective way to lessen the consequences and help build resilience.
For individuals, understanding the nature of the hazards and the potential impacts will allow them to share in the 
responsibility for preparing for, responding to and recovering from disasters.
Disaster resilience is a joint responsibility of government, business, the non-government sector and individuals.  
By working together with a shared sense of responsibility and focus our efforts will be far more effective.
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Appendix A: Methods
A.1 Initial collation of current controls
Three weeks prior to the workshop series, workshop invitees and relevant experts were asked to participate in a 
‘Hazard-Specific Controls Survey’. A snapshot of the ‘Hazard-Specific Controls Survey’ is shown in Figure A.1. The 
purpose of the survey was to collate a list of state-level controls that acted to reduce the likelihood of consequences 
occurring. These individual responses were collated for review during the workshop. 
Figure A.1 Snapshot of the controls survey used by the review team to obtain data from 
the workshop participants. 
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A.2 Confirmation and assessment of current controls
The collated list of controls was reviewed by breakout groups. Tasks were to identify duplicates, add missing 
controls and confirm the strength and expediency of each control. Participants were strongly encouraged to 
provide rationale and expert opinion for these assessments. This process was worthwhile in itself and prompted 
some interesting discussions. 
A.3 Worst-case scenario consequence rating
These control assessments formed the basis of the central risk analysis activity in each workshop, priming 
participants to be acutely aware of the current controls before rating the consequences of each hazard scenario. 
This ensured the outcome of the process was an assessment of residual rather than inherent risk. With reference to 
an agreed ‘worst-case scenario’ for each hazard, participants determined the consequences level in relation to the 
five NERAG 2015 consequence categories and their sub-categories: (1) People, (2) Economic, (3) Environmental, (4) 
Public Administration, and (5) Social Setting (see Tables 2.1-2.5 in the main document). Each group was encouraged 
to note down key points of discussion and the rationale for the chosen rating. Breakout groups were also asked to 
assess their collective confidence in the rating, using the confidence level descriptions provided by NERAG 2015. In 
the event of a group feeling they lacked the expertise required, the review team followed up with additional experts 
in the weeks after the workshop, integrating these results into the process as a separate ‘working group’. 
A whole-of-workshop discussion and ‘report-back’ session was used to compare the responses of each breakout 
group, discuss common themes and identify, where necessary, any additional experts or departments that should 
be consulted for follow-up information. The group responses were later collated to determine the average rating of 
each impact category, sector, sub-sector and the hazard risk profile. 
A.4 Averaging multiple categorical responses
With multiple responses to the same task during the assessment, a method that accurately averaged between 
groups was required. This problem is deceptive, as it appears simple, but basic assumptions can skew results if the 
data is not handled properly. To illustrate the problem, here are three examples. Using the categories ‘A’, ‘B’, ‘C’.
Example 1
If results are collected from a single working group, there is no problem; values are discrete categorical values: A=1, 
B=2, C=3. This can be easily visualised, as can be seen in Figure A.2. 
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Figure A.2 Example visualisation of simple categorical data collected from a single group. 
Data are non-continuous, discrete values. 
1 2 3
A B C
Example 2
If results are collected from two working groups (or from one group who cannot decide on a single categorisation) 
and a straight average of both groups is sensible (for weighted-average solutions see below), there is a slight 
problem as half values can occur. If half values are accepted, this has the inherent by-product of creating more 
categories: A=1, A/B=1.5, B=2, B/C=2.5, C=3. Visualising this data has three basic methods, shown as Cases 1, 2 and 
3 in Figure A.3. In Case 1, drawing boxes of the same size (plus/minus 0.5 from integers) seems to make intuitive 
sense. However, this is incorrect, as it is impossible to get values less than ‘A’ (or the numeric 1) and greater than 
‘C’ (the numeric 3). So to correctly visualise this instance, Case 2 must be used. This highlights the way the central 
category ‘B’ has been over represented in this visualisation. As such, in the instance of ‘half values’, a decision must 
made either: to always round up/down to return to the 3 categories (see Figure A.2), ultimately disregarding one 
group’s input; or to create the two new categories ‘A/B’ and ‘B/C’ to represent the disagreement between groups, 
as presented in Case 3. Where each is shown as non-continuous discrete categories. 
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Figure A.3 Example visualisations of inadvertent bias that can occur when applying a 
non-weighted average to simple categorical data collected from two groups (or from one 
group who cannot decide on a single categorisation). Case 1 is how it would intuitively 
be achieved if interpreted as continuous values. Case 2 demonstrates the inadvertent 
bias introduced using the intuitive approach. Case 3 demonstrates how in this example 
averaged results should still be treated as non-continuous, discrete values and therefore, 
presented as such to accurately reflect the indecision/disagreement between groups. 
Case 1
1 1.5 2 2.5 3
A A/B B B/C C
Case 2
1 1.5 2 2.5 3
A A/B B B/C C
Case 3
1 1.5 2 2.5 3
A A/B B B/C C
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Example 3
If results are collected from three or more groups (or from two groups but requires a weighted-average), averaging 
values returned can become continuous, (e.g. (1+1+2) / 3 = 1.3333). This means in order to convert continuous 
values back into categories, data-bins of equal size are required: 1 <= A < 1.6667; 1.6668 < B < 2.3333; 2.3334 
< C <= 3. Note how thresholds selected are not midway points between the integers, to account for the fact 
the minimum and maximum values possible are existing integers. The effect of this approach on categorisation is 
visualised in Figure A.4. This visualisation is useful for highlighting the importance of using appropriate and accurate 
binning techniques when summarising categorical data from multiple sources. If the midway point between two 
integer values is used, the first and last categories are under-represented, as the bins are not of equal size. It is 
appealing to keep the continuous values to reflect the relative differences between nearby neighbours; however, it 
is the underlying category that is of interest (‘A’, ‘B’, or ‘C’), not the numerical value used to identify the appropriate 
category. 
Figure A.4 Example visualisation of how appropriate binning of values can change the final 
category when incorporating data from multiple working groups. 
1 1.5 1.6667 2.3333 2.5 3
A B C
CA
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Appendix B: Risk register
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People Deaths Major Highest Unlikely High High High 2 3 1 TAS-2016-BUS-011
People Injury Major Highest Likely High Extreme High 2 2 1 TAS-2016-BUS-012
Economic General Catastrophic High Unlikely High Extreme High 2 2 1 TAS-2016-BUS-021
Economic Industry Catastrophic Highest Unlikely High Extreme High 2 2 1 TAS-2016-BUS-022
Environment Species Major Highest Unlikely High High High 2 3 1 TAS-2016-BUS-031
Environment Value Major High Likely High Extreme High 2 2 1 TAS-2016-BUS-032
Public Administration Moderate Moderate Likely Moderate High Moderate 2 3 1 TAS-2016-BUS-041
Social Community 
Wellbeing Moderate High Unlikely High Medium High 3 4 1
TAS-2016-
BUS-051
Social Cultural 
Significance
Moderate Moderate Likely High High Moderate 2 3 1 TAS-2016-BUS-052
People Average Major Highest Likely High Extreme High 2 2 1 TAS-2016-BUS-010
Economic Average Catastrophic High Unlikely High Extreme High 2 2 1 TAS-2016-BUS-020
Environment Average Major Highest Unlikely High High High 2 3 1 TAS-2016-BUS-030
Public Administration 
Average Moderate Moderate Likely Moderate High Moderate 2 3 1
TAS-2016-
BUS-040
Social Average Moderate High Unlikely High Medium High 3 4 1 TAS-2016-BUS-050
Overall Average Major High Unlikely High High High 2 3 1 TAS-2016-BUS-000
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People Deaths Major High Unlikely Highest High High 2 3 1 TAS-2016-COA-011
People Injury Minor Highest Unlikely High Low High 4 5 1 TAS-2016-COA-012
Economic General Major High Unlikely Highest High High 2 3 1 TAS-2016-COA-021
Economic Industry Minor High Unlikely Highest Low High 4 5 1 TAS-2016-COA-022
Environment Species Moderate Highest Unlikely Highest Medium Highest 4 4 1 TAS-2016-COA-031
Environment Value Moderate Highest Unlikely Highest Medium Highest 4 4 1 TAS-2016-COA-032
Public Administration Minor Highest Unlikely Highest Low Highest 5 5 3 TAS-2016-COA-041
Social Community 
Wellbeing Minor High Unlikely Highest Low High 4 5 1
TAS-2016-
COA-051
Social Cultural 
Significance
Major High Unlikely Highest High High 2 3 1 TAS-2016-COA-052
People Average Moderate High Unlikely Highest Medium High 3 4 1 TAS-2016-COA-010
Economic Average Moderate High Unlikely Highest Medium High 3 4 1 TAS-2016-COA-020
Environment Average Moderate Highest Unlikely Highest Medium Highest 4 4 1 TAS-2016-COA-030
Public Administration 
Average Minor Highest Unlikely Highest Low Highest 5 5 3
TAS-2016-
COA-040
Social Average Moderate High Unlikely Highest Medium High 3 4 1 TAS-2016-COA-050
Overall Average Moderate High Unlikely Highest Medium High 3 4 1 TAS-2016-COA-000
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People Deaths Moderate High Extremely Rare Highest Low High 5 5 3
TAS-2016-
EAR-011
People Injury Moderate Moderate Extremely Rare Highest Low Moderate 4 5 1
TAS-2016-
EAR-012
Economic General Major High Extremely Rare Highest Medium High 4 4 1
TAS-2016-
EAR-021
Economic Industry Major High Extremely Rare Highest Medium High 4 4 1
TAS-2016-
EAR-022
Environment Species Moderate Moderate Extremely Rare Highest Low Moderate 4 5 1
TAS-2016-
EAR-031
Environment Value Major Moderate Extremely Rare Highest Medium Moderate 3 4 1
TAS-2016-
EAR-032
Public Administration Major High Extremely Rare Highest Medium High 4 4 1
TAS-2016-
EAR-041
Social Community 
Wellbeing Moderate High
Extremely 
Rare Highest Low High 5 5 3
TAS-2016-
EAR-051
Social Cultural 
Significance
Moderate Moderate Extremely Rare Highest Low Moderate 4 5 1
TAS-2016-
EAR-052
People Average Moderate Moderate Extremely Rare Highest Low Moderate 4 5 1
TAS-2016-
EAR-010
Economic Average Major High Extremely Rare Highest Medium High 4 4 1
TAS-2016-
EAR-020
Environment Average Major Moderate Extremely Rare Highest Medium Moderate 3 4 1
TAS-2016-
EAR-030
Public Administration 
Average Major High
Extremely 
Rare Highest Medium High 4 4 1
TAS-2016-
EAR-040
Social Average Moderate Moderate Extremely Rare Highest Low Moderate 4 5 1
TAS-2016-
EAR-050
Overall Average Major High Extremely Rare Highest Medium High 4 4 1
TAS-2016-
EAR-000
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People Deaths Catastrophic High Very Rare Highest High High 3 3 1 TAS-2016-FLO-011
People Injury Major High Very Rare Highest Medium High 3 4 1 TAS-2016-FLO-012
Economic General Major Moderate Rare Highest High Moderate 2 3 1 TAS-2016-FLO-021
Economic Industry Major Moderate Rare Highest High Moderate 2 3 1 TAS-2016-FLO-022
Environment Species Major High Rare High High High 3 3 1 TAS-2016-FLO-031
Environment Value Major High Rare High High High 3 3 1 TAS-2016-FLO-032
Public Administration Major High Rare Highest High High 3 3 1 TAS-2016-FLO-041
Social Community 
Wellbeing Moderate Highest Rare Highest Medium Highest 5 5 3
TAS-2016-
FLO-051
Social Cultural 
Significance
Major High Rare Highest High High 3 3 1 TAS-2016-FLO-052
People Average Major High Very Rare Highest Medium High 3 4 1 TAS-2016-FLO-010
Economic Average Major Moderate Rare Highest High Moderate 2 3 1 TAS-2016-FLO-020
Environment Average Major High Rare High High High 3 3 1 TAS-2016-FLO-030
Public Administration 
Average Major High Rare Highest High High 3 3 1
TAS-2016-
FLO-040
Social Average Moderate Highest Rare Highest Medium Highest 5 5 3 TAS-2016-FLO-050
Overall Average Major High Rare Highest High High 3 3 1 TAS-2016-FLO-000
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People Deaths Major High Likely High Extreme High 2 2 1 TAS-2016-
HEA-011
People Injury Moderate High Likely High High High 3 4 1 TAS-2016-
HEA-012
Economic General Moderate Low Likely Moderate High Low 2 2 1 TAS-2016-
HEA-021
Economic Industry Minor Moderate Likely Moderate Medium Moderate 3 4 1 TAS-2016-
HEA-022
Environment Species Minor High Likely High Medium High 4 4 1 TAS-2016-
HEA-031
Environment Value Insignificant High Likely High Low High 4 5 1 TAS-2016-
HEA-032
Public Administration Minor High Likely High Medium High 4 4 1 TAS-2016-
HEA-041
Social Community Well-
being
Insignificant Highest Likely High Low High 4 5 1 TAS-2016-
HEA-051
Social Cultural Significance Minor High Likely High Medium High 4 4 1 TAS-2016-
HEA-052
People Average Major High Likely High Extreme High 2 2 1 TAS-2016-
HEA-010
Economic Average Moderate Moderate Likely Moderate High Moderate 2 3 1 TAS-2016-
HEA-020
Environment Average Minor High Likely High Medium High 4 4 1 TAS-2016-
HEA-030
Public Administration 
Average
Minor High Likely High Medium High 4 4 1 TAS-2016-
HEA-040
Social Average Insignificant Highest Likely High Low High 4 5 1 TAS-2016-
HEA-050
Overall Average Minor High Likely High Medium High 4 4 1 TAS-2016-
HEA-000
H
ea
tw
av
e
2016 Tasmanian State Natural Disaster Risk Assessment / Appendices 169 
Appendices
H
az
ar
d
Se
ct
or
C
on
se
qu
en
ce
  
R
at
in
g
C
on
se
qu
en
ce
  
C
on
fid
en
ce
Li
ke
lih
oo
d 
R
at
in
g
Li
ke
lih
oo
d 
 
C
on
fid
en
ce
R
is
k 
Le
ve
l
C
on
fid
en
ce
 T
ab
le
Pr
io
ri
ty
Pr
io
ri
ty
 if
 m
or
e 
co
nfi
de
nt
C
at
eg
or
y
R
is
k 
C
od
e
People Deaths Major Highest Rare Highest High Highest 3 3 1 TAS-2016-LAN-011
People Injury Major Highest Rare Highest High Highest 3 3 1 TAS-2016-LAN-012
Economic General Moderate High Unlikely High Medium High 3 4 1 TAS-2016-LAN-021
Economic Industry Insignificant Highest Likely Highest Low Highest 5 5 3 TAS-2016-LAN-022
Environment Species Insignificant Highest Unlikely Highest Low Highest 5 5 3 TAS-2016-LAN-031
Environment Value Insignificant Highest Unlikely Highest Low Highest 5 5 3 TAS-2016-LAN-032
Public Administration Insignificant Highest Unlikely Highest Low Highest 5 5 3 TAS-2016-LAN-041
Social Community 
Wellbeing Minor Highest Rare Highest Low Highest 5 5 3
TAS-2016-
LAN-051
Social Cultural 
Significance
Insignificant Highest Unlikely Highest Low Highest 5 5 3 TAS-2016-LAN-052
People Average Major Highest Rare Highest High Highest 3 3 1 TAS-2016-LAN-010
Economic Average Minor Highest Unlikely Highest Low Highest 5 5 3 TAS-2016-LAN-020
Environment Average Insignificant Highest Unlikely Highest Low Highest 5 5 3 TAS-2016-LAN-030
Public Administration 
Average Insignificant Highest Unlikely Highest Low Highest 5 5 3
TAS-2016-
LAN-040
Social Average Insignificant Highest Rare Highest Very Low Highest 5 5 3 TAS-2016-LAN-050
Overall Average Minor Highest Unlikely Highest Low Highest 5 5 3 TAS-2016-LAN-000
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People Deaths Catastrophic Highest Unlikely Highest Extreme Highest 2 2 1 TAS-2016-PAN-011
People Injury Catastrophic Highest Unlikely Highest Extreme Highest 2 2 1 TAS-2016-PAN-012
Economic General Moderate High Unlikely Highest Medium High 3 4 1 TAS-2016-PAN-021
Economic Industry Moderate High Unlikely Highest Medium High 3 4 1 TAS-2016-PAN-022
Environment Species Insignificant Highest Unlikely Highest Low Highest 5 5 3 TAS-2016-PAN-031
Environment Value Insignificant Highest Unlikely Highest Low Highest 5 5 3 TAS-2016-PAN-032
Public Administration Major High Unlikely Highest High High 2 3 1 TAS-2016-PAN-041
Social Community 
Wellbeing Minor High Unlikely Highest Low High 4 5 1
TAS-2016-
PAN-051
Social Cultural 
Significance
Minor Highest Unlikely Highest Low Highest 5 5 3 TAS-2016-PAN-052
People Average Catastrophic Highest Unlikely Highest Extreme Highest 2 2 1 TAS-2016-PAN-010
Economic Average Moderate High Unlikely Highest Medium High 3 4 1 TAS-2016-PAN-020
Environment Average Insignificant Highest Unlikely Highest Low Highest 5 5 3 TAS-2016-PAN-030
Public Administration 
Average Major High Unlikely Highest High High 2 3 1
TAS-2016-
PAN-040
Social Average Minor Highest Unlikely Highest Low Highest 5 5 3 TAS-2016-PAN-050
Overall Average Moderate Highest Unlikely Highest Medium Highest 4 4 1 TAS-2016-PAN-000
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People Injury Minor High Likely Highest Medium High 4 4 1 TAS-2016-STO-012
Economic General Moderate Highest Likely Highest High Highest 4 4 1 TAS-2016-STO-021
Economic Industry Moderate Highest Likely Highest High Highest 4 4 1 TAS-2016-STO-022
Environment Species Insignificant High Unlikely Moderate Low Moderate 4 5 1 TAS-2016-STO-031
Environment Value Minor High Unlikely Moderate Low Moderate 4 4 1 TAS-2016-STO-032
Public Administration Minor Highest Unlikely Highest Low Highest 5 5 3 TAS-2016-STO-041
Social Community 
Wellbeing Minor Highest Unlikely High Low High 4 5 1
TAS-2016-
STO-051
Social Cultural 
Significance
Major High Likely Highest Extreme High 2 2 1 TAS-2016-STO-052
People Average Moderate Highest Likely Highest High Highest 4 4 1 TAS-2016-STO-010
Economic Average Moderate Highest Likely Highest High Highest 4 4 1 TAS-2016-STO-020
Environment Average Minor High Unlikely Moderate Low Moderate 4 4 1 TAS-2016-STO-030
Public Administration 
Average Minor Highest Unlikely Highest Low Highest 5 5 3
TAS-2016-
STO-040
Social Average Moderate Highest Unlikely Highest Medium Highest 4 4 1 TAS-2016-STO-050
Overall Average Moderate Highest Likely High High High 3 4 1 TAS-2016-STO-000
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People Deaths Catastrophic Highest Extremely Rare Highest High Highest 4 4 1
TAS-2016-
TSU-011
People Injury Catastrophic Highest Extremely Rare Highest High Highest 4 4 1
TAS-2016-
TSU-012
Economic General Catastrophic High Extremely Rare Highest High High 3 4 1
TAS-2016-
TSU-021
Economic Industry Major High Extremely Rare Highest Medium High 4 4 1
TAS-2016-
TSU-022
Environment Species Major Moderate Extremely Rare Highest Medium Moderate 3 4 1
TAS-2016-
TSU-031
Environment Value Moderate Moderate Extremely Rare Highest Low Moderate 4 5 1
TAS-2016-
TSU-032
Public Administration Major Highest Extremely Rare Highest Medium Highest 4 4 1
TAS-2016-
TSU-041
Social Community 
Wellbeing Moderate High
Extremely 
Rare Highest Low High 5 5 3
TAS-2016-
TSU-051
Social Cultural 
Significance
Major Highest Extremely Rare Highest Medium Highest 4 4 1
TAS-2016-
TSU-052
People Average Catastrophic Highest Extremely Rare Highest High Highest 4 4 1
TAS-2016-
TSU-010
Economic Average Major High Extremely Rare Highest Medium High 4 4 1
TAS-2016-
TSU-020
Environment Average Moderate Moderate Extremely Rare Highest Low Moderate 4 5 1
TAS-2016-
TSU-030
Public Administration 
Average Major Highest
Extremely 
Rare Highest Medium Highest 4 4 1
TAS-2016-
TSU-040
Social Average Moderate Highest Extremely Rare Highest Low Highest 5 5 3
TAS-2016-
TSU-050
Overall Average Major Highest Extremely Rare Highest Medium Highest 4 4 1
TAS-2016-
TSU-000
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Proposed treatment options
Treatment
B
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Improve the strategic resource-to-risk skills mix (recruitment, retention, 
capacity), including investigating difference models of volunteering 
within the TFS Brigade Network.
Continue the Fuel Reduction Program.
Monitor effectiveness of new Land Use Planning and Building System 
reforms to evaluate effectiveness of delivering desired outcomes.
Review legislation relating to Fuel Stove only areas, Fire Permit 
System and Total Fire Bans to ensure appropriate incentives to modify 
individuals’ behaviour.
Continue the development and implementation of community level 
Bushfire Mitigation Plans.
Build capacity to enable IMTs to manage the likely increased frequency 
and intensity of major fire events.
Continue the Bushfire Ready Neighbourhoods Program. Maintain adequate seasonal fire crew resources across the fire agencies.
Consider outcomes of national review of warnings and review resilience 
of warning systems’ infrastructure.
Develop, implement, review and exercise inter-agency community 
evacuation and recovery plans across the State. 
Continue the Community Bushfire Protection Program with a renewed 
focus on vulnerable groups.
Introduce child-centred household level disaster risk reduction 
strategies in school programs. 
Expand the existing Fire Ready Schools Program with enhanced support 
and incorporate other sites used by vulnerable groups.
C
oa
st
al
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Assess vulnerability of ecosystems and species to coastal inundation. Review coastal inundation evacuation and response plans.
Utilise coastal mapping to assess need for coastal defences. Assess options for managed coastal retreat.
Develop coastal inundation education materials that meet the needs of 
exposed communities.
Improve understanding of the weather systems that cause storm surge 
events to improve predictability and warnings.
Improve the understanding of the vulnerability of critical infrastructure. Improve understanding of how coastal inundation events interact with 
riverine flood events.
Include consideration of coastal inundation in land use planning for new 
developments and uses.
Make coastal mapping available to public.
Improve understanding of the allocation of ownership across 
government, business and individuals. 
Improve beach morphology mapping to understand coastal inundation, 
including post-event surveys.
Review building controls to ensure they are adaptive to changing coastal 
inundation risks.
Ea
rt
hq
ua
ke
Review seismic monitoring network alert systems to ensure emergency 
managers are on the contact lists.
Exercise time-critical decision making processes within the context of an 
earthquake scenario.
Review all hazards response and recovery plans to ensure they address 
likely earthquake consequences.
Improve the coordination and delivery of the National seismic 
monitoring program.
Develop a strategic plan for the operation and management of the 
seismic monitoring network in Tasmania.
Develop and deliver earthquake hazard awareness products.
Develop enablers and capacity for Tasmanian earthquake risk owners. Review the allocation of responsibilities for earthquake risk 
management.
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Identify and anlalyse the location of critical infrastructure within defined 
flood areas.
Integrate clean-up arrangements into emergency plans.
Actively manage riparian vegetation to manage flood dynamics. State to develop a Swift Water rescue capability.
Integrate Storage Operating Rules with downstream flood response 
plans.
Integrate non-government entities into emergency response and 
recovery arrangements. 
Promote the use of Water Sensitive Urban Design in stormwater 
systems.
Build flood capable infrastructure.
Develop flood evacuation plans for at risk communities. Review legal liability of participants in prevention and mitigation 
preparedness, response and recovery activities.
Develop a statewide flood hazard map for use within the Tasmanian 
Planning System.
Improve maintenance of flood mitigation infrastructure.
Raised access routes. Review flood response sustainment capacity of organisations.
Integrate existing capabilities into a Total Flood Warning System. Assess water supply resilience in the case of an interruption. 
Develop and implement a targeted community flood awareness 
program.
Improve insurance affordability.
Develop and deliver flood incident response management training to 
SES personnel.
Review temporary bridge stockpile for adequacy (DSG).
Review environmental risks associated with hazardous uses within flood 
prone areas.
Increase SES Capability and Capacity to respond to flood event.
Ensure appropriate levels of insurance of public assets from flood risks. Locate and design new public infrastructure so that it can continue to 
operate during flood events.
Deliver Flood Studies.
H
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Improve knowledge and understanding of the effect heatwaves 
coinciding with other hazard events have on the effectiveness and 
capability of response and recovery capabilities
Develop innovative response models of patient care to improve surge 
capacity.
Exercise heatwave arrangements with a focus on the public 
administration sector and management of vulnerable people
Improve information about electricity demand during heatwaves .
Identify facilities that can be used as cool spaces during heatwaves and 
establish linkages between operators and emergency management 
organisations
Quantify the effect of heatwaves on vulnerable people.
Develop arrangements to identify and communicate with people 
vulnerable to heat stress,
Incorporate heatwave surge response planning into business continuity 
planning. 
Review community information and warning systems to ensure they 
cater for heatwave messages
Improve community educational information.
Create a stakeholder plan template to aid heatwave preparedness and 
response in facilities occupied by people vulnerable to heatwaves (e.g. 
nursing homes)
Include heatwave in existing preparedness programs. 
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Provide information on landslide hazards and risks to decision makers. Investigate the potential effectiveness of economic and financial 
mechanisms to manage the risk appetites of land owners.
Make property level information on landslide hazards publicly available Incentivising safer sites (charge people less rates and discounts for 
defensive actions by land managers). 
Monitor effectiveness of new Land Use Planning reforms to evaluate 
effectiveness of delivering desired outcomes.
Raise public awareness of the limitations of general insurance relating to 
landslide.
Nuance the exercises for flood / dam-break / debris flow to incorporate 
consideration. 
Conduct research into changes of owners’ and occupiers stated and 
revealed risk tolerance and preference for treatment measures before 
and after natural hazard events.
Further development of Landslide Hazard Banding of the State (MRT). Pro-actively manage landslide areas.
Development mechanisms to support small councils to manage 
treatment across the PPRR spectrum (across all hazards).
Ensure landuse planning and building systems, including appeal 
mechanisms, are transparent, equitable and integrated at the municipal, 
State and national levels.
Increased regulation of landslide risk assessment. Establish arrangements to enable the buy-back of specified landslip 
prone land.
Assessment of council’s capacity to manage land effectively. Undertake local level emergency management planning for areas at risk 
of debris flow.
Develop linkages between landslide risk assessors and building 
engineers/structural works. 
Pa
nd
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ic
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Personal protective equipment (masks, gowns, gloves, goggles) – 
enhance stocktake methods.
Review Tas Govt interoperability arrangements.
Personal protective equipment (masks, gowns, gloves, goggles) – review 
supply/distribution arrangements. 
Encourage businesses to consider human influenza pandemics in 
business continuity planning.
Personal protective equipment (masks, gowns, gloves, goggles) – review 
fit-testing vs fit-checking.
Deliver human influenza pandemic training and exercises in THS and 
other key organisations.
Review Ambulance Tasmania surge capacity. Advocate for an National Notifiable Diseases Database.
Provide training sessions to GPs to improve their understanding of their 
roles, options and obligations relating to human influenza pandemic.
Improve integration of health information systems.
Clarify the relationship between the DHHS and THS in the 
establishment of flu services.
Develop a disaster client record system.
Enhance business continuity planning by the Tasmanian Health Service. Implement a database management approach for notifiable disease 
record systems.
Develop a flexible plan for establishing flu-specific services. Test the Biosecurity Act 2015.
Review and exercise the Tasmanian Mass Vaccination Plan. Implement a social marking program to promote improved respiratory 
etiquette and hygiene.
Review State Special Emergency Plan: Human Influenza Pandemic 
Emergencies.
Relax the requirement for medical certificates in the event of an 
outbreak.
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Ensure people designing and certifying buildings are appropriately 
trained and qualified.
Undertake inter-agency severe storm exercises.
Continue the enhancement of forecast and warning services. Enhance the community development program.
Develop and implement a community storm safe awareness program. Establish emergency services ICT redundancy arrangements for damage 
loss of communications infrastructure.
Review volunteering arrangements to improve recruitment and 
retention. 
Up-skill isolated communities in emergency PPRR skills.
Improve working relationship with the insurance industry to access 
impact information.
Develop SOP for recovery package.
Review interagency information sharing arrangements. Develop and exercise Severe Storm Emergency Management Plan.
Develop capacity to utilise the new high-resolution satellite products 
now available.
Develop a community education strategy for when to call 000, 131 444, 
and 132 500.
Formalise response triage arrangements. Identify and analyse statewide storm hazard risk.
Engage with industry bodies to explore opportunities to better 
understand and manage risks.
Ts
un
am
i
Increase understanding of the Puysegur Trench dynamics to improve 
certainty around the likelihood and magnitude of future Tsunamis.
Deliver updated inundation mapping.
Investigate the costs and benefits in enhancing the current Tsunami 
detection buoy network.
Investigate the costs and benefits of delivering a public education and 
awareness program.
Investigate usefulness of satellite data for PPRR planning. Review current all-hazards emergency management arrangements to 
evaluate if they adequately address Tsunami response and recovery 
requirements.
Ensure sufficient investment in controls across the PPRR spectrum with 
a focus on Prevention and Mitigation.
Extend current tsunami maritime hazard modelling project to deliver 
coastal inundation modelling.
Investigate the costs and benefits in enhancing the current Tsunami 
warning arrangements with signage and audible warning systems at key 
exposed locations (e.g. Port Arthur and Kingston Beach).
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